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Democracy in Action

OBSERVATION REPORT ON THE EARLY ELECTIONS FOR THE ASSEMBLY OF KOSOVA



7 JUNE, 2026

DEMOCRACY IN ACTION

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAK	Alliance for the Future of Kosova
DiA	Democracy in Action
IRDK	New Democratic Initiative of Kosova
JGP	Jedinstvena Goranska Partija
KDI	Kosova Democratic Institute
KDTP	Kosova Demokratik Türk Partisi
KGJK	Kosova Judicial Council
KKZ	Municipal Election Commission
KQZ	Central Election Commission
KVV	Polling Station Council
LDK	Democratic League of Kosova
LVV	Lëvizja Vetëvendosje
LZP	Law on General Elections
MPJD	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora
NDS	Nova Demokratska Stranka
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OJQ	Non-Governmental Organization
OSBE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OShC	Civil Society Organizations
PDK	Democratic Party of Kosova
PLE	Egyptian Liberal Party
PREBK	United Roma Party of Kosova
PSA	Social Democratic Party of Ashkali
PVT	Parallel Vote Tabulation
PZAP	Election Complaints and Appeals Panel
QKN	Municipal Counting Centre
QNR	Counting and Results Centre
SDU	Socijaldemokratska Unija
SKQZ	Secretariat of the Central Election Commission
SMS	Short Message Service
VAKAT	Koalicija Vakati

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The coalition of election observation organizations Democracy in Action (DiA) assesses that the early parliamentary elections of 7 June 2026 were generally conducted in line with democratic standards for free, competitive and calm elections.

The electoral process, including CEC preparations for organizing the elections, election day, counting, the handling of votes from outside Kosova, the review of complaints and the announcement of results, was administered in a generally professional manner and without problems that would undermine the overall integrity of the elections. Compared with recent electoral processes, these elections marked a noticeable improvement in technical administration, the publication of results, counting in MCSs and the completion of the post-election phase.

The elections were held in an unusual political and institutional context, as the third nationwide electoral process within a period of around sixteen months. These successive election cycles resulted from the inability of political actors to build stable institutions and secure the minimum consensus needed for the normal functioning of the institutional system. Compared with recent electoral processes, the campaign and Election Day reflected electoral fatigue, expressed through lower political mobilization, more limited citizen participation in public activities and a decline in turnout.

The Central Election Commission administered the vast majority of electoral operations professionally and within the prescribed deadlines. Unlike some earlier electoral processes, the work of the CEC was marked by fewer political clashes and a more functional and consensual decision-making process. The organization of voting inside and outside Kosova, technical preparations for Election Day, management of post-election phases and public communication with voters were generally carried out effectively. However, in several cases the CEC took actions that exceeded the existing legal basis, particularly through certain provisions adopted in the Regulation on Election Observers and the decision to allow out-of-country voters to identify themselves with expired documents, which was later annulled by ECAP.

Out-of-country voting took place without serious problems and without the political debates that had characterized earlier processes. Diaspora interest remained high, with 132,212 voters registered outside Kosova and turnout of 82.46% in physical voting at diplomatic missions. The administration of registration, physical voting, receipt and assessment of postal packages, and counting at the CRC was generally regular. However, the publication on social networks of photographs and videos showing completed ballots continues to raise concerns about the secrecy of the vote and the integrity of out-of-country voting.

The election campaign took place in a competitive and generally calm environment. Political entities were able to conduct their activities and communicate freely with voters throughout the country. Political discourse was more moderate than in some earlier electoral processes and was not accompanied by serious incidents. However, the violation of equality of the race remained one of the main issues identified during this period. Decisions of the caretaker Government to allocate one-off financial payments to different categories of citizens and to subsidize air routes for the diaspora on the eve of the elections undermined equality among political competitors.

The media played an important role in informing citizens during the election period and provided space for the presentation of the positions of political entities. However, reporting and public debates often focused more on race dynamics and political rhetoric than on analysing the programmes and concrete policies proposed by contenders. A visible shortcoming was the absence of direct confrontations between candidates for prime minister, which limited citizens' ability to compare political alternatives through direct debate.

The election campaign continued to shift significantly into the digital space, where social networks served as one of the main channels of political communication. DiA monitored around 500 social media profiles, including the official profiles of the main parties, their candidates and candidates of entities from the Serb community. During the ten-day official campaign alone, sponsorship expenditure on Meta platforms amounting to more than 100,000 euros was identified.



Voting outside Kosovo took place without serious problems and without the political debates that had characterized previous processes.

Diaspora interest remained high, with **132,212** registered voters outside Kosovo

with participation from **82.46%** in physical voting at diplomatic missions.

The political offer focused mainly on economic and social issues, while public debate was often dominated by political messages and electoral slogans rather than detailed discussion of public policies, the financial cost of promises and sources of funding. The campaign remained largely centred on party leaders, while women continued to be less represented in public debates and media space than in electoral lists. This shows that the formal inclusion of women in lists is not sufficient for equal participation in the political race.

Election Day took place in a calm atmosphere and without serious incidents that could have undermined the integrity of the process. The opening, voting and closing of polling stations were generally administered in an orderly manner. However, one of the most pronounced problems during the day remained voters' difficulty in finding the correct polling station, a phenomenon identified in a considerable number of polling stations. Access for persons with disabilities to polling centres and the uneven im-

plementation of some electoral procedures also remain challenges.

A particularly positive development in these elections was the significant decline in assisted voting. DiA data show that stricter enforcement of the rules for this form of voting had a clear impact in reducing the cases identified compared with previous electoral processes, contributing to the protection of vote integrity.


The counting process in Municipal Counting Centres marked a clear improvement compared with previous processes. The MCSs functioned in a more orderly and transparent manner in relation to the verification of votes for political entities and the counting of candidate votes. The use of cameras and monitors, observer access and better organization of the process contributed to increased confidence in this phase. The problems identified were mainly technical or human and were concentrated at specific tables or polling stations.

The Counting and Results Centre administered without delays the procedures related to conditional votes, votes of persons with special needs, votes from outside Kosovo and recounts. The recount of 185 regular polling stations, or 7.41% of polling stations, showed very limited changes in votes for political entities, while changes in candidate votes, although more numerous, were nevertheless small in terms of impact and mainly related to the more complex nature of preferential voting. These data support the assessment that the errors identified did not carry weight in the overall election result.

The CEC also marked a clear improvement in communication with the public. Digital campaigns for voter information and education were clearer and more present, while notices on deadlines, voting procedures and verification of polling centres were published more regularly. The CEC website and the results platform also functioned very well, especially in publishing real-time data, thereby increasing transparency and public access to information.

Electoral justice mechanisms functioned effectively throughout the process. ECAP and the Supreme Court handled electoral complaints and disputes within the legal deadlines and demonstrated a high level of professionalism and consistency in decision-making. In addition, the Prosecution and Kosovo Police played an active role in handling suspected violations of electoral rights and in protecting the integrity of the process.

Overall, DiA assesses that the early parliamentary elections of 7 June 2026 were conducted in a democratic, competitive and calm environment. The administration of the electoral process was generally professional, while the responsible institutions successfully managed most organizational and procedural challenges. However, the use of measures with electoral impact by public institutions, continuing difficulties in guiding voters, barriers to access for persons with disabilities and some shortcomings in the implementation of electoral procedures remain issues that require attention in future electoral processes.



▼ The Count and Results Center promptly administered procedures related to conditional votes, votes of persons with special needs, votes outside Kosovo, and recounts.

The recount of 185 regular polling stations, or 7.41% of polling stations, showed very limited changes in the votes of political entities, while the changes in the votes of candidates, although more numerous, were nevertheless small in terms of impact and mainly related to the more complex nature of the preferential vote. These data support the assessment that the errors identified did not have a bearing on the overall election result.


1. MISSION AND METHODOLOGY OF DiA

Democracy in Action (DiA) is a coalition of local civil society organizations in Kosova, engaged in promoting free, fair and democratic elections through systematic observation of electoral processes, public reporting, voter education and advocacy for electoral reform. For the early parliamentary elections of 7 June 2026, DiA engaged around 750 volunteers and members of professional teams to ensure independent, impartial and comprehensive observation of the electoral process.

This report presents DiA's assessment of the electoral process as a whole, covering the period from the announcement of the election date, the work of the institutions responsible for election administration, the election campaign, out-of-country voting, Election Day, counting in Municipal Counting Centres, procedures in the Counting and Results Centre, the review of complaints and electoral disputes, and the announcement and certification of results.

During the preparatory period, DiA monitored meetings of the Central Election Commission, decision-making by electoral institutions, implementation of the CEC operational plan and calendar of electoral activities, the certification process for political entities and candidates, preparations for voting inside and outside Kosova, and issues related to the voter list.

DiA also monitored the election campaign, including public activities of political entities, political communication in the field, use of public resources, representation of women and other groups in the campaign, the role of the media and developments in the digital space. Campaign monitoring was based on field reporting, tracking of public activities, analysis of online communication and review of available data on expenditure for sponsored promotion on social networks.



On Election Day, DnV has engaged over

600

volunteers in the field.

Of these, 500 observers were deployed in 500 polling stations selected according to the Parallel Vote Count (PVT) methodology, based on a representative sample.

On Election Day, DiA deployed more than 600 volunteers in the field. Of these, 500 observers were stationed in 500 polling stations selected according to the Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) methodology, based on a representative sample. This methodology enabled the collection of reliable statistical data on the opening of polling stations, turnout, the conduct of voting, compliance with procedures and preliminary results for political entities.

In addition to observers deployed in polling stations according to the PVT sample, DiA engaged around 50 observers in mobile teams, which monitored the general atmosphere in and around polling centres, voter access, the presence of promotional materials, security and other issues that cannot be fully covered through observation at individual polling stations. Around 50 additional volunteers were engaged in the Call/Data Centre, where field reports were received, verified, processed and analysed throughout the day.

After the close of voting, DiA continued observing the counting process in Municipal Counting Centres through around 100 observers in the field, with at least two observers for each municipal counting centre and up to four observers in larger municipalities. This observation covered receipt of election material, verification of votes for political entities, counting of candidate votes, compliance with procedures, process transparency and observer access. DiA also followed the work of the Counting and Results Centre, including the handling of conditional votes, votes from outside Kosova, votes of persons with special needs and any recount procedures.

DiA's legal teams continuously followed the review of complaints and appeals before the Election Complaints and Appeals Panel, as well as Supreme Court decision-making on electoral matters. DiA also monitored the engagement of law-enforcement and justice institutions in handling suspected criminal offences against electoral rights.

The data collected by DiA observers were reported through internal reporting platforms, verified by the responsible teams and analysed by professional staff and experts engaged for this process. During Election Day, DiA informed the public through regular media conferences and communication on social networks, while after the completion of the main phases of the process it prepared the final assessment presented in this report.

After the end of voting, the DnV continued to observe the counting process in the Municipal Counting Centers through around 100 field observers – respectively with a minimum of two observers for each municipal counting center, while in large municipalities up to four observers were engaged. This observation included the receipt of election material, verification of votes for political entities, counting of votes for candidates, respect of procedures, transparency of the process and access of observers. The DnV also monitored the work of the Counting and Results Center, including the handling of conditional votes, votes from outside Kosova, votes of persons with special needs and eventual recount procedures.

DiA's observation methodology is built on the principles of impartiality, objectivity, transparency and respect for international standards for domestic election observation. The findings and recommendations in this report are based on data collected through field observation, institutional monitoring, legal analysis and review of public documents and decisions of the institutions responsible for administering and safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process.

2. POLITICAL CONTEXT

The early parliamentary elections of 7 June 2026 were held in an unusual political and institutional context, marking the third nationwide electoral process within around sixteen months. This frequent electoral dynamic resulted from the continuing difficulties of political actors in building stable institutions and securing the minimum level of consensus necessary for the normal functioning of the parliamentary system.

The deadlock after the February 2025 elections directly affected the functioning of institutions. The inability to fully constitute the Assembly, elect its bodies and form the Government created institutional uncertainty and limited the country's capacity to take regular political, legal and budgetary decisions. During this period, public debate was dominated by issues of parliamentary procedure, constitutional interpretations and political responsibility for the deadlock, further deepening polarization among political entities.

In the absence of political compromise, the Constitutional Court was repeatedly involved in clarifying issues related to the constitution of institutions, parliamentary procedures and the implementation of constitutional deadlines. The Court's role was necessary to clarify institutional ways forward, but at the same time showed that political actors were not resolving disputes through political dialogue. This shifted a significant part of the crisis from the parliamentary arena to the constitutional and legal one.

The extraordinary elections of 28 December 2025 were seen as an opportunity to overcome the institutional stalemate. They enabled the constitution of the Assembly and the election of the Government, but did not produce sustainable political stability. Relations among parliamentary forces remained fragile, while the lack of readiness for political cooperation continued to limit institutional functionality. In this sense, the December elections provided a temporary solution for establishing institutions, but not a solution to the broader crisis of trust and political cooperation.

The crisis culminated with the Assembly's failure to elect the President of the Republic within the constitutional deadlines, leading to the dissolution of the Assembly and

the announcement of new parliamentary elections. As a result, the elections of 7 June 2026 were seen as a continuation of a long institutional crisis that had still not found a sustainable solution.

This circumstance in particular, as well as the overall political context and repeated electoral cycle, had a significant impact on the electoral atmosphere. Compared with previous processes, the campaign for the 7 June elections took place with a lower level of political and citizen mobilization. Public activities were less intensive, citizen participation was more limited and public interest in the process was weaker. This shows that a considerable part of the electorate experienced the process more as a continuation of the previous crisis than as the beginning of a new political cycle.

The decline in turnout confirmed this trend. According to the data, turnout on 7 June was among the lowest in parliamentary elections since the declaration of independence. It was considerably lower than in the parliamentary elections held only six months earlier, as well as the February 2025 elections. This development is one of the clearest indicators of electoral fatigue and a decline in citizens' motivation to participate in repeated electoral processes that had not produced institutional stability.

At the same time, the elections took place in an environment where the integrity of election administration and the credibility of post-election phases remained an important part of public debate. Previous processes had been accompanied by delays in counting and certification, problems during the counting of candidate votes in Municipal Counting Centres, disputes related to out-of-country voting and investigations into suspected electoral violations. These developments increased public sensitivity to how elections are administered, how votes are counted and how electoral disputes are handled.

Overall, the political context of these elections was defined by three main elements: institutional instability, lack of political compromise and citizen fatigue from repeated elections. These elements directly affected the nature of the campaign, the level of participation and public expectations of the process.

3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK


The legal framework for parliamentary elections in Kosovo is defined by the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, the Law on General Elections, the Law on the Financing of Political Entities, the Criminal Code and sub-legal acts issued by the Central Election Commission. This framework regulates all main phases of the electoral process, including the announcement of elections, their administration, certification of political entities and candidates, voting inside and outside Kosovo, vote counting, the review of complaints and certification of results.

The early parliamentary elections of 7 June 2026 were conducted under the same primary legal framework that had also been applied in recent electoral processes. There were no changes to primary electoral legislation between the December 2025 elections and the June 2026 elections. Consequently, the electoral system, the method of seat allocation, rules for the representation of non-majority communities, the gender quota, main voting procedures and mechanisms for protecting voting rights remained unchanged.

Kosovo continues to apply a proportional system with open lists, where the entire territory of the country constitutes a single electoral district. The Assembly of Kosovo has 120 seats, of which 20 are guaranteed for non-majority communities, namely 10 for the Serb community and 10 for other non-majority communities. A 5% electoral threshold applies to political entities competing for non-guaranteed seats, while this threshold does not apply to entities competing for guaranteed seats. Voters have the right to vote for one political entity and up to ten candidates within that entity's list.

The Law on General Elections, adopted in 2023, introduced several important changes to election administration, including the expansion of out-of-country voting methods, the counting of candidate votes in Municipal Counting Centres and the expansion of preferential voting to up to ten candidates. These changes continued to apply in the 7 June 2026 elections. Experience from recent electoral processes has shown that some of these changes improved participation opportunities, especially for voters outside Kosovo, but at the same time

Kosovo continues to implement a proportional system with open lists, where the entire territory of the country constitutes a single electoral zone. The Assembly of Kosovo has **120 seats**, of which **20 are guaranteed for non-majority communities, namely 10 for the Serb community and 10 for other non-majority communities**. For political entities competing for non-guaranteed seats, an electoral threshold of 5% is applied, while this threshold does not apply to entities competing for guaranteed seats. Voters have the right to vote for one political entity and up to ten candidates within that entity's list.



increased the administrative complexity of the process and the organizational capacity required from electoral institutions.

During the period before the 7 June elections, the Central Election Commission approved amendments and supplements to four election regulations. These changes concerned registration and out-of-country voting, the functioning of the Counting and Results Centre, voting procedures, counting at polling stations and polling station management, as well as the regulation of procedures for accrediting election observers. Most of these changes were technical in nature and aimed to adapt procedures to the experience of recent electoral processes.

The most problematic change related to Election Regulation No. 04/2026 on Election Observers. Through this regulation, the CEC expanded the scope of documentation and information required from civil society organizations for accreditation, introducing requirements that go beyond those provided in the Law on General Elections. This approach undermined the possibility of exercising independent election observation by burdening the accreditation process and giving the CEC broader discretion in an area where the law provides clear and limited criteria.

DiA assesses that the regulation of election observation should remain closely linked to the legal basis. Election observation is an important mechanism for transparency and credibility of the electoral process, and therefore accreditation procedures should facilitate the exercise of this role, not burden it with administrative requirements that are not necessary for the integrity of the process.

Another case demonstrating the need for greater care in interpreting the CEC's competences was the decision to allow out-of-country voters to identify themselves with expired documents. This decision was annulled by the Election Complaints and Appeals Panel following KDI's complaint. ECAP's decision restored the application of the legal standard for voter identification and confirmed the importance of legal control over decisions of the election administration.

In addition to issues related to sub-legal acts, the 7 June process also showed the continued existence of several gaps in electoral legislation. Political activities before the official start of the campaign remain unregulated, leaving political entities and candidates space for pre-election promotion without the same level of transparency, accountability and financial reporting required during the official campaign.

The campaign in the digital space also continues to develop faster than the regulatory capacity of institutions. Sponsored advertising on social networks, the use of unofficial pages, the production of costly digital content and the dissemination of disinformation require clearer rules on expenditure transparency, identification of those commissioning political content and financial reporting for online activities.

The Law on General Elections, adopted in 2023, introduced several important changes to the administration of elections, including the expansion of forms of voting outside Kosovo, the counting of candidate votes in Municipal Counting Centers, and the expansion of preferential voting to ten candidates. These changes continued to be implemented in the elections of 7 June 2026. The experience of recent electoral processes has shown that some of these changes have improved the possibilities of participation, especially for voters outside Kosovo, but at the same time have increased the administrative complexity of the process and the requirements for greater organizational capacities from electoral institutions.

The legal eligibility standard for candidates also remains an issue requiring review. Following the 2023 legal changes, the ban on candidacy is mainly linked to effective prison sentences of more than one year. This standard leaves room for persons convicted of offences related to corruption or abuse of public office to remain eligible to run in cases where they have received alternative sentences or fines.

In terms of gender equality, the legal framework continues to guarantee minimum representation of 30% for the less represented gender on electoral lists and in seat allocation. However, the experience of these elections shows that the legal quota continues to secure mainly formal representation, while the substantive participation of women in the campaign, in public debates and in political decision-making remains limited.

Overall, the legal framework enabled the organization of the 7 June 2026 elections and provided a sufficient basis for administering the process. However, the experience of this process, as well as others held in recent years, confirms the need to review electoral legislation in order to address the main technical and substantive shortcomings of Kosovo's electoral system.

4. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

Based on the constitutional and legal provisions in force, the body responsible for preparing, supervising, directing and verifying actions related to the electoral process, as well as for announcing election results, is the Central Election Commission. In exercising its responsibilities, the CEC is supported by the CEC Secretariat, which carries the main burden for the technical and administrative implementation of electoral operations.

At the municipal level, election administration is carried out through Municipal Election Commissions, which operate in each of Kosovo's 38 municipalities. These commissions are responsible for technical preparations at the local level, coordination with the CEC, voter services, organization of training and support for the bodies that administer voting on Election Day.

The voting process at polling stations is administered by Polling Station Councils, which are composed of members nominated by political entities and appointed according to procedures established by the CEC. After the close of voting, the process continues in Municipal Counting Centres, where election material is received, votes for political entities are verified and candidate votes are counted. The Counting and Results Centre administers conditional votes, votes from outside Kosovo, votes of persons with special needs, any recounts and the technical preparation of final results.

In the 7 June 2026 elections, the overall administration of the electoral process was considerably calmer and more orderly than in previous processes. The CEC and its Secretariat managed to carry out electoral operations within the prescribed deadlines and without problems that would directly affect the overall integrity of the process. Unlike the 2025 elections, the main phases of administration were not accompanied by major delays, technical failures with public consequences or continuous political disputes within the CEC.



In the elections of 7 June 2026, the overall administration of the electoral process was significantly smoother and more orderly than in previous processes. The CEC and its Secretariat managed to carry out the electoral operations within the foreseen deadlines, without problems that would directly affect the overall integrity of the process. Unlike the elections of 2025, the main phases of the administration were not accompanied by major delays, technical failures with public consequences or ongoing political contestations within the CEC.

4.1 Work of the Central Election Commission

The Central Election Commission administered the early parliamentary elections of 7 June 2026 in a generally professional and efficient manner. Despite the shorter timelines for organizing the process, most key operations were completed on time and without major obstacles. The CEC approved the decisions necessary for organizing the elections, certifying political entities and candidates, the voter list, out-of-country voting, the composition of electoral bodies, election materials and procedures related to election day and the subsequent counting phases.

Unlike the 2025 elections, the work of the CEC was not characterized by continuous political tensions, major delays in key operations or technical failures with a direct impact on public trust. Most of the decisions necessary for organizing the process were taken on time and without major disputes among Commission members.

Since the announcement of the elections, the CEC held more frequent meetings at which key decisions for implementing the operational election plan were approved. These decisions included the certification of political entities and candidates, the voter list, out-of-country voting, the composition of electoral bodies, election materials, election day procedures and subsequent counting phases. In most cases, decision-making was calmer and less politicized than in previous processes. More often than in previous electoral cycles, the CEC also used decision-making procedures through circulation meetings without physical attendance. Although this practice may be necessary for technical and urgent matters, its use should remain limited and justified. CEC decision-making, especially on matters of public interest, should take place as openly as possible, with the possibility of being followed by the public, media and observers.


Since the announcement of the elections, the CEC has held more frequent meetings to adopt key decisions for the implementation of the electoral operation plan. These decisions included the certification of political entities and candidates, the voter list, out-of-Kosovo voting, the composition of electoral bodies, electoral materials, election day procedures, and the subsequent counting phases. In most cases, decision-making was calmer and less politicized than in previous processes. In significantly more cases than in previous election cycles, the CEC also used decision-making procedures through circulating meetings (without physical attendance).

Beyond generally regular, functional decision-making without pronounced clashes within the CEC, the work of the CEC Secretariat was one of the most positive aspects of this electoral process. The preparation of election materials, coordination with municipal structures, organization of out-of-country voting, technical support for MCSs and the CRC, and data processing were carried out with a higher level of order and coordination. This had a direct impact on the smooth conduct of the process and on avoiding the problems that had characterized previous elections.

The work of the CEC Secretariat, which carried the main responsibility for the practical implementation of electoral operations, also deserves particular assessment. The preparation of election materials, organization of voting inside and outside Kosova, coordination with municipal structures, functioning of reporting systems and data processing were carried out more regularly than in previous processes. This was also reflected in the improved publication of results and better management of information related to the progress of electoral operations and procedures.

➤ One of the positive elements in this regard was the level of transparency of the CEC regarding the progress of electoral activities and operations.

➤ In particular, it is worth highlighting the continuous and impartial information provided to the public by the CEC on the progress of electoral activities.



➤ The CEC published frequent, regular and detailed announcements during the election preparation period, voting day and post-election phase, through which the public and the media were informed about the electoral operations inside and outside the country, as well as about the daily progress of the counting activities at the NCC and the CRC. This information was operational and explanatory in nature, providing the public and the media with regular data on each phase of the electoral process.

One of the positive elements in this regard was the level of CEC transparency regarding the progress of electoral activities and operations. In particular, the continuous and impartial public information provided by the CEC on the progress of electoral activities should be highlighted. The CEC published frequent, regular and detailed notices during the preparatory period, on election day and in the post-election phase, informing the public and the media about electoral operations inside and outside the country, as well as the daily progress of counting activities in MCSs and the CRC. This information had an operational and explanatory character, providing the public and media with regular data on every phase of the electoral process.

Other teams within the CEC Secretariat also performed well, including the units responsible for data management, digital systems, publication of results and work in the CRC. More stable, systematic and detailed publication

of data and better functioning of online platforms had a positive impact on the transparency of the process and on access to information for citizens, civil society, media and political entities.

Despite the generally positive assessment, some CEC decisions remained problematic. The Regulation on Election Observers expanded accreditation requirements for observer organizations beyond what is provided by the Law on General Elections. DiA assesses that this regulation unnecessarily undermined the accreditation process by burdening observer organizations and giving the CEC broader room for assessment than the law provides.¹

1 Election Regulation No. 04/2026 on Election Observers. Accessed on 08.07.2026 at: <https://kqz-ks.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Rregullore-Zgjedhore-Nr.04-2026-Vezhguesit-e-Zgjedhjeve.pdf>

The decision to allow voters outside Kosovo to identify themselves with **expired documents** was another case where the CEC exceeded the legal basis. This decision was overturned by the ECAP following an appeal by the KDI. Although the ECAP decision corrected this issue before it had any consequences for the voting process, the CEC had not done enough to correct the prior notice to allow voting with expired documents. Furthermore, the manner and level of communication of this information to election staff in the diplomatic missions where the voting took place remains unclear.



The decision to allow out-of-country voters to identify themselves with expired documents was another case in which the CEC exceeded the legal basis. This decision was annulled by ECAP following KDI's complaint. Although ECAP's decision corrected this issue before it could produce consequences for the voting process, the CEC had not done enough to correct the prior notice allowing voting with expired documents. Moreover, the manner and level of communication of this information to election staff in diplomatic missions where voting took place remains unclear².

The CEC also failed to resolve sustainably the issue of election administration in the northern municipalities. The absence of Municipal Election Executive Officers in these municipalities was again covered through temporary arrangements.


Another problematic issue was the Regulation on Election Observers, through which the CEC imposed additional requirements for the accreditation of observer organiza-

tions. DiA assesses that some of these requirements go beyond what is provided by the Law on General Elections and unnecessarily burden the accreditation process for civil society organizations. Regulation of observation should ensure transparency and order, but without turning accreditation into an unnecessary process of administrative control over observer organizations.

Overall, DiA assesses that the CEC and its Secretariat administered the 7 June elections professionally and with clear improvements compared with recent electoral processes. Regular public information, better functioning of data systems, improved technical coordination and less contested decision-making had a positive effect on the quality of administration. The shortcomings identified, including decisions corrected by electoral justice mechanisms, the regulation on observers, the use of electronic circulation procedures and administration in the northern municipalities, did not undermine the overall integrity of the process, but they are issues that should be addressed in future processes.


2 Decision of the Election Complaints and Appeals Panel, ZP. Anr.19/2026, dated 5 June 2026. Accessed on 08.07.2026 at: <https://smaa.rks-gov.net/documents/51968.pdf>

Updating candidate lists with young people from the main parties



This level of change indicates that political parties, even though they competed in a repeated electoral process within a short period, did not enter the race with completely recycled lists. In particular, LDK, PDK, and AAK made greater interventions in the composition of their lists.

The average age of certified candidates was 42 years old.



This distribution shows that the majority of candidates are between the ages of **31 and 50 years old**, while very young candidates and those over **60** make up a smaller portion of the lists.



4.2 Municipal Election Commissions and Polling Station Councils

Municipal Election Commissions are the main link between the CEC and election administration in the field. They carry responsibility for the technical organization of the process at the municipal level, including voter services, preparation of polling centres, coordination of training, receipt and distribution of election materials and support for Polling Station Councils on Election Day.

Polling Station Councils administer the voting process in each polling station. Their role includes opening the polling station, verifying voters, issuing ballots, maintaining order inside the polling station, protecting the secrecy of the vote and handing over materials after the close of voting.

DiA did not conduct continuous and structured monitoring of the work of all Municipal Election Commissions during the preparatory period. For this reason, the assessment in this part is based mainly on CEC decisions and public information, data reported by observers on election day and issues identified during the administration of voting and the first phases after polling stations closed.

Based on the available data, the functioning of MECs and PSCs was not accompanied by major organizational problems. Polling stations generally opened on time, election materials were available and the voting process took place without serious interruptions. Cases of delayed opening were limited and, for the most part, related to the absence of a PSC member or to technical issues in specific polling stations.

However, Election Day showed that some weaknesses in the practical organization of the process continue to recur. The most pronounced was the difficulty of a considerable number of voters in finding the correct polling station. This problem is not related only to central information provided by the CEC, but also to the way voters are guided inside polling centres, especially in larger municipalities and centres with a higher number of polling stations.

Access for persons with disabilities to polling centres also remained a recurring problem. Some polling centres continued not to provide suitable conditions for easy and independent access. This issue requires earlier attention from the election administration, in cooperation

with municipalities and the institutions that manage public facilities used for voting.

In the northern municipalities, election administration continued to rely on temporary arrangements due to the absence of Municipal Election Executive Officers. Although these arrangements enabled the process to take place, they do not constitute a sustainable model for election administration at municipal level. The CEC should treat this issue as part of the regular functionalization of the election administration, and not as a problem to be addressed only on the eve of elections.

In DiA's assessment, MECs and PSCs managed to fulfil the basic tasks for organizing and administering voting. The shortcomings identified did not affect the overall integrity of the process, but they show that voter services, access to polling centres and election administration in the northern municipalities require more sustainable treatment in future processes.

4.3 Work in Municipal Counting Centres

Municipal Counting Centres are one of the most important changes in election administration following the latest legal reform. Through them, the counting of candidate votes has been moved from polling stations to the municipal level, with the aim of conducting the process in more controlled conditions, with more space for observation and better opportunities for data verification. These centres receive election material from polling stations, verify votes for political entities, count candidate votes, complete the relevant forms and send data to the Counting and Results Centre.

In the 7 June 2026 parliamentary elections, work in the MCSs marked a clear improvement compared with recent electoral processes. Unlike the previous elections, this phase was not accompanied by major delays at the start, procedural problems or uncertainty about how the centres would function. The errors identified were mainly technical, procedural or human, concentrated at specific tables and polling stations. Observation data and recount results do not indicate an organized pattern of interference, pressure or manipulation of counting in the MCSs.

> DnV has observed the work of the NCCs through about

100 observers engaged in the field.

> The data in this subchapter are supported by direct reports from field observers, over 500 monitored desks, as well as 50 reported incident forms.

> The general evaluation of the DnV in relation to the work of the NCCs is positive. NCCs functioned as more controllable and transparent spaces for the counting of candidates' votes. In the vast majority of monitored segments, observers had the opportunity to clearly see the ballot on the screen and its registration in the system.

In most municipalities, counting began and continued at a steady pace, with regular presence of security officials, better organization of the counting space and sufficient access for observers.

DiA observed the work of the MCSs through around 100 observers deployed in the field. The data in this subsection are based on direct reports from observers in the field, on more than 500 monitored tables, as well as on 50 reported incident forms.

DiA's overall assessment of the work of the MCSs is positive. The MCSs functioned as more controllable and more transparent spaces for counting candidate votes. In the vast majority of monitored segments, observers were able to see clearly the ballot on the screen and its entry into the system.

In this regard, the use of cameras and monitors was among the most important elements of the process. In almost all monitored tables, the relevant cameras and monitors were functional at all active tables, while in 11 cases it was reported that they were functional only at some tables. Only one report noted that cameras and monitors were not functional for a period of around one hour.

Technical problems were nevertheless present, especially at the beginning of the process. Observers reported isolated cases of cameras not providing a clear image, monitors not functioning, internet interruptions, problems with the system or software, and electricity outages in certain cases. According to observers' reports, most problems were related to the initial start-up and technical adjustment phase, while the process stabilized in the following days.

However, these problems did not constitute a violation of the integrity of the process. In most cases, they caused delays, repeated registration or the need for technical intervention. When errors were noticed during processing, teams restarted the process for the relevant entity or polling station and continued with a new entry in the system. This reaction is important because it shows that the system had the possibility of correction during the process, not only after its completion.

In terms of order and the behaviour of actors inside the MCSs, the process was generally calm. It was reported that police officers were present at the entrance of all MCSs, taking care of recording attendance and general



security at the MCSs. Observers did not report interference or pressure on counting teams by persons outside the team. Heated debates or security incidents were reported only in rare cases.

Observer access to the process was generally good. However, in some isolated cases, restrictions on observers' movement between tables in the MCS were reported.

The most sensitive part of the work in MCSs relates to the accuracy of recording candidate votes. Data received from DiA observers show that discrepancies between the ballot displayed on the screen and the entry in the system were reported at 12 monitored tables. The relevant incidents indicate that these cases were mainly human errors during reading or data entry, such as switching candidate numbers, failing to read a ballot, incorrect registration of a candidate vote or confusing the vote of one entity with another. In some cases, the process was restarted for the relevant entity and the errors were corrected. Moreover, observation data do not show any organized pattern of changing candidate votes.

Unclear or contested votes were reported in 36 cases, while objections or complaints during processing were identified in only three cases. This is a positive indicator of acceptance of counting-table decisions by the actors present. In a process where preferential votes are counted and each vote may matter for candidates, such a low number of objections shows that most table decisions were accepted without contestation.

As regards election material and security seals, the process was generally regular. Discrepancies in numbers or codes of security seals were reported only in limited cases. At the end of processing, in the vast majority of segments it was reported that the relevant forms had been completed and signed by counters, and that new security seals had been placed and recorded after the election material was closed. This shows good procedural discipline during the closing phase of ballot boxes and election material.

Regarding incidents, observer reports from the field show two categories as the most frequent: technical problems and errors in counting or recording votes, with 19 reports each. Four incidents were related to election material or security seals, three to obstruction of observation, three to forms and results, one to order and se-

curity in the MCS and one to unauthorized interference. This shows that the main nature of incidents was not related to political pressure or restriction of access to the process, but to the technical and operational accuracy of counting.

The CEC Secretariat report on the recount of 185 regular polling stations also supports this assessment. The recount covered 185 polling stations, or 7.41% of the total 2,498 regular polling stations. The process began on 18 June and ended on 19 June. After the recount, changes in votes for political entities were identified in 27 polling stations in 16 municipalities. The absolute change for political entities was 56 votes, while the effective change was a net increase of 16 votes.

This level of change is very low for a recount of 185 polling stations. In 21 polling stations, the change related to the reassessment of ballot validity, where 25 ballots previously treated as invalid were assessed as valid, while nine ballots assessed as valid in MCSs were declared invalid. In six other polling stations, the recount identified cases where the votes of one political entity had been mistakenly counted for another entity, without affecting the total number of valid votes.

Changes in candidate votes were more numerous, but limited in weight. According to the Secretariat report, changes were identified for 547 candidates. For 388 candidates, a total of 1,197 fewer votes were identified, while for 447 candidates, 1,634 more votes were identified. The absolute change was 2,831 votes, or 1.4% of the total 201,423 valid candidate votes in the recounted polling stations. For 355 candidates, no change was identified.

More important is the nature of these changes. The Secretariat report shows that 92% of the differences were differences of only one vote per candidate in one polling station. Larger differences were rare, while the maximum change was four votes for one candidate in one polling station. These findings are also consistent with DiA observer reports from MCSs, according to which the errors identified were mainly small human errors in reading, categorization or recording, and not deviations that would change the overall assessment of the integrity of the process.

On the other hand, observation of the work of the MCSs and especially the recount of 7.4% of polling stations

brought to light several findings that should be further addressed by the competent bodies. Suspicions were reported of similarities in signatures at polling stations in Gračanica and Ranillug, ballots with suspicious symbols in Ranillug, and ballots with a similar pattern of completion in Klokot.

In DiA's assessment, compared with previous processes, the procedures administered in MCSs improved in organization, transparency, control and the possibility of correction during the process. The use of cameras and monitors, better observer access, regular security presence and better discipline in closing procedures contributed to a more credible process. Findings from DiA monitoring and recount reports show that although the process still needs practical improvements, in this electoral process the MCSs functioned considerably more sustainably.

4.4 Work in the Counting and Results Centre

The Counting and Results Centre is the final link in the technical administration of election results. This centre handles categories of votes that are not completed at polling stations or in Municipal Counting Centres, including conditional votes, votes from outside Kosova, votes of persons with special needs and possible recount processes. The CRC also has an important role in controlling election materials, verifying forms and technically preparing final results for certification by the CEC.

In the 7 June 2026 elections, work at the CRC took place in a generally orderly manner and without major delays. Procedures for handling conditional votes, votes from outside Kosova, postal votes and other legally foreseen categories were completed within a relatively fast dynamic. This phase of the process was not accompanied by major public disputes or uncertainties that would have burdened the announcement and certification of results.

The CRC had adequate capacities for administering the procedures foreseen by law. The increase in counting tables, better organization of work and more regular coordination with the CEC Secretariat helped ensure that different categories of votes were handled without delays. This was particularly important for votes from

outside Kosova, which in previous processes had been among the most sensitive and contested segments of the post-election phase.

Process transparency was also better. The CEC published regular notices on the progress of work at the CRC and on the main counting phases. The gradual publication of data on the results platform gave political entities, media and citizens a better opportunity to follow the process.

In DiA's assessment, the CRC successfully administered the main procedures under its responsibility. Conditional votes, votes from outside Kosova, postal votes, other votes foreseen by law and recounts were handled without delays and without problems that would affect the overall integrity of the elections. Improved counting capacities and more regular public information contributed to this phase being completed more clearly and more quickly than in previous processes.

4.5 Out-of-country voting

Out-of-country voting remained one of the most important segments of the electoral process, both because of the high number of registered voters and because of the political sensitivity this process has had in recent electoral cycles. In the 7 June 2026 elections, the administration of this process was more regular and less contested than in previous elections.

The registration period for out-of-country voters began on 6 May and ended on 17 May 2026. During this period, the CEC received 142,803 registration applications, a record number of applications. After reviewing the applications, 132,212 requests were approved, 10,497 were rejected and 94 requests were cancelled. Among rejected requests, the largest number related to the absence of a document proving residence abroad, lack of a photograph with an identification document, absence of a Kosova identification document, discrepancy between the declared address and submitted documentation, and other formal shortcomings during application. These data are part of the CEC report on certification of the Voter List, approved on 21 May 2026.

Of the 132,212 voters registered outside Kosova, 100,970 registered to vote by post through mailboxes outside Kosova, 3,518 by post to the CEC mailbox in Kosova, and 27,724 to vote physically in diplomatic missions. These figures show that postal voting remains the dominant form of diaspora participation, while physical voting in diplomatic missions remains important but more limited due to the number and capacity of locations.

For physical out-of-country voting, the CEC organized voting in 30 diplomatic missions, including 17 embassies and 13 consulates, with a total of 47 polling stations. Physical voting took place on 6 June 2026. Of 27,724 voters registered for this form of voting, 22,860 citizens voted, or 82.46%. The process took place without pronounced organizational problems and without serious contestation.

Postal voting took place from 21 May to 6 June 2026. For this form of voting, 104,488 voters were registered, of whom 100,970 for sending ballots to mailboxes outside Kosova and 3,518 for sending them to the CEC mailbox in Kosova. Suspected ballot packages were collected from CEC mailboxes in 22 different countries, as well as from the CEC mailbox in Kosova.

On 14 June, the CEC completed the assessment of 85,790 suspected ballot packages. Of this number, 82,809 packages were approved and 2,981 were rejected. The rejection rate was relatively limited in relation to the total number of packages received, while reasons for rejection were mainly linked to non-compliance with procedural criteria for postal voting. After assessment, the envelopes containing ballots were arranged in 223 ballot boxes according to the municipalities from which registered voters came.

The counting of postal votes was organized at the Counting and Results Centre on 20 counting tables. This increase in counting capacity helped the process proceed at a better pace and without major delays.

Administratively, this process marked an improvement compared with the 2025 elections. Voter registration, physical voting in diplomatic missions, receipt of postal packages, their assessment and counting at the CRC took place without much politicization or other political clashes. Regular CEC information on the progress of the process also helped stakeholders and the public follow

For physical voting outside Kosovo, the CEC organized voting in 30 diplomatic missions, of which 17 embassies and 13 consulates, with a total of 47 polling stations. Physical voting took place on June 6, 2026.

27,724 voters registered for this form of voting, 22,860 citizens, or 82.46% voted.

The process took place without significant organizational problems and without serious disputes.



Voting by mail took place from May 21 to June 6, 2026.

On June 14, the CEC concluded the evaluation process of 85,790 presumed ballot packages. Of this number, 82,809 packages were approved, while

2,981 were rejected.

The rejection rate was relatively limited in relation to the total number of packages received.

more easily the administration of out-of-country voting. Among the few problematic issues characterizing this process was the CEC decision allowing out-of-country voters to identify themselves with expired documents.

Despite generally good administration, out-of-country voting continued to present several issues requiring attention and institutional response. During the postal voting period, photographs and videos of completed ballots were published on social networks. In some cases, the published images created the impression of group voting or completion of a larger number of ballots in the same setting. Although these cases cannot be assessed only on the basis of materials published on social networks, they should be addressed by the responsible institutions because they relate to vote secrecy and the possibility of influencing voters' will.

4.6 Certification of political entities and their candidates

The process of certifying political entities and candidates for the early parliamentary elections of 7 June 2026 took place without major disputes and without decisions that would affect equality of the race. Unlike some previous processes, certification did not become a source of political tension within the CEC or an issue requiring intervention by electoral justice mechanisms.

A total of 21 political entities and 902 candidates for MP were certified for these elections. Of the certified entities, three were categorized as coalitions, 17 as political parties and one as an independent candidate. The number of candidates was lower than in the early parliamentary elections of 28 December 2025, when 1,180 candidates had run. This decline is mainly linked to the smaller number of competing entities and more limited composition of some lists of non-majority community entities.

The main Albanian political entities ran with full lists of 110 candidates. Lëvizja Vetëvendosje, the Democratic Party of Kosova, the Democratic League of Kosova and the Alliance for the Future of Kosova each certified 110 candidates. The Serbian List ran with 25 candidates.

Other non-majority community entities ran with smaller lists.

A particular issue in the certification process remains the legal eligibility standard for candidates. Under the Law on General Elections, the right to run is restricted for persons who in the last three years have been convicted by a final decision and sentenced to one year or more of effective imprisonment. This standard does not include candidates with active indictments, nor candidates with final convictions resulting in fines, suspended sentences or imprisonment below the legal threshold. As a result, during the certification phase the CEC acted within the limits of the law in force, while the issue remains the legal standard that determines which convictions produce a ban on candidacy.

In this context, according to a report by the Kosova Law Institute, of the 902 certified candidates, 25 candidates, or 2.77%, were identified as being involved in criminal cases. Of these, 15 candidates have active indictments and 13 candidates have final criminal convictions. In three cases, the same candidates were identified both as persons with criminal convictions and as persons with active indictments. KLI data also show that candidates involved in criminal cases are part of the lists of eight political entities. According to the same report, the 25 identified candidates are linked to a total of 29 criminal cases. By chapters of the Criminal Code, the most frequent cases relate to official corruption and offences against official duty, identified 14 times. At the level of specific offences, KLI identifies 10 cases of "Use of a weapon or dangerous instrument", seven cases of "Abuse of official position, duty or authority", and five cases of "Failure to report or false reporting of assets, income, gifts or other financial obligations". Compared with the elections of 28 December 2025, the total number of candidates involved in criminal cases decreased from 27 to 25, while the number of candidates with criminal convictions increased from 12 to 13 and the number of political entities with such candidates from seven to eight.³

3 Kosovo Law Institute, "Integrity of electoral lists, Early parliamentary elections 7 June 2026", Prishtina, May 2026.

A visible element of this process was the renewal of candidate lists by the main parties compared with the elections of 28 December 2025. In the LDK list, 63% of candidates were new names compared with the previous list; in the PDK list, 56%; in AAK, 54%; in the Serbian List, 44%; and in LVV, 29%. This level of change shows that political parties, although competing in a repeated electoral process within a short period, did not enter the race with entirely recycled lists. In particular, LDK, PDK and AAK made larger changes to the composition of their lists.

The average age of certified candidates was 42. By age group, 182 candidates were up to 30 years old, 237 were between 31 and 40, 263 between 41 and 50, 143 between 51 and 60, 40 between 61 and 64, while 37 candidates were over 65. This distribution shows that most candidates belong to the 31 to 50 age group, while very young candidates and those over 60 make up a smaller share of the lists.

In terms of gender, of the 902 certified candidates, 593 were men and 309 were women. Women accounted for 34.3% of the total number of candidates, above the legal minimum of 30%. Among the main entities, women's representation was also above the legal threshold. LVV had 39 women on its list, PDK 37, LDK 38, AAK 37, while the Serbian List had 10 women out of 25 candidates. However, fulfilment of the quota in lists continues not to be sufficient for equal participation in the campaign and in public space, an issue addressed more broadly in the section on women's representation in the electoral process.

The territorial distribution of candidates shows a high concentration in several larger municipalities. 157 candidates came from Prizren, 153 from Prishtina, 77 from Ferizaj, 68 from Peja and 55 from Fushë Kosova. These five municipalities accounted for most certified candidates. On the other hand, some municipalities had very few candidates. Partesh and Zubin Potok had one candidate each, Zvečan and Shtërpce two each, while Hani i Elezit and Junik had three candidates each.

The candidate certification process continued to apply the legal eligibility standard established after the 2023 amendments. Under this standard, the ban on candidacy is mainly linked to effective prison sentences of more than one year. DiA has assessed in previous processes as well that this standard is low for the integrity of po-

litical representation, because it allows the candidacy of persons who may have alternative sentences, fines or open proceedings, including in cases related to corruption or abuse of public office.

In DiA's overall assessment, certification of political entities and candidates for the 7 June elections took place in an orderly manner and without problems that would undermine the electoral race. The CEC administered this phase more calmly than in previous processes, while political entities were able to compete in line with legal requirements.

4.7 Certification of the Voters' List, and Voter Services

The Voters' List for the early parliamentary elections of 7 June 2026 was certified by the CEC on 21 May 2026. According to certification data, the total number of Kosova citizens with the right to vote in this process was 2,092,174 voters. Compared with the early parliamentary elections of 28 December 2025, the list contained 15,884 more voters.

Of the total number of voters, 1,959,962 were included in the voter list inside Kosova, while 132,212 were registered to vote out of country. Of the voters registered outside Kosova, 100,970 registered to send their ballot to a mailbox outside Kosova, 3,518 to send their ballot to the CEC mailbox in Kosova, and 27,724 to vote physically in diplomatic missions.

For voting inside the country, the CEC approved 911 polling centres for regular voting, with a total of 2,498 polling stations. For conditional voting, 38 polling centres were approved, one in each municipality, with a total of 52 polling stations. In total, the electoral process inside Kosova was organized in 949 polling centres and 2,550 polling stations. For physical out-of-country voting, the CEC approved voting in 30 diplomatic missions, including 17 embassies and 13 consulates, with a total of 47 polling stations.

In this process, the number of new voters was 22,685. Of them, 16,934 had reached the age of 18 after the elections of 28 December 2025 and had the right to vote for the first time in parliamentary elections. Of this number, 8,752 were men and 8,182 women. The remaining 5,751


voters included citizens registered for the first time in the Civil Registry between the two electoral processes, as well as citizens who had regained Kosova citizenship.

In these elections, 6,801 persons were removed from the Final Voter List. Of them, 6,165 were removed as deceased persons identified by the Civil Registration Agency; 419 due to loss of citizenship of the Republic of Kosova; and 217 after receipt of data from the Kosova Judicial Council. These updates show that the CEC and responsible institutions have continued the administrative cleaning of the list, although its accuracy remains dependent on the quality and timely exchange of inter-institutional data.

Voter Services, on the other hand, took place from 6 to 17 May 2026. During this period, voters had the right and opportunity to verify the polling centre to which they had been assigned and to submit a request to change it. According to CEC data, 11,840 requests to change polling centres were received, of which 11,276 were approved and 564 rejected.


To inform voters about their polling centre, the CEC also used notifications through text messages. This mechanism, alongside the online verification platform, gave citizens an additional opportunity to be informed before election day. However, on Election Day many cases were identified of voters having difficulty finding the correct polling station. This shows that, despite regular certification of the list and the use of information tools, practical guidance of voters in polling centres remains a recurring problem.


According to data from the certification of the list, the total number of Kosovo citizens with the right to vote in this process was



The territorial distribution of candidates shows a high concentration in several larger municipalities.

These five municipalities accounted for the majority of certified candidates.



Municipality	Voters inside Kosova	 
 Deçan	39,885	20,154  19,731
 Gjakovë	118,486	59,894  58,592
 Drenas	55,711	28,754  26,957
 Gjilan	102,225	51,487  50,738
 Dragash	40,340	20,254  20,086
 Istog	49,258	25,359  23,899
 Kaçanik	32,132	16,309  15,823
 Klinë	49,457	25,261  24,196

Voters outside Kosova	Polling centres	Regular polling stations	Conditional voting centres	Conditional polling stations
4,168	14	48	1	1
7,387	36	144	1	2
2,466	31	73	1	1
8,950	37	127	1	2
2,175	33	57	1	1
4,091	22	60	1	1
2,654	21	44	1	1
3,238	21	62	1	1

Municipality	Voters inside Kosova	 
 Fushë Kosovë	53,732	26,911  26,821
 Kamenicë	31,776	16,170  15,606
 Mitrovicë e Jugut	80,271	40,737  39,534
 Leposaviq	12,671	6,575  6,096
 Lipjan	63,251	32,359  30,892
 Novoberdë	9,890	5,203  4,687
 Obiliq	25,214	12,950  12,264
 Rahovec	56,705	29,017  27,688

Voters outside Kosova	Polling centres	Regular polling stations	Conditional voting centres	Conditional polling stations
2,578	16	62	1	2
3,239	28	46	1	1
6,590	32	100	1	2
18	18	25	1	1
4,475	34	83	1	1
261	18	23	1	1
1,319	14	34	1	1
4,900	34	75	1	1

Municipality	Voters inside Kosova		
 Pejë	115,600	58,564	57,036
 Podujevë	80,917	41,426	39,491
 Prishtinë	55,711	108,166	111,488
 Prizren	184,671	92,346	92,325
 Skenderaj	51,456	26,586	24,870
 Shtime	26,853	13,684	13,169
 Shtërpca	12,221	6,243	5,978
 Suharekë	66,920	33,633	33,287

Voters outside Kosova	Polling centres	Regular polling stations	Conditional voting centres	Conditional polling stations
7,726	30	135	1	2
6,788	47	103	1	2
11,378	54	262	1	6
9,769	76	232	1	3
2,942	33	71	1	1
2,254	15	33	1	1
225	9	17	1	1
6,627	34	86	1	1

Municipality	Voters inside Kosova	 
 Ferizaj	118,838	59,783  59,055
 Viti	47,306	24,273  23,033
 Vushtrri	72,489	37,245  35,244
 Zubin Potok	6,470	3,412  3,058
 Zveçan	6,977	3,574  3,403
 Malishevë	49,258	25,359  23,899
 Junik	32,132	16,309  15,823
 Mamushë	4,503	2,307  2,196

Voters outside Kosova	Polling centres	Regular polling stations	Conditional voting centres	Conditional polling stations
9,451	48	146	1	2
4,691	30	62	1	1
6,013	32	89	1	1
85	12	15	1	1
2,175	33	57	1	1
4,091	22	60	1	1
2,654	21	44	1	1
244	1	5	1	1

Municipality	Voters inside Kosova	 
 Hani i Elezit	8,506	4,293  4,213
 Graçanicë	23,969	12,049  11,920
 Ranillug	4,892	2,564  2,328
 Partesh	4,806	2,483  2,323
 Klllokot	4,059	2,128  1,931
 Mitrovicë e Veriut	17,604	8,440  9,164
Total	1,959,962	991,196 968,766

Voters outside Kosova	Polling centres	Regular polling stations	Conditional voting centres	Conditional polling stations
467	4	11	1	1
120	14	33	1	1
6	7	10	1	1
0	3	7	1	1
140	5	8	1	1
155	6	21	1	1
132,212	911	2,498	38	52

5. WOMEN'S INCLUSION IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

In these parliamentary elections as well, the representation and inclusion of women continued to remain below the standard of full gender equality in political representation. Although the minimum 30% quota established by the Law on General Elections has contributed to increasing the presence of women on electoral lists, it has still not translated into equal gender representation or sufficient inclusion of women in electoral processes.

Of the total 902 candidates certified by the CEC in these elections, 309 were women, accounting for around 34% of all candidates. This level of representation, although it exceeds the minimum threshold set by the gender quota, shows that women's inclusion in electoral lists continues to remain mainly limited to the level of the legal requirement, without reflecting a greater commitment to achieving full gender equality in the political race.

Among the main political entities, the LVV included 39 women in its list of candidates, or about 35% of its list, while the LDK included 38 women, also about 35%. The PDK and the AAK each included 37 women in their lists, which constituted about 34% of the candidates. These data show that, although political entities have guaranteed a minimum level of women's representation in electoral lists, exceeding the quota has remained limited. In this regard, the gap between the minimum electoral quota of 30% and the principle of full gender equality of 50%, as defined by the Law on Gender Equality, continues to remain a challenge for the political system in Kosovo.

Women's representation in electoral institutions

Of 12,835 officials engaged as members of Polling Station Councils in the 7 June 2026 elections, only 5,081 were women. In the composition of Municipal Election Commissions (MECs), out of a total of 212 officials, only 57 were women. The political entity with the highest inclusion of women in MECs was Lëvizja Vetëvendosje with 14, or 36.8%, followed by the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo with 11 women, or 28.9%, the Democratic League of Kosovo with 7 women, or

18.4%, the Democratic Party of Kosovo with 7 women, or 16.21%, Za Slobodno Pravdu i Opstanak with 5 women, or 35.7%, KDTP with 4 women, or 80%, the Serbian List with 4 women, or 27.5%, IRDK with 4 women, or 42%, Koalicija Vakati with 1 woman, or 33%, Nova Stranka Demokratska with 1 woman, or 20%, and the Progressive Movement of Roma of Kosovo with 1 woman, or 100%.


Even at the highest institutional levels, gender representation remained uneven. Only three of the 10 current members of the CEC are women. Women made up about 26.9% of polling station commission members – still a low percentage for a system that aims for inclusiveness.

Results and representation in the Assembly

The election results show that 41 women MPs will be represented in the new composition of the Assembly of Kosovo, the same number as in the elections of 28 December 2025. Of them, 35 were elected through merit votes, while 6 secured their mandates through the gender quota mechanism provided by the Law on General Elections.

In the previous legislature, there was an increase in women's participation in parliamentary leadership positions. The Assembly was led by a woman as Speaker, while two women served as Deputy Speakers. Two parliamentary groups were also led by women, and seven parliamentary committees were chaired by women MPs.

Although these developments represent progress in increasing women's participation in parliamentary life, the level of representation remains far from the principle of gender equality. The fact that the number of elected women remained unchanged compared with the previous elections shows that progress in this regard has stagnated. Moreover, most women who won mandates belong to a single political entity, suggesting that the increase in representation is not the result of an equal commitment by all political parties to promote women, but mainly reflects the electoral results and the structure of mandates won by that entity.



POLITICAL ENTITY			TOTAL
			
Nova Demokratska Stranka	19	 11 (37%)	30
Egyptian Liberal Party	28	 13 (32%)	41
United Roma Party of Kosovo - PREBK	23	 11 (32%)	34
PSA	44	 22 (33%)	66
Socijaldemokratska Unija - SDU	16	 11 (41%)	27
Srpska Lista	15	 10 (40%)	25
Za Slobodu Pravdu i Opstanak	7	 3 (30%)	10
PSD	4	 2 (33%)	6
Esmir Kasi	1	 0 (0%)	1
TOTAL	593	  309 (34%)	902

TABLE 3: Gender composition of the certified lists of political entities

POLITICAL ENTITY			TOTAL
			
LVV - Lëvizja Vetëvendosje!	24	 14 (36.84%)	38
Aleanca për Ardhmerinë e Kosovës	27	 11 (35%)	38
LDK - Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës	31	 7 (35%)	38
Partia Demokratike e Kosovës	31	 6 (35%)	37
Za Slobodu Pravdu i Opstanak	9	 5 (35%)	14
KDTP	1	 4 (35%)	5
Serbian List	10	 4 (35%)	14
IRDK	4	 3 (35%)	7
Koalicia Vakut	2	 1 (35%)	3
NDS	4	 1 (35%)	5
Levizja Përparimtare e Romëve të Kosovës	0	 1 (100%)	1
Socijaldemokratska Unija - SDU	2	 0 (0.00%)	1
JEDINSTVENA GORANSKA PARTIJA	1	 0 (0.00%)	1
PSA	5	 0 (0.00%)	1
PLE	4	 0 (0.00%)	0

TABLE 4: Gender Composition of Municipal Election Commissions

6. ELECTION OBSERVATION

Election observation for the 7 June 2026 process was carried out by political entities, local civil society organizations, international organizations, local and international media, diplomatic missions and one local institution. According to CEC decisions, the total number of observers accredited for this process was 16,543.

The CEC initially accredited the first group of 761 observers. On 2 June 2026, at its 60th meeting, a second group of 15,782 observers was accredited. Following these decisions, the electoral process was covered by 14,925 observers from political entities, 796 observers from 13 local NGOs, 130 observers from four international organizations, 457 observers from 39 local media outlets, 78 observers from 23 international media outlets, 90 observers from six diplomatic missions and 67 observers from one local institution.

Most accredited observers belonged to political entities. Lëvizja Vetëvendosje had 3,879 observers, PDK 3,789, LDK 3,253 and AAK 2,541. This broad presence of political entities at polling stations and in subsequent phases of the process contributed to mutual control of the process by the electoral contestants themselves. At the same time, domestic observation by civil society organizations remained important for the independent assessment of the process and for public reporting on election administration.

Observer accreditation took place without major delays and without disputes that would affect the overall ability to observe the process. The high number of accredited observers shows that the CEC, in practical terms, enabled a broad presence of stakeholders in the electoral process. Observers had access to polling stations, polling centres and counting phases, including Municipal Counting Centres and the Counting and Results Centre, in accordance with accreditation rules.

The majority of accredited observers belonged to political entities.

	MONITORS
LVV	3,879
PDK	3,789
LDK	3,253
AAK	2,541

This broad presence of political entities at polling stations and in the subsequent stages of the process contributed to the mutual control of the process by the electoral contestants themselves.

DnV observed the process through a local mission extended to the main stages of the elections. On election day, DnV deployed over 600 observers, of which 500 in polling stations selected according to the PVT methodology, as well as mobile teams to monitor the atmosphere in and around the polling stations.

However, the accreditation process was conducted on the basis of the new Regulation on Election Observers, which had expanded administrative requirements for applicant organizations. DiA has assessed that some of these requirements go beyond what is provided by the Law on General Elections and make the accreditation process more burdensome than necessary for observation purposes.

During the review of applications, the CEC supported the recommendation to refuse accreditation to Radio-televizija Vojvodine. According to the reasoning provided, the applicant presented itself as a local media outlet but was not registered with the Independent Media Commission or the Press Council of Kosova, and instead of the relevant certificate had submitted an identification card of the media outlet.

These elections did not have a full international election observation mission comparable to the large observation missions that usually cover all phases of the electoral process. However, the presence of international organizations, diplomatic missions, international media and domestic observers contributed to increasing the transparency of the process. In this context, the role of

domestic observers was particularly important, especially on election day and during counting in the MCSs.

DiA observed the process through a domestic mission deployed across the main phases of the elections. On Election Day, DiA engaged more than 600 observers, including 500 in polling stations selected according to the PVT methodology, as well as mobile teams to monitor the atmosphere in and around polling centres. After election day, DiA continued observation in Municipal Counting Centres through around 100 observers in the field, while legal and professional teams followed institutional decision-making and complaint processes.

Overall, the large presence of observers from political entities, local organizations, media and international missions created opportunities for continuous monitoring of the process. Observation is a guarantee for the credibility of elections and should not be treated as an administrative process more burdensome than required to maintain order and the integrity of the process.

7. ELECTION DAY

Democracy in Action observed Election Day through 500 observers deployed in 500 polling stations selected according to a random representative sample. This methodology enabled DiA to collect comparable and statistically reliable data on the opening of polling stations, the conduct of voting, turnout, compliance with procedures, secrecy of the vote, closing of polling stations and preliminary results for political entities. In addition to polling station observers, DiA also engaged mobile teams to monitor the atmosphere in and around polling centres.

The voting process on 7 June 2026 took place calmly and without serious incidents that would undermine the overall integrity of the elections. Voters were able to exercise their right to vote freely, while irregularities identified during the day were mainly procedural, technical or related to practical organization in polling stations and polling centres.

Polling stations generally opened on time. Only 1.6% of observed polling stations opened late. The main reasons were the absence of a commissioner at the moment of opening or technical issues in specific polling stations. These delays were limited and did not affect the overall conduct of voting.

Several technical shortcomings were also identified during the opening phase. Problems with the functioning or placement of cameras were reported in around 2% of polling stations. In certain cases, improper positioning or functioning of cameras may raise concerns about the secrecy of the vote. In addition, 16% of polling stations had no women members in the composition of the Polling Station Council.

One of the most frequent problems during the day was voters' difficulty in finding the correct polling station. By the close of the process, such cases had been reported in 67% of observed polling stations. Up to 10 cases were reported in 54% of polling stations, 11 to 30 cases in 11%, while a smaller number of polling stations recorded even more cases. This shows that the problem was widespread, although in most polling stations it did not reach a level that would seriously obstruct the process. This problem is not related only to the accuracy of the voter list.

The CEC had enabled online verification of polling centres and used additional forms of information, including SMS notifications. However, in practice, a large number of citizens continued to have difficulty finding the polling station within the centre to which they had been assigned. This was observed especially in larger polling centres, where the number of polling stations within one facility makes orientation more difficult.

Turnout was considerably lower than in the last two parliamentary processes. According to DiA data, turnout by the close of polling stations was around 37%, excluding conditional votes and votes from outside Kosova. In the parliamentary elections of 28 December 2025, turnout was around 45%, while in the elections of 9 February 2025 it was 44.1%. The drop in turnout was one of the clearest indicators of electoral fatigue and lower citizen interest in a third electoral process within a short period.

Lower turnout was not accompanied by problems in exercising the right to vote. The process was open, competitive and without incidents that would intimidate or obstruct voters in an organized manner. However, low turnout remains an important political and democratic development because it shows that repeated elections and institutional crises have affected citizens' motivation to participate in the process.

Assisted voting was identified at considerably lower levels than in previous electoral processes. Stricter enforcement of the rules by commissioners helped limit this practice, which in earlier elections had been one of the most problematic phenomena on Election Day. In 66.8% of polling stations, commissioners were reported to have requested medical documents or other evidence in up to 10 cases, while in 36.8% of polling stations there were cases where voters were not allowed to vote with assistance due to lack of relevant documentation.

The decline in assisted voting is a positive development for the integrity of the vote. However, stricter enforcement of the rules should be accompanied by care to ensure that voters who genuinely need assistance are not prevented from exercising their right to vote. DiA also identified limited cases where assisted voting was not recorded in the Poll Book.



Turnout in the election was significantly lower than in the last two parliamentary processes.

The decline in turnout was one of the clearest indicators of election fatigue and lower citizen interest in a third electoral process within a short period.

7 june 2026
37%

28 december 2025
45%

9 february 2025
44.1%



During the day, 39 cases of photographing the ballot were reported. This phenomenon continues to be concerning, even when it appears in limited numbers. Photographing the vote violates the principle of secrecy and may be linked to pressure, vote buying or proof of voting for third parties.

During voting, cases were also identified of voters being identified with expired Kosova documents. Such cases were reported in 28.6% of polling stations, mainly in small numbers. One to four cases were reported in 26.2% of polling stations, five to ten cases in 2.2%, and more than ten cases in only 0.2%. This shows that the implementation of voter identification rules was not fully uniform across all polling stations, although the phenomenon did not reach a scale that would affect the overall assessment of the process.

Physical access to polling centres remained a problem for some citizens. According to DiA observers, around 19% of polling centres did not provide suitable conditions for easy access for persons with physical disabilities. This is a recurring problem and is linked to the selection of facilities used for voting, the absence of minimal infrastructure adaptations and the lack of early planning with municipalities.

In some polling centres, promotional materials were identified within the prohibited 100-metre perimeter. These cases were limited and did not dominate or affect the atmosphere of Election Day.

The closing of polling stations was generally orderly. In 93.2% of polling stations, closing took place between 19:00 and 19:15. Only in isolated cases were polling stations closed before 19:00 or after 19:15. In polling stations where citizens were in line at the time of closing, voters were generally allowed to vote in accordance with electoral rules. After polling stations closed, election material was prepared for delivery to Municipal Counting Centres.

Overall, DiA assesses that Election Day took place in a calm, orderly manner and without serious incidents. Voters were able to exercise their right to vote, while the election administration at polling stations managed the process without major interruptions. The main findings of the day relate to considerably lower turnout, voters' difficulties in finding their polling station, insufficient access for persons with disabilities, cases of photographing ballots and the not fully uniform implementation of several procedures.

These shortcomings did not undermine the overall integrity of the elections, but they show that administration at polling station and polling centre level requires technical improvements.

8. ELECTION RESULTS

The process of announcing results in the early parliamentary elections of 7 June 2026 took place more quickly and with fewer disputes than in previous processes. Unlike the 2025 elections, when the publication and certification of results were accompanied by long delays, technical problems and public uncertainty, this time the phase after election day was more orderly.

The CEC published preliminary results for political entities during election night, without repeating the technical problems that had damaged the process in earlier elections. The results publication platform was functional and enabled citizens, civil society, media and political entities to follow the progress of results in real time.

The phase of counting candidate votes in Municipal Counting Centres also took place with fewer problems. The process was not accompanied by major delays in starting, long interruptions or general procedural uncertainty. The problems identified were mainly technical and related to specific tables or polling stations, while in most cases they were corrected during the process. This made the counting phase more controllable and less contestable than in the latest elections.

At the Counting and Results Centre, procedures for conditional votes, votes of persons with special needs, votes from outside Kosova and postal votes were administered without significant delays. Assessment of postal packages and counting of out-of-country votes did not produce a procedural crisis and did not drag out the announcement of final results. Increased counting capacity and more regular public information helped this phase close more clearly than in previous processes.

Part of the post-election process was the recount of 185 regular polling stations decided by the CEC. This recount covered 7.41% of regular polling stations and was completed within a short period, from 18 to 19 June. The recount results showed very limited changes in votes for political entities, with an absolute change of 56 votes and a net effect of 16 votes. Changes in candidate votes were more numerous, but mostly small and linked to the more complex nature of preferential voting.

These data support the assessment that the errors identified during counting did not carry weight in the overall election result. They point more to human and procedural errors in reading, categorizing or recording votes, especially preferential votes, than to structured problems in the administration of results.

On 27 June 2026, the CEC decided to announce the final results of the early elections for the Assembly of the Republic of Kosova. The results were announced 20 days after Election Day. These results were certified on 8 July, 31 days after Election Day. This timeframe represents a clear improvement compared with the February 2025 elections, when certification of results had taken 46 days.

According to the final results, Lëvizja Vetëvendosje came first with 382,869 votes, or 47.13%, winning 53 seats. PDK received 157,892 votes, or 19.44%, and won 22 seats. LDK received 135,567 votes, or 16.69%, and won 18 seats, while AAK received 54,729 votes, or 6.74%, and won 7 seats. These four entities won all 100 non-guaranteed seats in the Assembly.

In the seats guaranteed for the Serb community, Srpska Lista won 9 mandates, while one mandate was allocated to Za Slobodu Pravdu i Opstanak. In the seats guaranteed for other non-majority communities, KDTP won two mandates, while Koalicija Vakrat, IRDK, NDS, SDU, PSA, the Egyptian Liberal Party, JGP and PREBK won one mandate each.

The gender composition of the new Assembly shows that women will represent more than the legal minimum of 30%. Of the 120 elected MPs, 41 are women, or 34.2% of the Assembly's composition. This keeps women's representation above the constitutional and legal threshold, but still far from equal representation.

Lëvizja Vetëvendosje



47.13%
382,869 votes

Partia Demokratike e Kosovës



19.44%
157,892 votes

Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës




16.69%
135,567 votes

Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës



6.74%
54,729 votes

These four entities won all **100 non-guaranteed Assembly seats.**



35/41

Of the 41 women elected, 35 were elected through meritorious votes, while 6 mandates are the result of the application of the gender quota.

This shows that in this process, the majority of elected women have secured their mandate directly through the vote of citizens.

Of the 41 elected women, 35 were elected through merit votes, while 6 mandates resulted from the application of the gender quota. This shows that in this process most elected women secured their mandate directly through citizens' votes. However, the quota continued to play a decisive role in some political entities and remains a necessary mechanism for guaranteeing minimum gender representation.

In LVV, all 19 elected women won mandates through preferential votes. In LDK as well, all six elected women were within the winning ranking based on votes. By contrast, in PDK two of the seven elected women entered the Assembly through the gender quota. In AAK, all three elected women entered through application of the quota. In Srpska Lista, one of the three elected women received a mandate because of the quota. These cases show that, despite improvement in preferential votes for women in some lists, the quota still plays a corrective role in entities where women do not enter the winning range through votes alone.

After the announcement of final results, political entities and candidates had the legal deadline of 48 hours to file complaints with the Election Complaints and Appeals Panel. At this stage, five complaints were filed against the results. ECAP rejected all complaints, finding no basis for intervention or change in the results announced by the CEC.

After the announcement of final results, five complaints against the results were submitted to ECAP. Two related to preferential votes within the PDK list and requested a broader recount of candidate votes. The other three complaints related to the guaranteed seats of non-majority communities and contested votes won by certain entities in settlements where complainants claimed the demographic structure did not correspond to the community profile of the beneficiary entity. ECAP rejected all complaints, assessing that there was no sufficient basis for intervention in the results announced by the CEC.

Following ECAP decisions, the parties had the right to appeal to the Supreme Court. The parties exercised this right and submitted appeals to the Supreme Court within the legal deadline. They repeated their claims before the Supreme Court, challenging ECAP decisions rejecting the complaints. Through the appeals, the parties requested from the Supreme Court a full recount of candidate votes within PDK and review of the validity of votes

of political entities for guaranteed seats in the Assembly of Kosovo, claiming that minority parties had received votes in places where the community for which those political entities were competing was not represented. The Supreme Court decided within the legal deadline to reject all appeals as unfounded, upholding ECAP's decisions and leaving in force the CEC decision announcing the final results.

In DiA's assessment, the process of announcing results in the 7 June elections was among the most improved parts of this electoral cycle. Publication of preliminary results, counting in MCSs, handling of votes in the CRC, recounts and announcement of final results took place without major delays and without problems that would undermine confidence in the result.

However, the process showed that the accuracy of preferential votes remains the most sensitive area of results administration. The errors identified through the recount were limited, but they are directly related to the ranking of candidates within lists and can therefore generate disputes even when they do not affect the results of political entities. Overall, the results of the 7 June elections were administered more efficiently, more transparently and with fewer disputes than in recent electoral processes.

9. ELECTORAL JUSTICE

Kosova's legal framework provides detailed rules, procedural guidance and accelerated deadlines for filing and reviewing complaints at all stages of the electoral process. Interested parties have the right to challenge inclusion in or exclusion from the voter list, certification of political entities and candidates, violations during the campaign, irregularities on election day and during counting, as well as the final results announced by the Central Election Commission (CEC). The Election Complaints and Appeals Panel (ECAP) is the central instance for handling electoral disputes and has full competence to review complaints against CEC decisions and violations of electoral rules.

ECAP decisions are appealable to the Supreme Court in cases involving fines above the legal threshold or affecting fundamental electoral rights. As a permanent and independent body appointed by the Kosova Judicial Council, ECAP functions as a specialized judicial mechanism for protecting the integrity of the electoral process and ensuring the swift resolution of disputes.

ECAP and the Supreme Court demonstrated a high level of professionalism and consistency in handling electoral matters. Decisions were taken within the legal deadlines and, in general, reflected a stable interpretation of legal provisions. Compared with some earlier electoral processes, no pronounced inconsistencies in decision-making practice or cases creating legal uncertainty for participants in the process were identified.

In addition to ECAP and the Supreme Court, the Prosecution and law-enforcement bodies also played an important role in protecting the integrity of the process. During the electoral period, a number of cases related to suspected criminal offences against electoral rights were handled, including allegations of violations of the free will of voters and other forms of unlawful influence on the electoral process.

On Election Day, the engagement of a large number of prosecutors and coordination with the Kosova Police contributed to a rapid response to reported cases and to maintaining public confidence in the process. Overall, DiA assesses that the electoral justice system func-


tioned effectively during this electoral process. The professional approach of the responsible institutions, respect for procedural deadlines and the effectiveness of legal remedies contributed to resolving electoral disputes and strengthening confidence in the legality of the process.

Nature of ECAP decisions

In the early parliamentary elections of 7 June 2026, electoral justice was characterized by a relatively limited number of complaints and by the absence of disputes that would risk institutional stability or the integrity of the process. This represents a clear difference from some previous cycles, where electoral justice had become an arena for strong political clashes. In this cycle, electoral complaints remained mainly administrative and disciplinary in nature.

From the announcement of the 7 June 2026 parliamentary elections until the announcement of final results, the Election Complaints and Appeals Panel received and reviewed a total of 58 complaints. Most related to initial decisions of the Central Election Commission, including proportional appointment of members of Municipal Election Commissions, certification of political entities and candidates, accreditation of NGO observers, and complaints concerning the annulment of administrative decisions issued by the CEC.

During the campaign and post-election phase, ECAP also reviewed complaints related to violations of election campaign rules, challenges to the counting of preferential votes in Municipal Counting Centres, and complaints against the final decision announcing the election results. The structure of the complaints filed is as follows:



- ▼
- 9** complaints concerning the use of children in the election campaign;
- 3** complaints concerning the placement of election material in public spaces;
- 3** complaints concerning the distribution or display of any type of material in a polling centre or within 100 metres of it;
- 2** complaints concerning incitement to hatred;
- 1** complaint concerning the use of public resources;
- 1** complaint concerning the holding of a political rally without notification to the MEC;

During this period, ECAP also issued a particularly important decision to safeguard the legality of the out-of-country voting process, annulling the CEC decision allowing voting in diplomatic missions with expired documents. This case was filed by DiA's legal representatives, and the decision was also confirmed by the Supreme Court.^{4 5}

Analysis of ECAP decisions on campaign violations

By 7 June 2026, the Election Complaints and Appeals Panel (ECAP) had received a total of 19 complaints concerning violations committed during the election campaign by political entities. In these cases, ECAP issued 18 decisions, of which 9 were approving, 7 rejecting, 1 complaint was dismissed as inadmissible and 1 complaint was dismissed as late.

For established violations of the Code of Conduct during the election campaign, ECAP imposed fines on political entities in the total amount of 26,100 euros. A considerable share of these fines was related to the use of children in public campaign activities.

Lëvizja Vetëvendosje was fined 11,100 euros for using children in the campaign, in rallies held in Vushtrri, Podujevë and two others in Lipjan. The Democratic League of Kosova was fined 11,000 euros for using children in its campaign held in the municipalities of Viti and Lipjan. The Alliance for the Future of Kosova was fined 2,000 euros for using children in the campaign in a case during a rally in Deçan. The political entity Serbian List was fined 2,000 euros for placing posters on public roads in the municipality of Novobërdë.^{6 7 8 9}

The remaining complaints were rejected by ECAP mainly on the grounds that they were unfounded, or were dismissed as late or inadmissible.

Another important element of this process is the fact that during this election campaign ECAP did not issue any fine for violations involving inciting or hateful lan-

guage against political entities or candidates. This indicates a higher level of restraint and maturity in political discourse, mainly also reflecting the deterrent effect of the punitive practice of previous years.

Complaints and decisions during the counting procedure in MCSs and the CRC

Regarding the process of counting votes in Municipal Counting Centres (MCSs) across Kosova, the Election Complaints and Appeals Panel (ECAP) received a total of seven complaints filed by certain political entities and by voters.

Of these seven complaints, ECAP issued five rejecting decisions and two approving decisions. Specifically, it approved two complaints filed by the political entity Serbian List concerning the counting process in the MCS of Ranillug municipality, where ECAP found that in these two cases ballots for this political entity had not been counted correctly. The cases involved five ballots marked with the symbols “=”, “%” and “@”, which had been declared invalid by the MCS in Ranillug.

ECAP found that in these cases the voter’s intention was clearly determined and that declaring these five ballots invalid was unlawful. For this reason, it ordered the CEC and the relevant MCS to count these votes as valid and register them in the election results. The other five complaints were rejected as unfounded. These included a complaint filed by an LDK candidate concerning the process in the Peja MCS, a PDK complaint against an LVV commissioner in the Ferizaj MCS, a Serbian List complaint concerning the process in the Ranillug MCS, and two complaints filed by voters A.P. against the MCS in Kaçanik and A.K. against the MCS in Gjakovë.

Complaints to ECAP against the recount in the CRC

Regarding complaints against the vote recount process in the CRC, ECAP handled a total of two complaints filed by two PDK candidates for MP, Bekim Haxhiu¹⁰ and Qëndrim Kryeziu.¹¹

In their complaints, they claimed that the CEC decision to recount 185 ballot boxes counted in MCSs left room to doubt whether the votes counted for MPs in MCSs had been accurate. According to them, after the voting process ended, candidate votes were counted in Municipal Counting Centres while results were administered by the Central Election Commission. During the process, the CEC found circumstances requiring additional verification of the accuracy of the counting of votes for candidates for MP. On this basis, through decision 01/1300-2026, the CEC ordered the recount of 185 regular polling stations at the Counting and Results Centre. The recount ended on 19 June and its results were published by the CEC.

According to their claims, particularly in the complaint of candidate Bekim Haxhiu, official data showed that although 185 polling stations had been recounted, these represented only around 7.41% of the total 2,498 polling stations in which candidate votes were counted nationwide. According to the results, of the total 147,594 votes won by PDK, only 5,201 votes were recounted, representing approximately 3.52% of all votes of PDK and its candidates for MP, while more than 96.48% of PDK candidate votes were not verified through the recount process. According to the complaints, the recount result could not be considered reliable without a comprehensive verification of the accuracy of the initial count when only a minimal part of the political entity’s votes had been checked. These claims by the complainants were dismissed as unfounded by ECAP and later by the Supreme Court of Kosova.

4 ECAP, decision dated 5 June 2026. Available at: <https://smaa.rks-gov.net/documents/51968.pdf>
5 Kosova, ruling dated 11 June 2026. Available at: <https://smaa.rks-gov.net/documents/52125.pdf>
6 ECAP, decision dated 6 June 2026 <https://smaa.rks-gov.net/documents/51977.pdf>
7 Ibid, <https://smaa.rks-gov.net/documents/51976.pdf>
8 Ibid, <https://smaa.rks-gov.net/documents/51982.pdf>
9 Ibid, <https://smaa.rks-gov.net/documents/51971.pdf>

10 See ECAP decision in case A.nr.52/26 dated 22 June 2026, published at: <https://smaa.rks-gov.net/documents/52183.pdf>
11 Ibid., decision in case A.nr.53/26, dated 22 June 2026, published at <https://smaa.rks-gov.net/documents/52184.pdf>

Decisions by ECAP and the Supreme Cour

Initially, according to ECAP and the Supreme Court decisions in the cases at issue, it was clarified that the complainants were fully aware of the established practice and the consistency of that practice regarding the cases in which ECAP and the Supreme Court have ordered the CEC to conduct a recount, or in which a recount has been applied. According to the reasoning of the relevant decisions, the complainants claimed in their complaints that there was concrete evidence, but it was not clear where that concrete evidence was. If the complaint referred only to the CEC decision to return a counting process for verification and recount, this was insufficient evidence to approve the complaints and the request for recount.¹²

Moreover, when reviewing the appeals against the relevant decisions, the Supreme Court emphasized in both cases that under no circumstances was there arbitrariness in the challenged ECAP decisions, but rather legality and discretion based on evidence, because the legal provision limits ECAP precisely in order to prevent arbitrary decision-making.¹³

According to the Supreme Court, the complainants' claims that the error identified by the CEC in the recount and the post-recount result alone constituted a sufficient basis in the concrete case did not amount to a sufficient basis for a recount procedure. Electoral processes are fast processes with deadlines; intervention by ECAP and the Supreme Court in these processes applies only in cases where the rights of candidates or competing entities are violated, and such violation must be proven by the complainants through either direct concrete evidence or circumstantial evidence raising a well-founded suspicion. Otherwise, claims such as those in the appeal do not constitute a sufficient basis.

Complaints after the announcement of final results

After the CEC announced final results on 27 June, a total of five complaints were filed with the Election Complaints and Appeals Panel, all of which were rejected as

unfounded. Specifically, two complaints were filed by candidates of the Democratic Party of Kosova, Bekim Haxhiu and Qëndrim Kryeziu; two complaints by the political entity Nova Demokratska Stranka - NDS; and one complaint by the political entity Serbian List.¹⁴

In the complaints filed by the two candidates for MP from the Democratic Party of Kosova, they requested a full recount of candidate votes for that party. According to them, ECAP should approve the complaints as grounded because there had been inaccuracies in calculating the votes of candidates for MP within this party during counting and recounting. The Serbian List, in its complaint, claimed that Nenad Rašić's party (ZSP0) had obtained votes in municipalities where, according to the 2024 Kosova population census, the Serb community practically does not exist. Similarly, the political entity NDS complained against Nenad Rašić's party and Koalicija Vakati, claiming that these two parties had received votes in polling stations where there was no significant presence of the Bosniak and Serb communities, respectively.

ECAP decisions on complaints concerning final results

On 1 July 2026, the Election Complaints and Appeals Panel, deciding on the complaints of the parties in question, decided to reject all of them as unfounded, thereby leaving in force the CEC decision announcing the final result.¹⁵

First, regarding the complaints filed by PDK candidates, ECAP, in rejecting them, found that the complaints procedure after the announcement of final results is intended to review claims supported by concrete evidence that may call into question the legality or accuracy of the announced result, and not to reassess issues already reviewed during previous phases of the administration and verification of the electoral process. These decisions state that the complaints were based on data already treated previously by ECAP and, in a sense, constituted adjudicated matters.¹⁶ ECAP also rejected the Serbian List complaint, reasoning that its claims were unfound-

ed because the right to vote has two main principles: equality and secrecy, and the voter list does not contain data on voters' ethnicity. There is no legal or constitutional basis to annul votes as invalid because of the nature of ethnicity¹⁷ ECAP provided similar reasoning when rejecting the complaints of NDS, which claimed that Nenad Rašić's party and Koalicija Vakati had received votes in locations where there were no voters of their communities.¹⁸

Despite these ECAP decisions, the parties in question challenged them before the Supreme Court of Kosova.

Appeals and decisions by the Supreme Court

On 7 July 2026, the Supreme Court rejected as unfounded five administrative appeals filed against decisions of the Election Complaints and Appeals Panel (ECAP) concerning the final results of the Early Elections for the Assembly of the Republic of Kosova.

Through judgment AA.nr.29/2026, the Supreme Court rejected the Serbian List's appeal against the ECAP decision (ZP.A.nr.56/2026), which claimed that the political entity "GI - Za Slobodu, Pravdu i Opstanak" (ZSP0) had secured the guaranteed mandate for the Serb community mainly through votes won in Albanian-majority municipalities and polling stations, undermining authentic representation of the Serb community. The Court assessed that electoral legislation does not link the validity of a vote to the voter's ethnicity or the demographic structure of a settlement, and that the complainant had not presented concrete evidence of vote manipulation or irregularities that would affect the election result.¹⁹

Through judgments AA.nr.30/2026 and AA.nr.31/2026, the Supreme Court rejected two appeals filed by candidate Emilija Rexhepi (NDS) against ECAP decisions A.nr.57/2026 and ZP.A.nr.58/2026.²⁰ The Court reiterated

that the Voter List does not contain data on voters' ethnicity, while the CEC does not administer such data, and therefore there is no constitutional or legal basis to assess the validity of votes on the basis of the ethnic structure of settlements. The Court also found that the claims were based on statistical analyses and not on concrete evidence of vote manipulation or violations of electoral procedures.

Meanwhile, through judgments AA.nr.32/2026 and AA.nr.33/2026, the Supreme Court rejected the appeals of PDK candidates Bekim Haxhiu and Qëndrim Kryeziu, filed against ECAP decisions ZP.A.nr.54/2026 and ZP.A.nr.55/2026.²¹ The Court assessed that the CEC report did not constitute a sufficient basis for a general recount, because the corrections identified were sporadic and did not undermine the credibility of the final result or the integrity of the electoral process. It was also emphasized that the recount of 185 polling stations had been carried out within the control mechanisms provided by electoral legislation and not as a result of establishing systematic irregularities.²²

12 Supreme Court of Kosova, decision in case A.A.nr.27/2026, dated 26 June 2026, published at: <https://smaa.rks-gov.net/documents/52185.pdf>
13 Ibid., Supreme Court of Kosova, decision in case A.A.nr.28/2026, dated 25 June 2026, published at: <https://smaa.rks-gov.net/documents/52186.pdf>
14 CEC, notice on the announcement of the final results of the parliamentary elections of 7 June 2026. Published at: <https://kqz-ks.org/dita-e-njezet-1200-mbledhja-e-69-te-kqz-shpalli-rezultatet-perfundimtare-te-zgjedhjeve-per-kuvendin-e-kosoves-7-qershor-2026/>.
15 See ECAP rejecting decisions in cases A.nr.54, 55, 56, 57 and 58/2025, dated 1 July 2026, published at: <https://pzap.rks-gov.net/category/vendimet/>
16 ECAP decisions in cases A.nr.54/2026 and 55/2026, dated 1 July 2026, available at: https://pzap.rks-gov.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/ZP.Anr_54-2026-Vendim.pdf dhe https://pzap.rks-gov.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/ZP.Anr_55-2026-Vendim.pdf

17 Ibid., decision in case A.nr.56/2026, dated 1 July 2026, available at: https://pzap.rks-gov.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/ZP.Anr_56-2026-Vendim.pdf
18 Ibid., decisions in cases A.nr.57 and 58/26, dated 1 July 2026, available at: https://pzap.rks-gov.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/ZP.Anr_57-2026-Vendim.pdf and https://pzap.rks-gov.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/ZP.Anr_58-2026-Vendim.pdf
19 Supreme Court of Kosova, judgment in case AA.nr.29/2026, published on 7 July 2026. Available at: https://supreme.gjyqesori-rks.org/wp-content/uploads/verdicts/SUP_AA%20_29_2026_SQ.pdf
20 Ibid., Supreme Court of Kosova, judgments no. AA.30 and 31/2026, published on 7 July 2026. Available at: https://supreme.gjyqesori-rks.org/wp-content/uploads/verdicts/SUP_AA%20_30_2026_SQ.pdf see also decision A.nr.31 at: https://supreme.gjyqesori-rks.org/wp-content/uploads/verdicts/SUP_AA%20_31_2026_SQ.pdf
21 Supreme Court of Kosova, judgment in case AA.Nr.32/2026, published on 7 July 2026. Available at: https://supreme.gjyqesori-rks.org/wp-content/uploads/verdicts/SUP_AA%20_32_2026_SQ.pdf
22 Supreme Court of Kosova, judgment in case AA.Nr.33/2026, published on 7 July 2026. Available at: https://supreme.gjyqesori-rks.org/wp-content/uploads/verdicts/SUP_AA%20_33_2026_SQ.pdf

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings and assessments from the observation of the early parliamentary elections of 7 June 2026, Democracy in Action presents the following recommendations, aimed at improving election administration and addressing the issues identified during this process. The recommendations relate to aspects such as the functioning of electoral bodies, out-of-country voting, counting, implementation of procedures at polling stations and the handling of electoral complaints.

However, DiA assesses that the next electoral reform process should not be limited only to technical issues. Whenever the Assembly of Kosovo initiates the electoral reform process, the discussion should also include broader elements of the electoral system, including **preferential voting, electoral districts, the electoral threshold, the method of electing the President** and other rules that further have a direct impact on the formation and functionality of institutions. This discussion should also include a review, respectively advancement, of **legal eligibility criteria for candidacy**, in particular by prohibiting the candidacy of persons convicted by a final decision for criminal offences related to corruption, abuse of official duty or violation of the integrity of public office, regardless of the type and severity of the sentence imposed. The Assembly should also open discussion on the **institutional model of the Central Election Commission**, including its composition, mandate and method of decision-making. In this regard, the possibility of balancing the composition of the CEC with non-political members should also be examined. These issues require a separate political and institutional debate, conducted in an inclusive and transparent manner.

Within the next electoral reform, the Assembly should also consider the possibility of codifying electoral legislation into a unified document, in line with practices recommended by OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission. This would place electoral reform on a single and harmonized basis, rather than partial interventions in different laws, regulations and decisions, which often create uncertainty for implementing institutions and participants in the process.

Since the 7 June elections were held only a few months after the previous process of 28 December 2025, some of the recommendations issued by DiA after the last elections remain valid. The short time between the two processes did not allow real space for legal changes. However, this process showed that several areas have improved.

The following recommendations are addressed to institutions and actors that have a direct role in adopting electoral legislation or administering the electoral process, including the Assembly of Kosovo, the CEC, electoral bodies at local level, ECAP, the Supreme Court, justice and security institutions, political entities, candidates, media and civil society organizations.

I. Election administration by the CEC and electoral bodies

1 The CEC's authority to take decisions and issue acts related to electoral operations should be limited while those operations are already under way, in order to guarantee legal certainty and the principle that the rules of the process should not be changed during its implementation. These limitations should apply to each electoral phase and operation, including the election campaign, out-of-country voting, certification of candidates, Election Day, counting and other operations.

2 CEC by-laws should remain within the authorisations provided by law. The CEC should not introduce additional criteria for political entities, candidates, observers or media if those criteria are not provided for by law or do not clearly derive from its legal competences.

3 CEC decision-making on the recommendations of the Office for Registration, Certification and Financial Control of Political Entities should be regulated according to a negative voting model. For issues such as the certification of political entities and candidates, the Office's recommendations should be considered approved unless they are voted down by a majority or by two-thirds of CEC members, depending on the threshold set by law. In case of rejection, the CEC should provide legal and factual reasoning for disagreeing with the Office's recommendation.

4 CEC decision-making through electronic circulation should be limited only to technical and procedural matters. Decisions that affect the rights of political entities, candidates, voters, media or observers should be

addressed in public meetings, with debate, reasoning and a recorded vote.bledhje publike, me debat, arsyetim dhe votim të regjistruar.

5 The new Regulation on Election Observers should be reviewed, while keeping the previous provisions in force. The criteria for accrediting observers should be clear, proportionate and directly based on the Law on General Elections. Accreditation should serve to verify the legal conditions for observation, not to introduce additional administrative requirements that are not necessary for the integrity of the process.

6 The system for digital publication of election results should be treated as a strategic priority of the CEC, not as a technical solution prepared separately for each electoral process. The CEC should set clear rules on the functioning, testing, maintenance, security and auditing of the results publication platform, including real-time publication, data retention, tracking of changes and back-up mechanisms in case of technical problems.

7 After every electoral process, the CEC should publish a post-election report on the administration of the process. The report should include an assessment of each electoral phase, key decisions, identified problems, costs, capacities used, performance of electoral bodies and recommendations for improvement. The report should also include an internal assessment of the division of responsibilities between the CEC, the Secretariat and electoral bodies in phases where delays, uncertainties or the need for additional decisions arose during the process. This document should be published as a standard after every electoral process and should be separate from the CEC's regular annual reporting.

- 8 A Code of Conduct for CEC members should be adopted, setting standards for discourse and language during CEC meetings.** To preserve institutional integrity and a democratic working environment, a code of conduct for CEC members should be adopted and should include sanctions in cases of violations.
- 9 More rigorous training and testing should be conducted for Polling Station Council members** before they are assigned to polling stations, so that their duties and responsibilities are carried out more professionally. Priority should be given to the counting process and to the most frequent violations, such as abuse of assisted voting, violation of the secrecy of the vote and similar issues. In this regard, political entities should also nominate commissioners with integrity and proper professional preparation.
- 10 An assessment system should be created for election staff, which after each process records the performance of Polling Station Council members, MCS staff and other persons engaged in election administration.** Persons with good performance should have priority for engagement in future processes, while persons with confirmed violations, negligence in duty or repeated mistakes should not be re-engaged without additional training, verification or a reasoned decision by the CEC.

Voter List and Voter Services:

- 1 The CEC, the Civil Registration Agency and the Kosova Judicial Council should have a regular mechanism for exchanging data that affect the cleaning of the Voter List.** This mechanism should define deadlines, a standardised data format and clear responsibilities for updating the list with deceased persons, persons who have lost citizenship and persons who do not have the right to vote under final court decisions. Verification should be carried out continuously, not only on the eve of elections.

- 2 The CEC should use additional information mechanisms for voters whose polling centre or polling station changes from one electoral process to another.** In addition to the online platform and SMS notifications, voters affected by changes should be informed more directly about the new centre, the polling station number and the exact location.

Out-of-country voting:

- 1 The CEC should adopt a special protocol for receiving, transporting and delivering ballot packages from outside Kosova to the CRC.** The protocol should define who receives the packages, how their number is recorded, how the date and place of receipt are documented, how the material is stored during transport and how handover in Kosova is carried out. These data should be kept as part of the election documentation and, in summary form, published after the process of receiving out-of-country votes is completed.
- 2 The CEC should establish a mechanism for tracking postal voting envelopes from voters outside Kosova.** Voters should be able to verify whether their envelope has been received by the CEC, at which stage of processing it is and whether it has been approved or rejected during assessment. In case of rejection, the notice should state the specific reason for rejection and the deadline for complaint, if the legal deadline is still open.
- 3 An independent and systematic audit of the entire out-of-country voting process should be carried out after every election.** This audit should include registration data, postal procedures and the transport route of envelopes, and should be published in order to increase public confidence.
- 4 The Kosova Police and the State Prosecutor should verify cases where there are suspicions that postal votes from outside Kosova were photographed, published or collected in an organised manner.** The verification should clarify whether the secrecy of the vote was violated, whether the voter acted freely and whether there are elements of an electoral criminal offence.

II. Election Day and polling-station procedures

- 1 The organisational structure of Polling Station Councils should be reviewed and standardised by restoring the position of ballot-box commissioner and clearly defining the duties of each member.** The position of ballot-box commissioner should be restored as a mandatory role, ensuring control over the critical moment of casting the vote.
- 2 The use of marking ink should be reviewed in order to fully guarantee the secrecy of the vote.** Any voter identification mechanism should be certified and in line with the rights to personal data protection and secrecy of the vote. The CEC should move towards electronic voter identification.
- 3 The CEC, in cooperation with municipalities, should ensure accessible polling centres for persons with disabilities.** Physical accessibility should be a mandatory criterion in selecting facilities used for voting. In cases where existing facilities do not provide suitable access, temporary practical measures should be taken before Election Day.
- 4 After the closure of each electoral process, the Poll Books kept at each polling station should be audited by the CEC,** in order to identify and address in detail the irregularities encountered on Election Day.

III. Counting, MCS, CRC and publication of results

- 1 The CEC should establish, through a specific rule, the obligation to publish periodic updates on the progress of counting and processing of results.** During the counting phase in MCSs and processing at the CRC, the CEC should publish, at regular intervals, data on the number of polling stations counted, votes processed, boxes or materials under verification, possible recounts and expected deadlines for completing the main

phases. This publication should be a pre-established obligation and not an ad hoc decision during the process.

- 2 A mandatory standard should be established for publishing detailed data on discrepancies, recount cases and the final result of all boxes processed at the CRC.** Publication of these data should be in open format and accompanied by explanations for each case, in order to strengthen transparency and public trust.
- 3 The concept of transferring counting to MCSs should be reconsidered by assessing the balance between cost, effectiveness and integrity of the process.** The CEC should conduct a comprehensive analysis of the impact of this model on vote integrity and public trust and, on this basis, decide whether it should be expanded, modified or whether counting should be partially returned to polling stations with strengthened oversight mechanisms.
- 4 The CEC should move towards digitalisation of the vote-counting process,** in order to avoid human errors and manipulation.

IV. Electoral justice

- 1 ECAP, in coordination with the CEC and the Supreme Court, should draft and approve an implementing catalogue/guide on hate speech, inciting language and discriminatory expressions during the election campaign, in line with constitutional and international standards on freedom of expression.** The document should serve as an official reference for handling electoral complaints and for informing political entities, candidates and media in advance. It should contain definitions, indicative examples and assessment criteria for distinguishing between permitted political criticism, harsh campaign language and expressions that incite hatred or discrimination against protected groups. Relevant institutions, media representatives, civil society organisations and human rights experts should also be involved in its drafting.

2 Provisions on electoral fines should be reviewed so that sanctions are linked more clearly to the type and gravity of the violation. ECAP should apply a gradation of fines for each type of violation, narrowing the minimum and maximum ranges considered during decision-making. The criteria considered when imposing sanctions should also be defined, including repetition of the violation, its public dissemination, use of media or social networks, impact on the electoral race and whether corrective measures were taken by the political entity or candidate. The criteria for determining fines should be public, so that decision-making is more predictable and sanctions are proportionate to the violation.

3 An indicative framework for electoral sanctions should be published. This would help political entities, candidates and the public better understand which violations are treated as more serious and how the proportionality of fines is determined.

4 ECAP’s capacities should be increased through an increase in the number of staff and the provision of sustainable technical and financial resources. Given the volume of complaints and the importance of handling them efficiently, the possibility of temporarily expanding ECAP capacities during election periods should be considered, through the activation of auxiliary bodies or additional/reserve resources.

5 Decision-making standards between ECAP and the Supreme Court should be harmonised in order to ensure a uniform and coherent approach to electoral justice. The Kosova Judicial Council, through joint training and comparative analyses of case law, should contribute to building a stable and predictable jurisprudence that respects the right to appeal while also protecting the integrity of the electoral process.

6 The mechanism for referring criminal cases to the Prosecution by electoral institutions should be formalised. ECAP and the CEC should have a clear cooperation protocol with the State Prosecutor for reporting cases containing elements of criminal offences. This protocol should include criteria for identifying suspicions, the referral format and deadlines for institutional action.

7 Justice institutions should treat as priority the cases related to violation of vote secrecy, photographing of ballots, pressure on voters, misuse of assisted voting and suspicions of organised voting outside the rules. Even when these cases do not affect the overall result, their handling is important for public confidence in the process.

V. Gender representation

1 Legal amendments should be adopted to transform the 30% quota for women on electoral lists into a progressive objective with annual targets leading towards equal representation (50/50), in line with the Law on Gender Equality. This change should be accompanied by provisions that prevent repeated minimal representation in lists and encourage gender rotation in high positions on lists.


2 The Law on Gender Equality should be implemented at all levels of election administration, including the Central Election Commission, Municipal Election Commissions and Polling Station Councils. This implementation should include the obligation for balanced gender representation in composition and leadership, with annual monitoring reports.

3 Political entities should ensure equal and transparent support for women candidates during the campaign. This includes access to funding, media space, public activities, promotional materials, campaign teams and debate appearances, so that women candidates have a real opportunity for equal competition within the list.


Annex 1: Certified election results and allocation of seats by political entity

Political entity	Votes	Percentage	Seats
Lëvizja VETËVENDOSJE!	382,869	47.13%	53
Democratic Party of Kosova - PDK	157,892	19.44%	22
Democratic League of Kosova - LDK	135,567	16.69%	18
Srpska Lista	43,843	5.40%	9
AAK – Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës	54,729	6.74%	7
Kosova Demokratik Türk Partisi – KDTP	5,709	0.70%	2
Za Slobodu Pravdu i Opstanak	5,447	0.67%	1
Koalicija Vakati	3,910	0.48%	1
Iniciativa e Re Demokratike e Kosovës – IRDK	3,492	0.43%	1
Nova Demokratska Stranka	2,693	0.33%	1
Socijaldemokratska Unija – SDU	2,682	0.33%	1
PSA	2,598	0.32%	1
Egyptian Liberal Party	2,199	0.27%	1
Jedinstvena Goranska Partija	1,650	0.20%	1
United Roma Party of Kosova - PREBK	905	0.11%	1
Total			120

Annexes 2 and 3: Women’s representation by political entity



Political entity	Total seats	Elected women	Elected men	Women elected through preferential votes	Women elected through the quota
● Lëvizja VETËVENDOSJE!	53	19	34	19	0
● PDK	22	7	15	5	2
● LDK	18	6	12	6	0
● AAK	7	3	4	0	3
● Serbian List	9	3	6	2	1
● KDTP	2	1	1	1	0
● Za Slobodu Pravdu i Opstanak	1	0	1	0	0
● Koalicija Vakrat	1	0	1	0	0
● IRDK	1	0	1	0	0
● Nova Demokratska Stranka	1	1	0	1	0
● SDU	1	1	0	1	0
● PSA	1	0	1	0	0
● Egyptian Liberal Party	1	0	1	0	0
● United Gorani Party	1	0	1	0	0
● PREBK	1	0	1	0	0
Total	120	41	79	35	6



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