

# Deadlock in the Kosovo Assembly

and the undermining of  
institutional integrity

JULY, 2025

ANALYSIS





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Transparency International for Kosovo

KDI's mission is to support the  
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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The political crisis that has been going on for over three months has blocked the functioning of one of the main pillars of the constitutional order – the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo. The lack of political compromise and the disregard of the interpretations of the Constitutional Court on its constitution are undermining institutional integrity and have paralyzed the functioning of the state architecture, consequently the control and balance between the powers. This situation has created a vacuum, enabling a government in resignation to act beyond its mandate – approving over 60 acts with a financial value of over 70 million euros – in the absence of democratic control and without proper transparency.

This situation has increased the risk of arbitrary decision-making, misuse of public funds, and undermined the independence of institutions and boards that are legally under the supervision of the Assembly. Furthermore, decisions of the Constitutional Court have been repeatedly ignored, risking that non-implementation of constitutional norms becomes normalized as political behaviour. When decision-makers do not face consequences for constitutional violations, respecting the Constitution begins to be perceived as a political option rather than an unquestionable obligation. This undermines the separation of powers and distorts institutional behaviour, turning institutions from guarantors of the public interest into instruments of the political will of the moment. In this way, citizens' trust in the functioning of the constitutional order is weakened and the country's democratic culture is damaged.

Externally, this crisis has damaged Kosovo's credibility and image in the international arena. The parliamentary deadlock of the Assembly has left several international agreements and reforms necessary for European integration on hold, including the implementation of the EU Growth Plan worth over 800 million euros. At the same

time, other agreements with the IMF, the World Bank and initiatives stemming from the Berlin Process have been blocked or delayed.

In addition to all the institutional and political consequences, one of the most underestimated consequences of the institutional deadlock is the deprivation of citizens from their political representation. The failure to constitute the Assembly has left citizens without representation, depriving them of the right to have a democratic forum where they can articulate their interests and concerns through elected deputies.

Another important decision is that of 26 June 2025, by which the Constitutional Court has determined that the Assembly must be constituted within 30 days of the official announcement of the election results, i.e. by 26 July 2025. This decision clearly states that the election of the President and Vice-Presidents of the Assembly is a prerequisite for the beginning of its functioning as a legislative and decision-making body. To date, this obligation has not been fulfilled, while the constitutional deadline is rapidly approaching. Although the Court has not determined direct sanctions for failure to comply with the deadline, ignoring it constitutes a violation of Article 116 of the Constitution, according to which the decisions of the Court shall be binding on all institutions of the Republic of Kosovo.

The current deadlock is entirely the result of a lack of political will. In this spirit, it is vital that the Assembly be constituted as soon as possible to restore the functionality of the institutions, to protect the constitutional order, and to restore the trust of citizens and international partners in Kosovo's institutions.



# ASSEMBLY AS A GUARANTOR OF DEMOCRATIC FUNCTIONALITY AND INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY







**At the foundation of Kosovo's constitutional order lies the principle of separation of powers, and checks and balances between them, as clearly defined in Article 4 of the Constitution. The state functions on three separate branches of power – the legislative, the executive and the judiciary – each with defined powers and mutually checked by the others.**

The Assembly of Kosovo is the highest legislative and representative body (Article 63 of the Constitution), which directly expresses the sovereignty of the people and exercises legislative power in accordance with democratic principles. Although legislation is not the only function of the Assembly, it remains its main and irreplaceable competence.

In this context, the legislative process, which includes the initiation, consideration, approval, decree and publication of laws, is the foundation of the work of the Assembly. The Government is obliged to implement the laws adopted by the Assembly and there is no room for evasion of this obligation. This report reflects the constitutional logic that clearly separates the roles and responsibilities of the institutions.

In addition to the legislative function, the Assembly plays a central role as a guarantor of reforms and the institutional integrity of the country. As an institution that forms and holds the Government accountable, the Assembly has broad powers to ensure that the policies of the executive are in line with the public interest and legal norms.

Article 97 of the Constitution establishes the political accountability of the Government to the Assembly, giving the latter the right to oversee, be informed and hold the Government to account without time or thematic limitations. This mechanism makes the Assembly a vital instrument for controlling the executive and for protecting the separation of powers.

The Assembly also has a special role in meeting international standards. As an institution that adopts laws and ratifies international agreements, the Assembly is the gateway through which Kosovo harmonizes its legislation with the standards of the European Union, the Council of Europe and other international organizations. This places it

at the center of the reforms needed for European integration and strengthening the rule of law.

Another basic function of the Assembly is the political representation of citizens. As the highest representative body, the Assembly is the only forum where the sovereignty of the people is articulated and exercised through the deputies. In its absence, citizens are left without an institutional mechanism to influence decision-making, address concerns and hold it accountable. This gap not only weakens the connection between society and the state, but also reduces the legitimacy of the policies undertaken during this period.



# DELAYS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORMS, LEGISLATION AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS







**The failure to constitute the Kosovo Assembly has paralyzed the legislative process and the implementation of strategic reforms. According to legal and procedural provisions, any legal initiative that was in parliamentary procedure, whether in first reading, second reading, or even just submitted for review, is automatically returned to the proposer, is not carried over to the new legislature, and in order to enter the procedure again, must be submitted from the beginning. This means that each of these initiatives must proceed in parliamentary procedure from point zero – a process that takes an average of 3 to 6 months.**

As a result of the delays in the constitution of the Assembly, several key reforms<sup>1</sup> are being directly affected due to the lack of decision-making capacity. Although it is standard procedure that legal initiatives return to the proposer after the end of a legislature's mandate, the current delays are excessively postponing their resumption. This applies especially to important initiatives such as Vetting and the package of laws on the Justice Reform, or the Civil Code, which, although they had passed a significant part of the parliamentary procedures – including review in committees and public consultations – now have to be processed again from the beginning, thus wasting time and the progress already achieved. The main risk is that, in addition to significant delays, some of these initiatives may lose political momentum or not be among the priorities of the new legislative agenda.

The failure to constitute the Assembly has a direct impact on the process of reviewing the current budget as well as on the planning and approval of the budget for the next year. This would impose a delicate financial situation, which would bypass the proper establishment of budgetary priorities that coincide with the real and developmental needs of the country.

International agreements are also exposed to the impact of the failure to constitute the Assembly. International agreements have remained unratified, and, even after the constitution, as long as a new Government with a full mandate is not established, they cannot be processed for approval.



### 2.1 The Obstruction of Justice Reform and Critical Legislation

The package of judicial reform laws includes several key initiatives that remain blocked due to the non-functioning of the Assembly. These laws aim to strengthen the justice system and increase the accountability and transparency of institutions. The functioning of the Assembly is necessary not only to adopt these acts on the basis of all the recommendations and observations presented by the Venice Commission, but also to commence the phase of supervising their implementation in practice.

#### VETTING

The constitutional amendments on vetting, approved by the Government and awaiting approval in the Assembly since December 2024, have remained blocked due to the lack of political consensus between the Albanian majority and representatives of non-majority communities, in particular the Serb one.

Vetting is more than a technical procedure, as it aims to cleanse the justice system of individuals with compromised integrity, by strengthening public trust in the judiciary, increasing transparency and making the handling of court cases more efficient.

<sup>1</sup> Although the range of draft laws and other acts that serve systemic reforms is wide and covers many other important areas, for the purposes of this paper, the focus is on reforms in the justice sector – which serve to increase institutional integrity and the fight against corruption.



#### CIVIL CODE

Another important law that remains suspended is the Civil Code, which is fundamental to the country's legal certainty, civil rights and economic development. Further delays risk undermining the entire process, forcing it to start from scratch and creating uncertainty for citizens and investors. This uncertainty also undermines Kosovo's efforts to integrate into the European market, where the harmonisation of civil legislation is one of the basic criteria.

#### OTHER DRAFT LAWS RELATED TO JUSTICE REFORM

Five draft laws that comprise the Joint Statement of Commitments for Reform in the Justice System are blocked, despite having been reviewed and evaluated by the Venice Commission.

These draft laws – on Disciplinary Liability of Judges and Prosecutors; on the Judicial Council; on the Prosecutorial Council; on Integrity Control, Status and Performance Evaluation for Judges and Prosecutors; on the Academy of Justice – address structural weaknesses that have hindered accountability and enabled abuses within the justice system. Without them, the justice system remains exposed to political influence and unable to impose high professional standards on judges and prosecutors.



### 2.2 Jeopardizing the revision and planning of the state budget

Another serious consequence of the failure to constitute the Assembly is the inability to approve the budget revision for 2025 and to prepare the budget for 2026. The budget revision, which usually occurs in the middle of the year, is a necessary process to reflect real needs and changes that occur during the fiscal year. In its absence, dozens of requests from institutions and municipalities remain unaddressed, hindering planned services and investments.<sup>2</sup>

Moreover, in the event of a further prolongation of the deadlock in the Assembly, the preparation of the 2026 budget is expected to be carried out by an outgoing government, without full political legitimacy and without the support of the Assembly. This process, which usually requires a broad institutional and public dialogue, loses its democratic basis and increases the risk that priorities will be set arbitrarily.



### 2.3 Obstruction of the ratification of International Agreements

Similarly, the absence of the Assembly has obstructed the ratification of international agreements that have direct implications for Kosovo's economy, credibility, and inclusion in regional and European processes. These agreements are not merely formal documents, but represent concrete investments, opportunities for reform, and political messages to international partners that Kosovo is a serious actor.

#### BENEFITS FROM THE EU GROWTH PLAN ARE AT RISK

The non-approval of the Western Balkans Growth Plan, a major financial instrument of the European Union that is expected to bring Kosovo over 800 million euros by 2027,<sup>3</sup> is a clear indicator of the economic cost that Kosovo could suffer from the continuation of the institutional deadlock. The disbursement of funds under this instrument is conditional on the approval of the agreement with the European Commission by the Kosovo Assembly, which is being made impossible due to the institutional crisis.

So far, the incumbent government has stated that the reason why the agreement has not been ratified within the stipulated deadline is that the European Commission itself has not adhered to the deadlines it has set. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that the ability of the previous Legislature to ratify this agreement on time has been limited, considering the fact that the incumbent government had not managed to secure the necessary votes to ratify 6 other international agreements that have remained on hold for months in the Assembly.

<sup>2</sup> Kosova Press, "The budget review for 2025 is forgotten, the political impasse also endangers the one for 2026", May 13, 2025, available at <https://kosovapress.com/harrohet-rishikimi-i-buxhetit-per-vitin-2025-ngerci-politik-rrezikon-edhe-ate-per-2026-n>

<sup>3</sup> 882.6 Million Euros from the Growth Plan, a Pledge to Unblock the Parliament, May 24, 2025, available at <https://www.dukagjini.com/882-6-milione-euro-nga-plani-i-rritjes-peng-i-zhbllokimit-te-kuvendit/>







Although there is still no clear signal whether the EU will penalize Kosovo for the delays in ratifying the Growth Plan agreement, the situation is not without consequences. The lack of ratification not only delays the commencement of planned reforms, but also presents Kosovo as an unstable partner and risks undermining its credibility in integration processes and relations with the EU. Moreover, every day lost without unblocking this process is one day less to launch reforms that are part of the Growth Plan, including in areas such as the rule of law, competitiveness, sustainable development and regional integration.

**RISKS ARISING FROM NON-APPROVAL OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS**

During the previous legislature, six other international agreements remained unapproved for months due to the lack of a parliamentary majority. These agreements include, among others, a development program aimed at improving fiscal efficiency, increasing competitiveness and promoting sustainable development. Also, one of the agreements is related to the financing of the solar energy project at KEK, part of the efforts for a sustainable energy transition. Meanwhile, several other agreements relate to Kosovo's accession to international conventions




that facilitate legal cooperation in civil and commercial matters, thus strengthening the country's international legal infrastructure.

Beyond their individual value, these agreements are closely linked to key state priorities, from macro-fiscal stability and clean energy to the effective functioning of the justice system in line with international standards. Prolonged delays in their ratification not only delay the implementation of these reforms, but also undermine the pace of cooperation with international partners.

Moreover, if the ratification process continues to remain obstructed, it remains unclear whether the partner institutions that negotiated and signed these agreements will continue to stand behind them with the same level of commitment.

In October 2024, Kosovo signed two other agreements within the framework of the Berlin Process – the Common Regional Market (CRM) Action Plan and the agreement on improving access to higher education<sup>4</sup> – which also require ratification.



4 Radio Evropa e Lirë, "Western Balkans Leaders Sign New Agreements in Berlin", October 14, 2024, available at <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/lideret-e-ballkanit-perendimor-nenshkruajne-marreshje-te-reja-ne-berlin/33158156.html>





Both documents are part of the regional agenda for deeper cooperation and integration in key areas such as the economy, the labor market and education. Among them, the agreement on improving access to higher education requires ratification by the Kosovo Assembly to enter into force. As for the new CRM Action Plan, although it is not clear whether its implementation requires a ratification procedure, parliamentary oversight remains essential for both agreements.

Delays in concluding these processes not only delay planned reforms, but also risk sending a signal to partners that Kosovo does not have sufficient will to advance its international commitments.

### 2.4 Consequences in the implementation of constitutional deadlines and decisions

The delay in the constitution of the Assembly of Kosovo is directly affecting the institutions' ability to implement important decisions of the Constitutional Court, producing political, legal, financial and social consequences. Although the non-implementation of some of these decisions dates back to the previous legislature, the lack of effective decision-making is prolonging the institutional vacuum and risks creating a practice where delays in the implementation of the Constitution are perceived as acceptable for political reasons.

An illustrative case is the Constitutional Court's decision regarding the Law on Salaries in the Public Sector, which obliged the Parliament to undertake legal harmonization within a six-month period – a period that expired on August 24, 2024. Due to the non-functioning of the Parliament, this constitutional obligation still remains unfulfilled. As a result, thousands of public officials have warned to file lawsuits for reimbursement of unpaid allowances, which could bring a financial burden of up to 40 million euros to the state.

This precedent clearly illustrates that the failure to implement constitutional decisions – even when resulting from an institutional vacuum – sends dangerous signals regarding the functioning of the rule of law. This practice

risks becoming institutionalized as a political norm, undermining the separation of powers, democratic control and the credibility of the state, both at inside and outside the country.



# LACK OF PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OVER GOVERNMENT ACTIONS








**The failure to constitute the Assembly has allowed the outgoing government<sup>5</sup> to operate without institutional oversight, which it has continued to exploit by making political and financial decisions beyond the limits set by the Law on Government.**

**During the period March 27 – July 14, 2025, the Government approved 14 sub-legal acts and took 50 other decisions, with a total financial value of 71,502,712.93 euros.<sup>6</sup>**

However, they were not accompanied by public consultation or institutional debate. The absence of the Assembly has created an environment in which decision-making takes place without transparency and is prone to abuse. In the absence of parliamentary questions, interpellations, or reporting obligations, the outgoing government faces no oversight over the policies it pursues, the appointments it makes, or the way it manages public funds. This situation undermines the integrity of the decision-making process and paves the way for arbitrary practices in financial management, employment, and the administration of public assets.

Graph 1: Division of legal acts of the Government in office by type, for the period March 27 – July 14, 2025



5 See: Law No. 08/L-117 on the Government of the Republic of Kosovo, Chapter VIII, Article 28 End of term of the Government, Paragraph 1. The term of the Government shall end: 1.1. Upon the ending of the four-year term of the Assembly (in this case, 26 March 2025);


6 Government of the Republic of Kosovo: Meeting No. 264/2025; Meeting No. 263/2025; Meeting No. 262/2025; Meeting No. 261/2025; Meeting No. 260/2025; Meeting No. 258/2025 and Meeting No. 256/2025



### 3.1 The outgoing government exceeds the limitations set by the law on the Government

The Law on Government clearly stipulates that a government in office can only address necessary and previously planned issues,<sup>7</sup> but during the period March–July 2025, 64 acts were approved without public debate or parliamentary control.

One of the most serious deviations during this period was the phenomenon of officials simultaneously holding dual roles as both members of parliament and ministers.

 **This violation undermines the constitutional principle of separation of powers,<sup>8</sup> as the same individual acts concurrently as the supervisor (legislative) and the supervisee (executive). The Supreme Court, in a ruling dated July 7, 2025, and published on July 15<sup>9</sup> declared unlawful an administrative instruction issued by the Minister of Finance due to this conflict of interest. The Court confirmed that such acts, undertaken in violation of mandate incompatibility, are in breach of the Constitution.**

In addition, during this period, decisions were adopted to establish commissions, committees and boards,<sup>10</sup> as well

as eight appointments in high public positions. Although some of them have concluded procedures initiated before the end of the government's mandate, the fact that the same ones – with long-term effects on the public administration – were made by an incumbent government is problematic and risks being seen as a space for appointments with a political background.

### 3.2 Lack of oversight of developments in the dialogue with Serbia

The role of the Assembly in overseeing foreign policy is defined by the Constitution<sup>11</sup> and remains vital for the democratic legitimacy of the ongoing negotiations for the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, since 2011.

In the absence of a functional Parliament, the dialogue process with Serbia, since the end of the previous legislature's mandate, has continued without transparency and oversight. After the parliamentary elections, two meetings were held in Brussels: on June 2<sup>12</sup> and on June 10<sup>13</sup> 2025. In both cases, Kosovo was represented by the Deputy Prime Minister in office, Besnik Bislimi, despite the fact that the Government is on a limited mandate and without full legitimacy.

The meetings have addressed the implementation of existing agreements and, potentially, new steps in the dialogue process. But since there is no Assembly to oversee these commitments, the dialogue takes place outside basic democratic criteria such as transparency and accountability. This creates uncertainty about the validity and sustainability of the commitments made in this process.

7 See, Law No. 08/L-117 on the Government of the Republic of Kosovo, Article 31 Restrictions on the outgoing Government

8 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Article 4 clearly emphasizes the fact that Kosovo is a democratic Republic based on the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances between them, as defined by the Constitution.


9 Supreme Court of Kosovo, judgment in case PA. No.09/25- dated 7 July 2025.

10 During this period, the Government has decided to establish the Citizenship Complaints Commission with a three-year mandate, the appointment of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Human, Animal and Environmental Health "One Health" with a two-year mandate, as well as the appointment of candidates for the board of directors of the Regional Water Supply Company "Hidroregjioni Jugor" J.S.C. in Prizren for a three-year mandate.

11 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Article 65, points 9 and 12.

12 On June 2, Bislimi held a meeting with the new EU representative for the dialogue, Peter Sorensen, during which they discussed the dialogue process and the implementation of commitments. For more information, see: <https://kallxo.com/lajm/takimi-bislimi-sorensen-a-ka-mandat-zv-kryeministri-ne-detyre-te-zhvilloje-bisedime-ne-bruksel/>

13 On June 10, a trilateral meeting was held in Brussels to discuss the implementation of the Brussels Agreement. For more information, see: <https://indeksonline.net/sorenseni-flet-per-takimin-trepalesh-ne-bruksel/>







UNDERMINING  
THE INTEGRITY  
AND FUNCTIONING  
OF INDEPENDENT  
INSTITUTIONS AND  
PUBLIC BOARDS







Over 20 independent agencies and authorities operate in Kosovo that report directly to the Assembly<sup>14</sup>. These institutions cover various areas affecting the public interest, such as personal data protection, environment, energy, communications, pensions, cultural heritage, public procurement, human rights and the fight against corruption. In addition to their functional responsibilities, these institutions jointly administer (although operating with separate budgets) around 60 million euros of public budget per year, which makes parliamentary oversight not only important, but vital to ensure their transparency and independence.

The failure to constitute the Assembly has blocked this oversight mechanism. For months, institutions have operated without any institutional control, leaving their decision-making outside the public eye and without democratic debate. In fact, some boards and bodies remain dysfunctional due to the failure to replace members.

### 4.1. Annual reports of independent institutions – pending review

One of the most important functions of the Assembly is the review of the annual reports of independent institutions, which ensures accountability and effective oversight of their activities and finances. According to law and practice, reports are usually submitted by the end of March and should be reviewed in the following months. However, due to the failure to constitute the Assembly, the institutions have not been able to proceed with the submission of their reports for 2024, as there is no relevant body to receive and review them. This means that no institution has had the obligation to account for its work before the representatives of the citizens.


This situation has blocked normal accountability functions and has delayed the review of annual reports that should legally be handled by the Assembly. Moreover, even a part of the reports for 2023, which had been submitted and were in the process, were not approved by the previous legislature – adding to the burden of unreviewed documents that are accumulating in the absence of parliamentary functioning. The failure to adequately handle and address these reports negatively affects the planning and priorities of the institutions for the coming years, because they receive neither approval nor official remarks on their performance.

<sup>14</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Article 65, point 9.



Independent institutions	Abbreviation	Annual budget in Euro <sup>15</sup>
1 Privatization Agency of Kosovo	PAK	5,111,731.00
2 Kosovo Property Comparison and Verification Agency	KPCVA	2,933,439.00
3 Agency for the Prevention of Corruption	APC	1,099,235.00
4 Agency for the Management of Memorial Complexes	AMMC	6,310,000.00
5 Information and Privacy Agency	IPA	495,563.00
6 Free Legal Aid Agencys	FLAA	563,418.00
7 Regulatory Authority of Electronic and Postal Communications	RAEPC	1,636,914.00
8 Environmental Protection Agency	KEPA	2,639,311.00
9 Railway Regulatory Authority	RRA	436,599.00
10 Civil Aviation Authority	CAA	858,966.00
11 Radio Television of Kosovo	RTK	8,960,000.00
12 Kosovo Pension Savings Fund	KPSF	1,721,100.00
13 The Ombudsperson's Institution	OIK	1,451,622.00
14 Kosovo Council for Cultural Heritage	KCCH	364,366.00
15 Independent Oversight Board of the Civil Service of Kosovo	IOBCSK	612,381.00
16 Independent Commission for Mines and Minerals	ICMM	1,566,882.00

<sup>15</sup> LAW NO. 08/L-332 ON BUDGET ALLOCATIONS FOR THE BUDGET OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO FOR THE YEAR 2025 at <https://gzk.rks-gov.net/ActDetail.aspx?ActID=99639>







Independent institutions	Abbreviation	Annual budget in Euro <sup>15</sup>
17 Central Election Commission	CEC	22,327,635.00
18 Public Procurement Regulatory Commission	PPRC	882,455.00
19 Independent Media Commission	IMC	1,386,137.00
20 Procurement Review Body	PRB	539,193.00
21 Nation Audit Office	NAO	3,532,633.00
22 Energy Regulatory Office	ERO	1,148,610.00
23 Water Services Regulatory Authority	WSRA	504,426.00
Total		59,037,446.00 Euro

### 4.2. The risk of politicization and misuse within independent institutions and public boards

The failure to constitute the Assembly makes political interference in independent institutions and public boards easier. The appointment of acting or politically connected persons, outside of transparent and merit-based procedures, undermines the integrity of institutions and turns their independence into a formality. Without the Assembly to oversee and verify these appointments, the risk of degradation and capture of institutions is real.

The absence of institutional oversight also facilitates financial misuse. Large budgets and public procurement processes can be exploited in a clientelist manner, driven by narrow political interests rather than the public good. This increases the risk of substandard implementation and inadequate supervision. Public sector employment is also at risk of becoming a tool for political rewards, driven by internal party agendas rather than merit-based criteria.

The absence of the Assembly creates an institutional vacuum, leading to uncertainty regarding the reporting and oversight of agencies established by the Assembly itself. In the Assembly’s absence, these agencies are left without a body to which they are accountable for their performance — or lack thereof. Prolonged failure to constitute the Assembly may have irreparable consequences for these agencies, undermining their accountability and transparency. This institutional vacuum seriously harms the principle of separation of powers.




# CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The current political and institutional crisis resulting from the failure to constitute the Assembly of Kosovo poses a serious threat to the foundations of the constitutional order and the functioning of democracy. The violation of the constitutional deadline for constitution, the disregard for Constitutional Court decisions, and the continuation of governance by a caretaker government have created a situation in which the rule of law, institutional integrity, and democratic oversight have been significantly weakened.

The non-constitution of the Assembly has led to several concrete consequences:

- The separation and balance of powers have been undermined, with an outgoing government making political, financial, and staffing decisions beyond its mandate, without oversight and without public debate.
- Legislative processes and essential justice reforms have been blocked, including constitutional amendments related to the Vetting process, draft laws within the Justice Reform Package, and the Civil Code—thus hindering progress in the fight against corruption and the strengthening of the rule of law.
- The functioning of independent institutions and public boards has been paralyzed, leaving them without oversight, without completed appointments, and without review of their annual reports—thereby increasing the risk of mismanagement and political interference.
- Kosovo’s international image has been damaged, with tangible consequences in relation to the EU and other international partners, including delays in the ratification of agreements and the implementation of reforms linked to the EU Growth Plan and the Berlin Process.
- A culture of non-compliance with the Constitution and decisions of the Constitutional Court has been normalized, setting a dangerous precedent for the future and eroding public trust in state institutions.

This situation is not merely a temporary political crisis, but an institutional failure producing long-term consequences for good governance, institutional integrity, and Kosovo’s integration aspirations.








Based on the findings of this report, the Kosova Democratic Institute (KDI) offers the following recommendations in order to overcome the institutional deadlock and to prevent similar situations in the future—ensuring the rule of law and the principle of separation of powers:

- **Immediate implementation of the Constitutional Court’s decision on the constitution of the Assembly** should be treated as an absolute priority. Members of Parliament must assume direct responsibility for completing the process within the constitutional deadline and standards.
- **The newly constituted Assembly should prioritize the adoption of blocked legislation related to the justice sector and international agreements.**
- **Strengthen the legal framework for transitional periods.** The new Assembly should amend the relevant legislation to establish:
  - the obligation for ex post audits of decisions taken during the transitional period;
  - deadlines and procedures for the annulment of unlawful or arbitrary decisions,
  - Clear limitations and sanctions for any overreach of powers by an outgoing government.
- **The budget revision and the preparation of the 2026 state budget must be carried out by a duly constituted Assembly.**
- **Fulfilment of obligations stemming from Constitutional Court judgments.**
- **Audit of government actions during the deadlock period.** The NAO should include in its annual plan a dedicated audit of the decision-making processes during the transition, and parliamentary committees should hold hearings with the government to oversee the actions taken.





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