



Demokracia në Veprim  
Demokratija na Delu  
Democracy in Action



# ASSESSMENT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN



Early Elections for the  
Assembly of Kosovo

7 JUNE, 2026

DEMOCRACY IN ACTION





# CONTENTS

|                                                                     |    |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| List of Acronyms.....                                               | 4  |
| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....                                             | 5  |
| 1. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND SOURCES OF THE ASSESSMENT .....      | 7  |
| 2. POLITICAL CONTEXT AND CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT .....                 | 8  |
| 3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE CAMPAIGN.....                            | 9  |
| 4. ACTIVITIES BEFORE THE OFFICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN .....           | 11 |
| 5. EQUALITY OF THE RACE AND USE OF PUBLIC RESOURCES .....           | 13 |
| 6. CAMPAIGN CONTENT, POLITICAL OFFERS AND ELECTION COMPLAINTS ..... | 15 |
| 7. DIGITAL CAMPAIGN, ONLINE SPENDING AND THIRD PARTIES .....        | 17 |
| 7.1 Forms of Digital Communication During the Campaign .....        | 18 |
| 7.2 Spending on Meta During the Official Campaign .....             | 18 |
| 7.3 Third Parties and Sponsorship Outside Candidate Profiles .....  | 19 |
| RECOMMENDATIONS.....                                                | 21 |

# LIST OF ACRONYMS

|         |                                                                                    |
|---------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| AAK     | Alliance for the Future of Kosova                                                  |
| DiA     | Democracy in Action                                                                |
| KDI     | Kosova Democratic Institute                                                        |
| KKZ     | Municipal Election Commission                                                      |
| KQZ     | Central Election Commission                                                        |
| LDK     | Democratic League of Kosova                                                        |
| LVV     | Vetëvendosje Movement                                                              |
| LZP     | Law on General Elections                                                           |
| PDK     | Democratic Party of Kosova                                                         |
| PR      | Public Relations                                                                   |
| PSD     | Social Democratic Party                                                            |
| PZAP    | Election Complaints and Appeals Panel                                              |
| ZRCKFSP | Office for Registration, Certification and Financial Control of Political Entities |

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The campaign for the early parliamentary elections of 7 June 2026 took place only a few months after the elections of 28 December 2025. The political debate before and during the campaign was shaped by the failure to establish stable and fully functional institutions after the previous process, by discussions on the election of the President, and by political responsibility for the possibility that the country could again go to elections. For this reason, the 7 June election campaign unfolded more as a continuation of the previous confrontation between political entities than as a new contest built around governing programmes.

Frequent election cycles also affected citizens’ participation in the campaign. Public activities by political entities were less intensive, attendance at rallies was more limited, and citizens’ interest in campaign developments was lower. Political entities focused their communication mainly on party rallies, activities of party structures, appearances by leaders, and messages distributed on social networks. There was limited space for direct discussion with citizens, public questions, and scrutiny of concrete promises. The official campaign period began on 28 May and lasted 10 days and 7 hours. However, activities with an electoral character had begun earlier, immediately after the announcement of elections and especially after the certification of political entities and candidates.

The digital campaign carried significant weight in this process. For the five Albanian political entities analysed, 450 profiles were identified, of which 427 were active during the campaign. These profiles published 11,906 posts, while 167 of them had spending on Meta.

In total,  
**6,673 sponsored posts**  
and  
**176,398 euros**  
in spending on Facebook and Instagram were identified. LDK had the highest amount of spending, followed by LVV, PDK, AAK and PSD. A large share of advertising took place through candidates’ profiles, turning online sponsorship into part of the race within the lists.



The equality of the race was undermined by decisions of the caretaker Government with financial effects for broad categories of citizens, adopted during the campaign period, respectively on the eve of Election Day. On 22 May, the Government approved the Inflation Response Package 2.0, which included one-off payments of 100 euros for pensioners, children, non-public sector workers and active students, as well as an increase in allowances for unemployed new mothers. On 26 May, the Government allocated 2 million euros to subsidise air routes to destinations serving the diaspora. These decisions undermined the equality of the race because they were made with public funds and on the eve of the elections, and gave the ruling party an opportunity to use government decision-making as an electoral advantage.

The content of the campaign was dominated by economic and social issues. Political entities and candidates spoke mainly about wages, pensions, allowances, capital investments, infrastructure, energy, education, health, security, the diaspora and Euro-Atlantic integration. In many cases, promises were presented without sufficient explanations of their budgetary cost, sources of funding, responsible institutions and implementation timelines. The campaign remained centred around party leaders and candidates for prime minister, while candidates for the Assembly relied more on local meetings and social networks for the race within the lists.

Complaints submitted during the campaign show that the contested violations were mainly related to the organisation and presentation of public activities. By 7 June, PZAP had received 19 complaints regarding campaign violations, issued 18 decisions and imposed fines in the total amount of 26,100 euros. The use of children in election activities was the most frequent category of complaints, with 9 cases.

The digital campaign carried significant weight in this process. For the five Albanian political entities analysed, 450 profiles were identified, of which 427 were active during the campaign. These profiles published 11,906 posts, while 167 of them had spending on Meta. In total, 6,673 sponsored posts and 176,398 euros in spending on Facebook and Instagram were identified. LDK had the highest amount of spending, followed by LVV, PDK, AAK and PSD. A large share of advertising took place through candidates' profiles, turning online sponsorship into part of the race within the lists.



▼  
**The analysis of sponsorships over the 30-day period around the elections showed that online political advertising also took place through pages that were not official pages of political entities or candidate profiles. Among the cases with spending above 100 euros, support pages, local pages, media pages, private companies listed as payers for candidates' ads, and ads without disclaimers were identified. This made it more difficult to link the candidate benefiting from the ad, the political entity and the source paying for it.**

# 1. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND SOURCES OF THE ASSESSMENT

This assessment complements Democracy in Action's final report on the early parliamentary elections of 7 June 2026 and focuses on the main developments during the election campaign and the period before its official start. Its purpose is to present DiA's assessment of campaign-related aspects concerning the equality of the race, the use of institutional office, the pre-campaign period, online spending, third parties and transparency of campaign financing.

The assessment is based on an analysis of political and institutional developments during the pre-election period, public decisions of institutions, public communication by political entities and candidates, available data on campaign activities, and materials collected by the DiA team during the electoral process. DiA analysed the main developments that affected the campaign environment, including activities with an electoral character before the official start of the campaign, decisions of public institutions with electoral effect, and the way political entities conducted their communication with voters.

During the official campaign period, DiA's legal team followed the complaints submitted to the Election Complaints and Appeals Panel and to the Supreme Court, as

well as the related decision-making on alleged campaign violations. This component was used to assess the nature of election complaints during the campaign, the types of violations reported, and how the election justice mechanisms handled cases of alleged violations by political entities and their candidates.

A separate part of the assessment is based on the monitoring of online spending on the Meta platform (Facebook and Instagram) during the official campaign period. For this purpose, DiA engaged a team of four monitors, who followed the data published in the Meta Ads Library on sponsored ads by political entities, candidates and pages linked to election activities. The monitoring focused on the value of spending declared by the platform, the type of sponsored content, the political entities and candidates most active in advertising, and cases where political sponsorship was carried out through pages or third parties that are not a formal part of certified political entities.



## 2. POLITICAL CONTEXT AND CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT

The campaign for the early parliamentary elections of 7 June 2026 took place in unusual political circumstances, shaped by frequent election cycles and the lack of institutional stability after previous processes. The elections were held only a few months after the last parliamentary elections of 28 December, at a time when the institutions, although they had begun functioning, depended on the issue of electing the President, which dominated political discussions in parallel with the question of responsibility for the institutional deadlock and the possible return to new elections.

These circumstances had a direct impact on the nature of the campaign. Unlike regular electoral processes, the June campaign did not unfold as a full contest for a new political cycle, but largely as a continuation of the earlier political confrontation between political entities.

**The campaign was marked by open competition and by the ability of political entities to carry out activities and communicate with voters. However, its content was influenced by the context of the previous institutional crisis. Instead of a detailed and substantive debate on public policies and the feasibility of programmes, political communication was often built around responsibility for the deadlocks, political legitimacy, possible coalitions and key party figures.**

Part of the public communication focused on the reasons that led the country back to elections, responsibility for institutional dysfunction, and possible post-election scenarios for forming the institutions.

Frequent election cycles also affected the level of political and civic mobilisation. Compared with previous processes, public activities by political entities were less intensive, citizens' attendance at rallies was more limited, and overall interest in the campaign appeared lower. This environment reflected voter fatigue from repeated elections and expectations that the electoral process should produce more stable institutional solutions.

In this context, the campaign was also influenced by the position of entities exercising power at the central or local level. The activities and public communication of officials, as well as decisions with financial effects for different categories of citizens, had a direct impact on the electoral race, mainly because of their proximity to Election Day.

The campaign was marked by open competition and by the ability of political entities to carry out activities and communicate with voters. However, its content was influenced by the context of the previous institutional crisis. Instead of a detailed and substantive debate on public policies and the feasibility of programmes, political communication was often built around responsibility for the deadlocks, political legitimacy, possible coalitions and key party figures.

For this reason, the assessment of the campaign depends to a large extent on the political context in which it took place. The 7 June elections were held in a situation where citizens were called to vote again after a short period, while political entities competed under pressure to show that they could offer a way out of the repeated cycle of institutional crisis.

## 3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE CAMPAIGN

The election campaign is regulated mainly by the Law on General Elections, the Law on Financing of Political Entities and Election Regulation No. 07/2024 on the election campaign, campaign monitoring and financial disclosure. These acts set the basic rules for the campaign period, the organisation of rallies, the use of election materials, the prohibition on the use of public resources, spending limits and financial reporting by political entities. The Law on General Elections defines campaign activity as any gathering, speech, public presentation or other activity prepared to propagate a political message in relation to elections, while campaign expenditure is linked to payments for goods, materials, works or services, tangible or intangible, intended to directly influence elections.<sup>1</sup>

In principle, the legal framework guarantees the right of political entities to campaign and to use media, political events and election materials lawfully. At the same time, it prohibits the use of public resources, namely the offices, resources or personnel of central and local institutions, to support a political entity in elections. This prohibition is important for preserving the equality of the race, especially when public officials leading institutions are also candidates in elections.<sup>2</sup>

Election Regulation No. 07/2024 operationalises part of these provisions by setting rules on spending limits, the organisation of public rallies, the use of campaign materials, the involvement of certain categories of persons in the campaign, election silence and financial disclosure. The Regulation provides that the maximum campaign spending limits - usually set at 1 euro per registered voter - apply to every good and service spent for campaign purposes, regardless of when the purchase was made or the service obtained.<sup>3</sup> It also provides that printed, au-

dio-visual and other election materials, including online materials, must bear the name of the political entity that ordered them.<sup>4</sup>



▼  
**The Law on General Elections defines campaign activity as any gathering, speech, public presentation or other activity prepared to propagate a political message in relation to elections, while it relates campaign spending to payments for goods, materials, works or services, tangible or intangible, that are intended to directly influence the elections.**

1 Law No. 08/L-228 on General Elections in the Republic of Kosovo, Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo, No. 14/2023, Articles 1, 2 and 3; Election Regulation No. 07/2024 on the Election Campaign, Monitoring of the Election Campaign and Financial Disclosure, Central Election Commission, 15 August 2024, Article 1.  
2 Law No. 08/L-228 on General Elections in the Republic of Kosovo, Article 4, paragraph 1, subparagraphs 1.5, 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8; Election Regulation No. 07/2024, Articles 5 and 6.  
3 Law No. 08/L-228 on General Elections in the Republic of Kosovo, Article 3, paragraph 1, subparagraph 1.45; Election Regulation No. 07/2024, Article 3.  
4 Law No. 08/L-228 on General Elections in the Republic of Kosovo, Chapter VIII, in particular Article 48 on the fair and impartial representation of political entities in political discussion programmes and debates; IMC Regulation KPM-2024/03 on the Obligations of Media Service Providers during the Election Campaign.





However, the current framework is more developed for traditional forms of campaigning than for the digital campaign. Although the law and the regulation use broad formulations such as online services or materials, social networks and coverage of digital campaigns, they do not contain specific regulation of online political advertising.<sup>5</sup> There are also insufficient rules on the prior declaration of pages and profiles used for campaigning, identification of the sponsor of online political content, timely reporting of spending on digital ads, or the distinction between regular political communication and electoral sponsorship on platforms such as Meta, TikTok or other social networks.

The legal framework also does not fully address the financing and expenditures of individual candidates. The Regulation provides that candidates' expenditures are made by the political entity on whose behalf they were certified, while candidates may not receive direct donations except through the political entity. At the same time, candidates may receive in-kind contributions for expenses made on their behalf, including social networks, media, promotional materials and other expenses, which they must declare to the political entity and which are then included as campaign expenditures of the entity.<sup>6</sup> This model places formal responsibility on the political entity, but does not ensure sufficient public transparency for spending at candidate level, especially in open-list

contests where candidates compete within the same list.

An even more visible legal gap remains the lack of regulation of third-party campaigning. Election legislation recognises the political entity as the main holder of rights and obligations during the campaign, while financial rules are built mainly around certified entities and, indirectly, their candidates.<sup>7</sup> External actors, such as unofficial pages, online groups, individuals, influencers, informal organisations or legal persons that may sponsor content in favour of or against political entities and candidates, are not regulated as a separate category of the election campaign. As a result, their spending may remain outside regular financial reporting, even when the content has a potentially direct electoral effect.

Another limitation of the current framework relates to the pre-campaign period. The law and the regulation link most obligations to the official campaign period, while political activities with an electoral character carried out before that period remain less regulated in terms of reporting, oversight and restrictions. This creates room for political entities and candidates to campaign before the official start of the campaign, without the same level of financial control, obligations and standards that apply during the official period.

## 4. ACTIVITIES BEFORE THE OFFICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN

The official campaign period for the early parliamentary elections of 7 June 2026 was set to last 10 days and 7 hours, from 28 May until 7 June at 06:59. This timeframe was set in the election activities plan, adopted after the announcement of the early elections. The same plan also set the deadlines for declaring participation by parties, forming coalitions, certifying political entities, submitting and verifying candidate lists, out-of-country voting, accreditation of observers and other activities of the process.

Although the official campaign began on 28 May, activities with an electoral character started earlier, immediately after the announcement of elections and later after the certification of political entities and candidates. From late April and the first days of May, the public space saw party decisions on candidates for prime minister, discussions on coalitions, presentations of lists, calls for electoral unity and communication oriented directly towards the 7 June elections.

This phase intensified after 12 May, when political entities began publishing candidate lists. On 16 May, the CEC certified 902 candidates for the Assembly from 21 political entities. Of these entities, 17 were political parties, three were coalitions and one was an independent candidate. Of the total number of candidates, 593 were men and 309 were women. Certification opened the most visible phase of the race before the official campaign, because the entities and candidates now had confirmed lists, ballot numbers and the basis to direct communication towards voters.

LDK published its list of 110 candidates on 12 May, accompanying the presentation with messages on strong institutions, development and a Western orientation. PDK published its candidate list on 13 May, emphasising new entries, the professional composition of the list and the public engagement of candidates. After the certification of candidates and the ordering of entities on the ballot, electoral numbers became part of early electoral communication. LVV ran with number 116, LDK with 113, PDK with 125 and AAK with 128, while the entities used these numbers in public messages, graphics, posts and calls for mobilisation. During this period, LVV presented its candidates in Gjakova on 17 May, while AAK presented the slogan "Security, Energy, Development" on 24 May, linking it to its programme priorities for the 7 June elections.

The pre-campaign also took place through meetings with party structures and citizens. Media and social media posts showed activities by branches and public meetings before the official start of the campaign, including the participation of party leaders in locally organised events with messages linked to the 7 June result.

In practice, the pre-campaign created an additional mobilisation period of at least two weeks between the certification of candidates and the formal start of the campaign. During this time, political entities presented candidates, lists, ballot numbers, slogans and parts of their political offer. Individual candidates, especially in the main Albanian political entities, used the same period to build their personal profile, communicate with local structures and increase their visibility on social networks.

<sup>5</sup> Election Regulation No. 07/2024, Article 14, paragraph 1, subparagraph 1.6, where "activities related to media and digital campaign coverage" are included as campaign expenditures; *ibid.*, Article 18, paragraph 1, subparagraph d, where monitoring by the IMC also includes digital communication and social networks.

<sup>6</sup> Election Regulation No. 07/2024, Article 10, paragraphs 7 and 8, which stipulate that candidates running on the list of a political entity may not receive donations directly, while independent candidates may receive donations directly.

<sup>7</sup> Election Regulation No. 07/2024, Article 15, paragraph 1, which establishes the obligation of a certified political entity to submit the campaign financial report no later than 30 calendar days after the certification of the final results by the CEC.

The official campaign period for the early parliamentary elections of June 7, 2026 was set to last

**10 DAYS AND 7 HOURS,**  
from May 28 to June 7 at 06:59.

On May 16, the CEC certified 902 candidates for deputies from 21 political entities.  
Of these entities:



**17 WERE POLITICAL PARTIES**



**3 COALITIONS**



**1 INDEPENDENT CANDIDATE**

From the total number of candidates:



**593 MEN**



**309 WOMEN**

The pre-campaign was particularly visible on social networks, where the official pages of political entities and candidates' profiles were used to publish photos and videos from meetings, share political pledges and promote individual candidates. This was more pronounced because of the open-list race and up to 10 preferential votes, where candidates competed not only for the result of the political entity, but also for their position within the list.

This form of communication affected the race within political entities. The early presentation of candidates, use of numbers, publication of meetings and online communication before the official campaign influenced the initial positioning of candidates. Candidates with greater access to party structures, communication teams, local support or financial capacity were able to start their personal race earlier and with greater visibility.

The current legal framework links most obligations to the official campaign period. For this reason, activities with an electoral character before 28 May remained less covered by rules on financial reporting, institutional oversight and restrictions on the use of public resources. This is important especially for activities that have a cost, such as organising meetings, producing promotional materials, managing pages, producing digital content and online sponsorship.

The absence of regulation of the pre-campaign created room for inequality in the race. Entities with greater financial, organisational or institutional capacities were able to extend the campaign beyond the official period and begin mobilisation earlier. At the same time, expenses related to this phase remained less transparent to the public and to oversight institutions.

## 5. EQUALITY OF THE RACE AND USE OF PUBLIC RESOURCES

The equality of the race was one of the most problematic aspects of the 7 June election campaign. Political entities carried out their activities without major obstacles and in a generally competitive environment, but decisions of the caretaker Government in the days before the official start of the campaign undermined equality among contestants. These decisions created an advantage for the entity leading the executive, giving it the opportunity to communicate concrete budgetary benefits at a time when other political entities could offer only programme pledges.

The Law on General Elections provides that political entities have the right to campaign and to have equal opportunities in the media, public funds and other forms of support. The same law prohibits the use of public offices, resources or personnel of central and local institutions to support a political entity in elections. Election Regulation No. 07/2024 repeats this prohibition and extends it to the resources of public institutions at both the central and local levels.

In the 7 June elections, the use of public resources appeared beyond classic forms, such as the use of offices, vehicles or public personnel for party activities. The main cases relate to budgetary decision-making on the eve of the campaign and to the public communication of officials who simultaneously exercised institutional functions and had a central role in the race.

Specifically, the equality of the race was undermined by decisions of the caretaker Government with a direct financial effect on broad categories of citizens, adopted in the days before the official start of the campaign. The decisions were made after elections had been announced, political entities had entered the race and candidates had been certified.

In the June 7 elections, the use of public resources appeared beyond the classic forms, such as the use of offices, vehicles or public personnel for party activities. The main cases are related to budgetary decision-making on the eve of the campaign and to the public communication of officials who simultaneously exercised institutional functions and had a central role in the race.

On May 22, six days before the start of the official campaign and 16 days before the vote, the incumbent Government approved the Inflation Response Package 2.0. The package included a one-time support of 100 euros for pensioners, children, non-public sector workers and active students. For pensioners and children, the payment was announced without application, while for non-public sector workers and students, the opening of the application was announced the following week.



On 22 May, six days before the start of the official campaign and 16 days before voting, the caretaker Government approved the Inflation Response Package 2.0. The package included one-off support of 100 euros for pensioners, children, non-public sector workers and active students. Payments for pensioners and children were announced without application, while applications for non-public sector workers and students were announced for the following week. At the same meeting, an increase in allowances for unemployed new mothers from 325 to 500 euros per month was also approved.

This package acquired electoral weight because of the timing of its approval, the scope of beneficiary categories and the public communication that accompanied it. The decision was taken on the eve of the campaign, covered large categories of citizens and was communicated at a time when the political race was active. The caretaker Government's financial measure became part of the electoral discourse and gave the ruling entity the opportunity to present concrete budgetary support before the start of the official campaign.

Four days later, on 26 May, the caretaker Government allocated 2 million euros for the implementation of the "Diaspora Support" measure, through subsidies for air routes to destinations serving Kosovo's diaspora.

The decision was taken two days before the official start of the campaign. According to public reports, the measure was linked to flight routes to destinations such as Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Turkey, Belgium, France, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark, while the programme envisaged a subsidy of 3 to 6 euros per passenger, depending on the criteria for operating the flights.

This decision also produced a political effect in the race. Voters outside Kosovo were an active part of the electoral process through voting in diplomatic missions, postal voting and the possibility of travelling to Kosovo to vote at their polling stations. The subsidy of air routes on the eve of the campaign was directly linked to a category of voters important to the electoral process and became part of the political debate before Election Day.

Both decisions placed the ruling party, which led the caretaker Government, in a more favourable position compared with other political entities. Opposition entities could present promises on social policies, financial support or diaspora measures, while the caretaker Government was able to take concrete decisions, allocate budgetary funds and communicate them to voters. This difference between an electoral promise and a budgetary decision during elections damaged the equality of the race.

## 6. CAMPAIGN CONTENT, POLITICAL OFFERS AND ELECTION COMPLAINTS

The official campaign for the 7 June elections took place over a very short period, lasting 10 days and 7 hours. Because of this limited timeframe, political entities concentrated their campaigns on quick mobilisation messages, main rallies, appearances by leaders and intensive communication on social networks. The campaign had a more mobilising character, with less space for detailed discussion of programmes, the feasibility of promises and governance priorities.

The political context had a direct impact on the level of civic mobilisation. The 7 June elections were the third national-level electoral process within roughly sixteen months. This was reflected in voter fatigue, more limited participation in public activities and lower public interest in campaign developments. This fatigue was also visible in the way political entities built their communication with citizens. Instead of broad meetings or discussions with different social groups, the campaign was dominated by narrower party rallies, activities of party structures and communication by campaign headquarters. Citizens were treated mainly as an audience for the messages of political entities, while space for questions, local confrontation, debate on concrete promises and direct involvement in discussion remained limited.

The content of the campaign was dominated by economic and social issues. Political entities and candidates spoke mainly about wage increases, pensions, social allowances, capital investments, infrastructure, energy, education, health, security, the diaspora and Euro-Atlantic integration. These issues were present in rallies, interviews, debates and social media posts. Although they were important to citizens, the way they were presented often remained at the level of general pledges. In many cases, explanations were missing on budgetary costs, sources of funding, institutions responsible for implementation and concrete timelines.

Instead of comparison and direct programme debates, part of the debate was built around key party figures, responsibility for the institutional deadlock, possible post-election coalitions and differences between leaders. This made the campaign more a race for political trust than a full debate on how public policies would be implemented. Even when candidates presented concrete measures on energy, economic development, fiscal policies or investments, these were often associated with criticism of political opponents.

The campaign was also characterised by a high level of political centralisation. The main messages were built around party leaders and candidates for prime minister, while individual candidates appeared more as part of leaders' teams than as carriers or promoters of distinct political offers. This was particularly visible among the main Albanian political entities, where public communication was oriented around the main party figures, central slogans and large party activities.

This centralisation also affected the visibility of candidates for the Assembly. Although the electoral system with open lists and up to 10 preferential votes makes the candidates' race very important, the campaign of political entities remained focused on political leaders and the general party message. Individual candidates relied more on social networks, local meetings and personal activities to build their profile. This created large differences between candidates with access to structures, communication teams and financial resources, and candidates with more limited opportunities for promotion.



In terms of political communication, the campaign was generally calmer than some previous processes. Political entities held rallies and public activities without serious incidents that would have obstructed the race. However, public communication also included harsh political language, labelling, personal accusations and clashes between representatives of political entities. These cases did not dominate the entire campaign, but they affected the quality of debate and shifted attention from programme content to inter-party confrontation.

Part of the standard of campaign communication was also reflected in complaints submitted to PZAP. By 7 June 2026, PZAP had received 19 complaints related to violations committed during the campaign by political entities. In these cases, 18 decisions were issued, of which 9 were approved, 7 rejected, one complaint dismissed as inadmissible and one dismissed as out of time. For established violations of the Code of Conduct during the campaign, PZAP imposed fines in the total amount of only 26,100 euros, a gradual but significant decrease compared with the 2025 elections.

Complaints during the campaign mainly concerned the use of children in election activities, placement of election materials in public spaces, distribution or display of materials in or near voting centres, incitement to hatred, use of public resources and holding a political rally with-

out notification to the Municipal Election Commission. In terms of structure, 9 cases concerned the use of children in the campaign, 3 concerned placement of election material in public spaces, 3 concerned materials in or near voting centres, 2 concerned incitement to hatred, 1 concerned use of public resources and 1 concerned a political rally held without notification to the MEC.

The use of children was the most frequent category of complaints and most of the fines imposed during the campaign were related to this practice. This shows that the inclusion of children in public activities and promotional materials remains present in campaigns, despite restrictions set out in election rules. Election Regulation No. 07/2024 prohibits the engagement of persons under the age of 15 in an election campaign, while for persons aged 16 to 18 it allows participation only voluntarily and outside school hours.

Overall, the 7 June campaign took place without serious obstacles to the activity of political entities, but remained limited in civic inclusion, centred around leaders and oriented more towards quick mobilisation than towards in-depth programme debate. The complaints submitted during the campaign show that the main contested violations related more to the organisation and presentation of public activities than to direct obstruction of political competition.



## 7. DIGITAL CAMPAIGN, ONLINE SPENDING AND THIRD PARTIES


The 7 June election campaign confirmed that social networks have become an inseparable part of electoral competition in Kosovo. In an official campaign lasting only around 10 days, political entities and candidates used the Meta platform (Facebook and Instagram) to increase their digital presence and distribute quick mobilisation messages. TikTok was used less, but remained important for distributing short videos, fragments from rallies and content with a more emotional character.

The use of online advertising was evident in earlier electoral processes as well. During the 2025 local elections, early campaigning by candidates on social networks, the lack of clear labelling of sponsored content and considerable spending on Meta had been observed. The 7 June elections reconfirmed this trend at the parliamentary level, but were distinguished by the fact that advertising was not concentrated only on the official pages of political entities, but was spread more across candidates' profiles.

DiA monitored around 500 profiles on social networks, including the official profiles of the main parties, their candidates and candidates of entities from non-majority communities. Of these, 432 profiles had at least one post during the official campaign period. In total, 11,951 posts were identified, of which 6,970 were posts with photos or text graphics, 3,485 were videos from campaign meetings and activities, and 1,606 others were productions, including creative videos produced for social networks by specialised teams.

In terms of paid sponsorships, 166 of the monitored profiles had spending identified on Meta. The monitoring shows that more than half (6,661 in total) of the posts identified during the campaign were sponsored, with an overall recorded value of around 170 thousand euros. It is also clearly evident that the online campaign was used as a separate channel for promotion, especially by individual candidates competing for preferential votes.

The digital campaign took place in parallel with rallies, local meetings and public appearances by political entities. The official party pages were used for the central campaign messages, publication of rallies, distribution of videos of leaders and repetition of the main slogans. Candidates' profiles, on the other hand, were used to build personal profiles, present field meetings, publish list numbers, show local support and link candidates with specific communities of voters. For this reason, online communication became much more personal than the official party campaign communication. In many cases, posts did not aim to explain the entity's programme, but to show the candidate's presence on the ground and closeness to specific groups of voters.



7.1 Forms of Digital Communication During the Campaign

Online communication by political entities and candidates was built around four main forms, including photo posts from meetings, graphics with short messages, videos from rallies and videos produced specifically for social networks. The official party pages served for general campaign messages, the publication of rallies and the repetition of central slogans. Candidates' profiles were used in a more personal way, including posts about their list number, calls for votes, local-level meetings, photos with citizens and support from party figures or other public figures.

Of the 11,951 posts identified, LVV and its candidates had 3,755 posts, followed by LDK and its candidates with 3,582 posts, PDK and its candidates with 2,464 posts, AAK and its candidates with 1,874 posts, and PSD and its candidates with 231 posts. These data show large differences between entities and within the lists themselves. While LVV and LDK had the highest number of posts, PDK had fewer posts than LVV and LDK, although some of its candidates were among the most active at individual level. AAK had a lower number of posts, with more pronounced activity by the central page and several key candidates. PSD, although with only 7 profiles - including the main page and the pages of its six candidates - had a high pace of publication and extensive use of video relative to the size of the monitored group.

Visual content dominated communication on social networks, with photo posts or text graphics being the most frequently used format, especially for publishing meetings, quotes, candidate numbers and short messages. Videos from meetings were used to multiply the effect of physical activities, turning one rally or local visit into several separate posts. Creative videos were used less often in number, but were important for candidates who invested in more developed materials, with editing, music, subtitles, calls for votes and formats adapted for Facebook and Instagram Reels.



As regards candidates, some posted every day, produced videos, used specific graphics and purchased paid ads. Other candidates relied mainly on organic posts, sharing the activities of the entity or photos from local meetings. In this form, social networks served as an extension of the race within the lists. The official pages of entities contained the central message and, in some cases, those of party leaders, while candidates' profiles personalised the campaign. The analysis of the types of posts by candidates shows that a significant number of candidates had PR teams, photographers, designers and prepared videos.

7.2 Spending on Meta During the Official Campaign<sup>8</sup>

For the five Albanian political entities included in the monitoring, the data covered 450 profiles of political entities and candidates. Of these, 427 profiles had published activity during the official campaign period, while 167 profiles had spending identified on Meta. In total, the monitoring identified 11,906 posts and 6,673 ads or sponsorship units, with a total value of 176,398 euros.

In the breakdown by entities and their candidates, LDK had the highest amount of spending on Meta. Of 111 LDK profiles, 55 had identified sponsorship. Total spending reached 68,433 euros, or 38.8% of the total for the five Albanian political entities. LDK was followed by LVV with 50,274 euros (28.5% of the total), from 54 profiles with sponsorship. PDK followed with 32,975 euros from 36 profiles with sponsorship, AAK had 19,309 euros from 17 profiles, while PSD had 5,407 euros from 5 profiles.

In relation to the number of monitored profiles, PSD had the highest average spending per profile. PSD profiles spent an average of 772 euros per profile, followed by LDK with 617 euros, LVV with 453 euros, PDK with 300 euros and AAK with 174 euros.

| Entity | Spending profiles                                                                                    | Sponsored posts                                                                               | Meta spending                                                                                    |
|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| LDK    | <br>55 Profiles   | <br>2,551  | <br>€68,433   |
| LVV    | <br>54 Profiles   | <br>2,125  | <br>€50,274   |
| PDK    | <br>36 Profiles  | <br>1,069 | <br>€32,975  |
| AAK    | <br>17 Profiles | <br>806  | <br>€19,309 |
| PSD    | <br>5 Profiles  | <br>122  | <br>€5,407  |
| Total  | 167                                                                                                  | 6,673                                                                                         | €176,398                                                                                         |

Spending was distributed differently within each entity. Candidates from LDK and LVV had a large number of profiles with sponsorship, almost half of the monitored lists. In LDK, 55 profiles had sponsorship spending, followed by LVV with 54, PDK with 36, AAK with only 17, and PSD, where 5 profiles had sponsorship.

The ten profiles with the highest spending during the official campaign were the official LDK page with 14,359 euros, Uran Ismaili with 8,177 euros, Ardian Gjini with 7,197 euros, Alisa Jetullahu with 6,996 euros, the official LVV page with 6,721 euros, Lumir Abdixhiku with 5,620 euros, Vjosa Osmani Sadriu with 5,293 euros, Bekim Haxhiu with 5,036 euros, Alban Bajrami with 4,954 euros and Albena Reshitaj

<sup>8</sup> To measure paid advertising on Facebook and Instagram, DiA used Meta Ads Library as the data source for political advertisements published during the official campaign period. Meta Ads Library enables searches of advertisements displayed on Meta platforms and stores advertisements related to social issues, elections or politics for a period of seven years.



with 4,124 euros. Together, these ten profiles spent 68,477 euros, or around 40% of all spending on Meta during the official campaign.

The average spending per sponsored post was around 26 euros per day. PSD and its candidates had the highest average investment in sponsorship, with around 44 euros per sponsored post. They were followed by PDK and its candidates, with an average of around 30 euros per sponsored post, LDK and its candidates with around 27 euros, AAK and its candidates with around 24 euros, and LVV and its candidates with around 23 euros invested per sponsored post.

7.3 Third Parties and Sponsorship  
Outside Candidate Profiles

In addition to monitoring candidates' profiles during the official campaign, DiA also analysed sponsorships made on Meta during the 30-day period around the elections, to see whether political advertising had begun before the official start of the campaign and whether ads related to the elections had continued after Election Day. The analysis of Meta sponsorships during the 30-day period makes it clearer that online political advertising also took place outside official pages and candidates' profiles.

The analysis focused on profiles/pages with spending above 100 euros. In this category, 151 pages were identified, with total spending of 190,010 euros over the 30-day period from mid-May to mid-June. Most of this amount was linked to candidate pages and official pages of political entities. However, the data also revealed several cases where the advertising was not paid directly by the candidate, or where the page publishing the ad was not an official page of the candidate or political entity.

The clearest cases relate to candidates whose ads appear to have been paid for by private companies. The page of PDK candidate Xhavit Haliti had 3,651 euros in spending with "Novalab LLC" listed as the disclaimer. The same company also appears on the page of another PDK candidate, Edon-jeta Berisha, with 154 euros in spending. The page of candidate Burim Meta had 270 euros in spending with "Anart Studio" listed as the disclaimer. Although these cases do not necessarily constitute violations in and of themselves, more information is needed on the candidate being promoted and the source paying for the ad. In campaign financial reporting, this distinction matters because the spending needs to be

understood as either linked to the political entity, to the candidate, to a contracted service or to support from outside the formal campaign structure.

Another category relates to pages that are not candidate profiles and do not appear as official pages of political entities, but whose names or content are linked to the race. "Candidates of Anamorava" had 418 euros in spending and 16 sponsored posts, most of which supported LVV candidate Bajram Mavriqi, but also several other candidates, including from other political entities. The page "The Work and Deeds of Rufki Suma" had 374 euros invested in sponsoring posts promoting LVV candidate Rufki Suma. The page "Vjosa for Another Term as President" had 345 euros invested in a total of 17 sponsored posts, but these did not include information on the entity that paid for them. In addition, the page "Voice of Mitrovica" had 334 euros invested in sponsoring dozens of posts that promoted and favoured LVV candidate Valon Peci. On the other hand, the page "Prishtina My City" had 107 euros invested in sponsoring several posts that supported candidates from different political entities, including LVV candidates (2 posts), PDK candidates (2 posts) and AAK candidates (1 post).

The analysed data also show pages of local party branches or structures, such as the "PDK-Shtime Branch" page, which had 406 euros in spending on sponsorship of various posts that promoted or favoured candidates from that municipality. Although pages of branches and local structures are not third parties in the full sense of the term, since they are linked to the political entity, they show that online advertising takes place at several levels simultaneously, where, in addition to the central page and candidates' profiles, branches, local pages and other structures linked to the political entity also enter the campaign.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the assessment of the campaign for the early parliamentary elections of 7 June 2026, Democracy in Action presents the following recommendations for regulating the issues that emerged during the pre-campaign, the official campaign and online advertising. The recommendations relate to the equality of the race, the use of public resources, institutional decision-making during the election period, public communication by institutions, the involvement of children in promotional activities, candidate financing, digital spending and the activity of third parties.

The recommendations are addressed primarily to the Assembly of Kosovo, the CEC, the Office for Registration, Certification and Financial Control of Political Entities, the Government, municipalities, political entities, candidates and the media. Some of them require legislative changes, while others can be implemented through CEC regulations, financial reporting practices, guidelines for institutional communication and internal standards of political entities during the campaign.

- 1. The pre-campaign period should be regulated by law, in order to prevent misuse of this phase by political entities and to guarantee equality in the race. The regulation should define which activities constitute early campaigning, the restrictions on the use of public resources during this period, and the obligations of parties to report financially on the pre-campaign as well.
- 2. The distribution of government financial benefits to citizens within a defined period before elections should be prohibited by law, in order to ensure a clear separation between institutional and electoral campaigning. This may include introducing a "moratorium" on selective fiscal measures from the day elections are announced.
- 3. Special rules for public communication by institutions should apply during the election period when the heads of those institutions are also candidates. Ministries, municipalities and other public institutions should not use official pages, press releases, photographs, videos, broadcasts of activities or materials produced by the institution to increase the public visibility of candidate officials. Institutional communication during this

period should be limited to information on public services, necessary decisions, deadlines and notices of direct interest to citizens, without promoting the image, work or activities of the official running in the elections.

- 4. A practice should be established for organising public debates between bearers of the lists of political entities, organised by the media (especially the public broadcaster), with equal participation, in order to enable citizens to compare platforms in an informed manner.
- 5. The digital campaign of political entities and candidates should be regulated as a distinct part of the election campaign, including official pages and profiles on social networks, paid ads, promotional videos, page management and production of digital content. Entities and candidates should declare the accounts they use for campaigning, while expenses for these activities should be reported as part of campaign expenditures.
- 6. Third-party campaigning in the online space should be regulated. Unofficial pages, groups, influencers or other actors that sponsor political content in favour of or against political entities and candidates should be subject to rules on transparency, reporting and financial limits.
- 7. Transparency and oversight of campaign financing should be strengthened by requiring political entities to submit detailed weekly reports during the campaign period, including all online and offline expenditures, with immediate publication on the official websites of the CEC and political parties.
- 8. Political entities should open separate bank accounts for the campaign. All income and expenditures related to the campaign should pass through these accounts, so that financial control is clearer and more traceable.

- **9. An electronic system for campaign financial reporting, integrated into the CEC platform, should be operationalised.** This system should enable the submission, review and publication of data on the financing of political entities and candidates, in standardised and comparable formats.
- **10. Financial disclosure by candidates should be regulated only for the period and activities of the election (pre-)campaign.** Candidates should report the income and expenditures they use for electoral promotion, including ads on social networks, promotional materials, public events, media services, and financial or in-kind support received for the campaign. These expenses should be part of the financial control of the campaign, alongside the reporting of the political entity.
- **11. Political entities should be more transparent in how they distribute campaign funds within the list of candidates.** This would help make the race within the list more equal and prevent candidates from depending only on personal resources or selective support from party structures.
- **12. The CEC, the Office for Registration, Certification and Financial Control of Political Entities and other responsible bodies should have greater capacities for overseeing campaign financing.** This includes sufficient staff, access to data, analytical tools for online monitoring and cooperation with digital platforms when necessary.
- **13. The formula for distributing public funds for campaigns should be changed so that non-parliamentary entities and entities running for the first time also have access to a minimum level of public support for campaigning.** This support should be defined as a limited part of the overall campaign fund. Access to this support should be linked to certification for elections and to the obligation to report financially under campaign rules.



Supported by:

