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# GENERAL ELECTIONS 2025

## MONITORING VIOLATIONS DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN ON SOCIAL MEDIA

### PRISHTINA, FEBRUARY 2025

# GENERAL ELECTIONS 2025

**MONITORING VIOLATIONS DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN ON SOCIAL MEDIA**

# Table of Contents

## Social networks with the most violations

**91.8%** Facebook

**4.6%** TikTok

**2.6%** Instagram

**1%** Youtube

## Nature of reported violations

**75.1%** Hate speech

**16.4%** Defamatory/ derogatory language

**2.7%** Misinformation

**2.5%** Other

**1.9%** Disinformation

**0.9%** Memes

**0.5%** Out-of-context information

# MAIN FINDINGS

## Political parties with the most violations

**43.2%** AAK-NISMA

**18.9%** VV

**14.8%** LDK

**11.8%** PDK

**10.7%** Coalition for Family

**0.6%** Serb List (Srpska Lista)

## The most targeted political parties

**81.8%** VV

**5.6%** PDK

**4.2%** AAK-NISMA

**4.1%** LDK

**0.1%** Coalition for Family

**0.1%** Serb List

**4.1%** Other

## Type of alleged violators

**80.6%** Third party

**11.4%** Individual candidate

**7.8%** Supporter of political party/ candidate

**0.3%** Political party

# 878
## VIOLATIONS

The monitoring unit has reported a total of 87 violations that occurred during the official election campaign periods for the general elections for the Assembly of Kosovo, held on February 9, 2025.

# Executive Summary

The election campaign on social media has been characterized by a harsh and unconstructive climate, where personal attacks and propaganda have taken the place of democratic debate. This approach has long-term impacts on citizens' perception of the electoral process and their trust in democratic institutions. For the future, a more regulated and supervised approach to political communication on digital platforms is needed, as well as a greater commitment by institutions to combat hate speech and misinformation in election campaigns.

In addition to efforts to gain electoral support, a large part of the campaign has focused on attacks on political opponents, creating a harsh and confrontational environment. Political entities are not only victims of attacks, but also active actors in the spread of confrontational narratives and violations of electoral ethics. With a significant percentage of violations recorded, it seems that a significant part of the electoral strategies has focused on discrediting opponents, rather than on promoting political programs and constructive ideas.

However, the majority of electoral violations were not committed directly by political entities or candidates, but by external actors, such as third parties and various supporters. Political actors may be using informal networks to avoid direct responsibility for problematic content. The dominance of violations by third parties associated with VV indicates a stronger presence of digital activism in favor of this political entity, but also raises concerns about the way political debate is taking place in the digital space. This situation highlights the need for stronger regulation and moderation of digital content during election campaigns, to guarantee a fairer and more balanced electoral process.

It is evident that negative campaigns and attacks on social media have been an important part of political strategies during the election campaign. The fact that individual candidates have been the most attacked, especially those of the VV, indicates a greater focus on discrediting certain political figures, rather than political entities as a whole. This trend raises concerns about the quality of political debate in digital spaces and the need for stronger measures to protect candidates from organized campaigns of disinformation and hate speech. It also highlights the major role that social media plays in shaping voter perceptions, creating a tense and often polarized political climate.

The campaign was characterized by a polarized climate, with widespread use of confrontational rhetoric and misinformation strategies. In this context, Facebook continues to be the dominant platform, becoming the main tool for political communication and, at the same time, for the dissemination of problematic content. However, the increasing influence of platforms such as TikTok and Instagram suggests a change of approach, especially for attracting young voters through shorter and more engaging audiovisual formats. Media literacy, oversight mechanisms and cooperation between social platforms and electoral institutions are essential to ensure that political debates take place in a more ethical and democratic environment. The main challenge remains the balance between freedom of expression and the protection of electoral processes from manipulation and disinformation.

Also, women in politics face high levels of derogatory language and offensive comments on social media, often being attacked not for their policies, but for personal aspects and gender stereotypes. The use of offensive language as

a means to discredit and discourage women from political engagement indicates a deep social problem, which requires a strong institutional response and public awareness. Only by denouncing these practices and creating a safer and more equal space for women in politics can a healthier and more inclusive political discourse be achieved.

# Introduction

The conduct of election campaigns has undergone a major transformation in the last decade, with social media now becoming the main arena for political communication. The general elections of 9 February 2025 in Kosovo reflected this trend, with political debates, promotions and clashes largely moving to platforms such as Facebook and TikTok. While these digital spaces offer extraordinary opportunities for interaction between voters and candidates, they have also created new challenges, such as the spread of disinformation, the use of derogatory language and increased political polarization.

This report aims to analyze violations identified during the election campaign on social media, including cases of hate speech, defamation, misinformation and strategies to discredit candidates. The monitoring related to social media was carried out by the organization Democracy for Development (D4D), as a member within the Democracy in Action (DnV) coalition, and includes a detailed observation of the nature of the violations, the parties involved and their impact on the electoral environment. Based on data collected from thousands of posts and comments on social networks, the report sheds light on how political actors and their supporters used digital platforms to influence voters' perceptions.

One of the most disturbing aspects of this campaign was the gender-based hate speech that was present in a large number of posts and comments, especially against female candidates. Many of them faced personal attacks and insults that were not related to their political platform or positions, but to their gender. This shows the ongoing challenges that women in politics face in an environment still dominated by gender stereotypes and prejudices.

The report contains detailed analyses of the political parties most targeted, the types of violations most common, and their impact on the overall campaign atmosphere. By addressing these issues, the report aims to create a fairer, more ethical, and more inclusive electoral environment, where political debate focuses more on ideas and less on personal attacks or denigrating propaganda.

# Methodology

This report is based on a detailed monitoring of the election campaign on social media, carried out by a team of five monitors. The monitoring took place throughout the campaign period and aimed to identify violations, analyze political narratives and assess their impact on public opinion.

## Scope of monitoring

The monitoring focused on content published by political parties and their candidates on major social media platforms, including:

- Facebook – the most used network for political campaigning and discussions

- TikTok – a rapidly growing platform, especially among young voters

- X (formerly Twitter ) – used primarily for political discussions and announcements

- YouTube – important channel for speeches, interviews and promotions

- Instagram – used for visual posts and interactions with voters

Monitors checked the official websites and accounts of political parties and their candidates on a daily basis, recording all posts made during the election campaign. In addition to analyzing the posts of political entities, the comments section was also monitored to identify interactions by third parties, including supporters, political opponents, and other social media users who were not directly involved in the election race.

## Using the Pikasa platform for data analysis

To ensure in-depth and standardized monitoring, the team used the Pikasa platform, an analytical tool that enables the automatic collection and processing of data from social networks. Pikasa helped in:

- Identifying and classifying negative, offensive or inappropriate comments

- Measuring interactions (likes, shares, comments) to understand the spread and impact of political content

- Categorizing violations by type (hate speech, defamation, disinformation, misinformation, etc.)

- Identifying the most targeted candidates and parties during the campaign

Using Pikasa, monitors analyzed a total of 86,576 articles shared on Facebook, including posts by parties, candidates, and comments from social media users.

## The process of data collection and analysis

All collected data is stored and organized in a central database, including:

- Posts and official statements of political parties and candidates

- Comments and reactions from third parties, including hate speech, defamation, and disinformation

- Type of violations identified during monitoring

- The platform where the post or comment was made

- The impact of content, based on the number of interactions generated

After collecting data, the monitoring team conducted an in-depth analysis to identify communication patterns, the most targeted subjects, and the impact of violations on the overall atmosphere of the campaign.

## Study limitations

This report focuses only on content published on social networks and does not include private communications or data available only to page administrators. Due to the rapid dynamics of social networks and the possibility of deleting some posts or comments, some cases may not have been included in the final analysis. However, the combination of manual monitoring by the DnV team and the use of Pikasa provide a comprehensive overview of the nature and extent of violations during the election campaign.

# Main findings

## General

The monitoring unit reported a total of 878 violations that occurred during the official campaign period for the general elections for the Assembly of Kosovo, held on 9 February 2025. A total of 28 political entities par-ticipated in these elections, which included 20 political parties, five coalitions, two civic initiatives and one inde-pendent candidate. These entities consisted of a total of 1,280 candidates for deputies. The official election cam-paign began on 11 January and lasted until 8 February.

CHART 1    Reported violations by period when they occurred

Week 1

Week 2

Week 3
43%

Week 4

29%

23%

5%

11–17
January

18–24
January

25–31
January

1–8
February

The first week of the election campaign (January 11-17) marked a low intensity of reported violations, accounting for 5% of the total violations that occurred during the entire election campaign. The quiet start of the campaign is mainly due to the slow mobilization of political entities and low public attention. The increase in violations continued during the second week (January 18-24), marking 23% of violations, to peak in the third week (January 25-31) with 43% of violations. During this week, the rhetoric of political parties had become harsher and mutual attacks were greater. The fourth week (February 1-8), or the closing week of the campaign, marked a decrease at 29%. In these elections, for the first time, the day of electoral silence was not applied, as a result of the changes made to the Law on General Elections. This may have affected the campaign dynamics, allowing for uninterrupted campaigning until election day.

CHART 2 | Proportion of reported violations by type of violation

Hate speech   75.1%

Defamatory/derogatory language   16.4%

Misinformation   2.7%

Other   2.5%

Disinformation   1.9%

Memes   0.9%

Out-of-context information   0.5%

Two-thirds of the reported violations concerned the use of hate speech, which accounted for the vast majority of cases (75.1%). This is a worrying trend in a campaign that focused on verbal attacks and polarization. In addition to hate speech, a significant portion of the violations were related to the use of defamatory and derogatory language (16.4%), indicating a harsh climate of communication between political actors. The spread of misinformation (2.7%) and disinformation (1.9%) also indicates a tendency to manipulate public opinion, with the aim of influencing voters' perceptions. An interesting, although less present, phenomenon was the use of memes (0.9%) and out-of-context information (0.5%) as tools to mislead or convey distorted messages. These figures show that alternative forms of political communication were also used to influence the electorate in indirect ways. In addition to the main categories, a small percentage of other violations (2.5%) were identified during the monitoring, which we assess as unethical. Overall, these data reflect a tense electoral campaign dominated by confrontational narratives, in which propaganda and personal attacks were more present than open and constructive debate.

CHART 3 | Proportion of reported violations by alleged violator



**80.6%** – **Third party**

**11.4%** – **Individual candidate**

**7.6%** – **Supporter of political party/candidate**

**0.3%** – **Political party**

**82%** – **VV**

**7.1%** – **PDK**

**5.4%** – **AAK-NISMA**

**4%** – **LDK**

**1.6%** – **Other**

Monitoring data show that the most frequent violations during the election campaign were committed by third parties, which represented 80.6% of the reported cases. This category includes actors outside the candidates and political parties themselves, such as informal organizations, influential individuals on social networks, anonymous pages, and various groups that support or attack certain political actors. This result shows that a large part of the harsh rhetoric and legal violations did not come directly from the political parties or candidates themselves, but from their external supporters.

In second place in terms of the number of violations reported are individual candidates with 11.4%, indicating that a small percentage of violations were committed directly by those running in the elections. Meanwhile, supporters of political parties or candidates account for 7.6% of cases, reflecting a lower presence of violations by political activists and sympathizers compared to third parties.

What is most striking is the fact that political parties themselves have the lowest percentage of reported violations, with only 0.3%, which suggests greater caution on their part to avoid being directly involved



CHART 4    Most targeted parties

80.6% – **Individual candidate**

11.4% – **Political Party**

7.6% – **Third party**

0.3% – **Supporter of political party/candidate**

78.7% – **VV**

9.8% – **AAK-NISMA**

5.9% – **PDK**

5.1% – **LDK**

0.4% – **Other**

in punishable acts, perhaps due to legal consequences and damage to public image.

Further analysis of third parties shows that the vast majority of violations in this category were committed by Vetëvendosje (VV) supporters, accounting for 82% of cases. This indicates a strong engagement by informal networks of supporters of this party in online political discourse, often using harsh language or aggressive tactics against political opponents.

In comparison, PDK supporters make up 7.1% of violations, while AAK-NISMA supporters accounted for 5.4% of cases. LDK had an even lower involvement, with 4% of violations, while supporters of other parties accounted for only 1.6% in this category. Fushata zgjedhore e këtij viti ka qenë e shënuar nga një nivel i lartë i tensioneve dhe shkeljeve të raportuara, të cilat kanë pasur ndikim të ndjeshëm në mbarëvajtjen e procesit zgjedhor. Të dhënat e paraqitura në grafikun e mësipërm tregojnë dy aspekte kryesore: partitë politike që janë shënjestruar më së shumti nga shkeljet dhe ato që kanë kryer numrin më të madh të shkeljeve. Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (VV) ka qenë partia më e shënjestruar gjatë fushatës, duke

përbërë 81.8% të rasteve të raportuara. Ky numër tregon një përqendrim të madh të sulmeve kundër kësaj partie, duke e bërë atë subjektin kryesor të përplasjeve politike në diskursin publik. Partitë tjera kanë qenë më pak objekt i sulmeve, Partia Demokratike e Kosovës (PDK), e cila ka përjetuar 5.6% të rasteve të raportuara, koalicioni AAK-NISMA (4.2%) dhe Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (LDK) ka pasur (4.1%). Subjektet e tjera kanë qenë relativisht më pak të ekspozuara ndaj sulmeve gjatë fushatës zgjedhore. Koalicioni për Familjen (0.1%) dhe Lista Serbe (0.1%) kanë qenë pothuajse të paprekura nga shkeljet e raportuara, duke treguar një interes më të ulët për sulme ndaj tyre nga kundërshtarët politikë.

Subjekti politik AAK-NISMA renditet i pari me më së shumti shkelje të raportuara, duke qenë përgjegjëse për 43.2% të tyre. Pas saj, VV zë vendin e dytë me 18.9%, pavarësisht se ka qenë subjekti më i shënjestruar nga sulmet gjatë fushatës. LDK renditet e treta me 14.8% të shkeljeve, pasuar nga PDK (11.8%) dhe Koalicioni për Familjen (10.7%) kanë pasur gjithashtu një pjesëmarrje të lartë në shkeljet e raportuara. Ndërkohë, Lista Serbe ka pasur ndikimin më të ulët në këtë aspekt, me vetëm 0.6% të rasteve të shkeljeve të regjistruara.

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**CHART 5** | Violators reported against targeted political parties



- 81.8% – VV
- 5.6% – PDK
- 4.2% – AAK-NISMA
- 4.1% – LDK
- 0.1% – Coalition for Family
- 0.1% – Serb List
- 4.1% – Other

The most targeted political parties

**43.2%** – **AAK-NISMA**

**18.9%** – **VV**

**14.8%** – **LDK**

**11.8%** – **PDK**

**10.7%** – **Coalition for Family**

**0.6%** – **Serb List**

**Political parties with the most violations**

This year's election campaign was marked by a high level of tensions and reported violations, which had a significant impact on the smooth running of the election process. The data presented in the chart above show two main aspects: the political parties that were most targeted by violations and those that committed the greatest number of violations. The Vetëvendosje Movement (VV) was the most targeted party during the campaign, accounting for 81.8% of reported cases. This number indicates a high concentration of attacks against this party, making it the main subject of political clashes in the public discourse. Other parties were less frequently targeted, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), which experienced 5.6% of reported cases, the AAK-NISMA coalition (4.2%) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) (4.1%). Other entities were relatively less exposed to attacks during the election campaign. The Coalition for Family (0.1%) and the Serb List (0.1%) have been almost unaffected by reported violations, showing a lower interest in attacking them by political opponents.

The political entity AAK-NISMA ranks first with the most reported violations, being responsible for 43.2% of them, followed by VV in second place with 18.9%, despite being the entity most targeted by attacks during the campaign. LDK ranks third with 14.8% of violations, followed by PDK (11.8%) and the Coalition for Family (10.7%) who also had a high share in reported violations. Meanwhile, the Serb List had the lowest impact in this regard, with only 0.6% of recorded violation cases..

CHART 6 | Proportion of violations by social networks

**Facebook** ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 91.8%

**TikTok** ▬▬ 4.6%

**Instagram** ▬ 2.6%

**Youtube** ▪ 1.0%

This year's election campaign has reflected a marked shift towards social media as the main space for political communication, public debate and, unfortunately, the spread of violations. To better understand this phenomenon, the monitoring team conducted detailed monitoring on some of the most used platforms, including Facebook, TikTok, YouTube, X (formerly Twitter ) and Instagram. The monitoring results clearly showed that Facebook is the platform where the majority of reported violations occurred, with 91.8% of them. This number proves that this platform continues to be the main tool for political debates, but also for the spread of harsh rhetoric, disinformation and hate speech. Being the most used social network in Kosovo, Facebook has provided a suitable ground for the distribution of content that has often crossed the boundaries of ethical and legal communication.

In second place, but by a significant margin, is TikTok with 4.6% of reported violations. This network, which is particularly popular with young people, has been used to spread political messages in shorter and more visually appealing formats. Meanwhile, Instagram and YouTube have had an even more limited impact, with 2.6% and 1% of reported violations, respectively. These platforms, although important for the distribution of audiovisual materials, have a more structured nature, making it more difficult for directly problematic content to spread to the same extent as on Facebook.

While other social networks are gaining ground, especially among young people, Facebook remains the epicenter of online political battle – an arena where democratic debate and misuse of digital space often go hand in hand.

CHART 7   Type of content through which violations were posted

**Comment** ████████████████████████████████ 80.1%

**Video** ████ 8.0%

**Post and photo** ███ 6.8%

**Written post** ███ 5.0%

**Story** █ 0.1%

The analysis of the content of the reported violations shows that comments on social networks are the dominant form of violations, representing 80.1% of cases. This shows that users are more likely to use the comments section to express hate speech, defamation or the spread of disinformation, often reacting to posts by politicians, media outlets or various public pages. In addition to comments, a significant part of the violations was spread through videos (8%), which were used as effective tools to amplify political messages or attack opponents. This category also includes fake videos for the purpose of manipulation or narratives that use visual elements to increase their impact. Posts accompanied by photos (6.8%) and simple written posts (5%) also contributed to the spread of problematic content, but to a lesser extent compared to comments. These posts are often used to build stable narratives or to shape public opinion on sensitive political topics. On the other hand, 'stories' account for only 0.1% of violations, indicating that this temporary form of content was not a widely used channel for violations during the election campaign.

## Political parties and candidates

The Law on General Elections, among the criteria for registration of political parties, also requires the signing of a statement by the party leader to respect and abide by the Political Party Code of Conduct.[1] The same criterion applies to certification to participate in the elections. While Chapter V of the law is dedicated to the Code of Conduct, which has the purpose of "establishing conditions under which the people of Kosovo may choose their representatives in free, fair and well-informed elections within a climate of democratic tolerance, peace, and respect for the rule of law".[2]

The Electoral Code clearly defines the responsibilities and limitations for political entities, candidates and their supporters during the election campaign.

All political parties and individuals involved in the electoral process are obliged to respect the provisions of this Code, while the Elections Complaints and Appeals Panel (ECAP) has the authority to review and sanction possible violations. Political entities are obliged to inform their members and supporters about the norms of conduct and to take measures to prevent violations. The use of hate speech, the publication of inciting or disinformation materials that may cause tensions and violence, is considered a serious violation and is subject to punitive measures by the relevant authorities.

This part of the report presents only some of the selected illustrative violations used by leaders, candidates or members of various political parties during the campaign.

### Vetëvendosje Movement

At a VV electoral rally in the Municipality of Vushtrri, which was distributed via video on the official website of this political entity, candidate for MP, Xhelal Sveçla, in his speech, calls some representatives of the opposition parties as

> **" some trash from the old parties."**



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1 Law on General Elections, Article 13, paragraph 4.5, available in the Official Gazette: https://gzk.rks-gov.net/ActDetail.aspx?ActID=77074
2 Ibid., Chapter V.

The other candidate for MP, Hajrullah Çeko, in a post on his Facebook profile, criticizing the Democratic League (Lidhja Demokratike) of Kosovo, distorts its name in pejorative terms such as

**Democratic Lassitude".**



Dimal Basha , who was on the list of candidates for MP of the VV, in a post on Facebook has insulted journalist Berat Buzhala, calling him a

**piece of sh***".**

The same insult has been repeated in comments by other users.

Blerim Gashani , who was part of the VV list from the Guxo party, has called

**Stanišićs"**

those who, according to him, are defending the LDK, although they used to attack it. The term "stanišićs" refers to Jovica Stanišić, the former head of the Serbian State Security Service, whom Albin Kurti has previously linked to Baton Haxhiu.

## Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK)

PDK candidate for deputy, Ardian Kastrati, in a post on Facebook, called the leader of the VV, Albin Kurti, a



> **communist ideological father".**

who should be "ousted" from power since, in his claim, he destroyed Kosovo. He accompanied this post with a photo of him containing his number on the list of candidates for deputy, and with a call to vote for him.



Kastrati also, in a video posted on his Facebook profile, called on VV supporters not to use offensive language. He asked them "not to

> **turn their mouths into a toilet",**

but to use only the argument."

Kastrati , who has been active in using insults against Albin Kurti, in another Facebook post shared a fragment from his appearance in a television debate on TëVë1. In this post, he concluded that Albin Kurti "is afraid of prison" and that this is the reason why he is

> **making pathetic speeches like a fool"**

during the election campaign.

Hisen Berisha, the PDK candidate for MP, has shared an earlier video from his speech at a session of the Kosovo Assembly. In this post, he stated that the attack on the Iber Lepenc Canal is a coordinated act between Prime Minister Albin Kurti and the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic.



Betim Gjoshi, the PDK candidate for deputy, in a live appearance on Kanal 10 (Channel 10), which was shared on YouTube, calls the analyst in the studio "the last blind man", telling him "you, Blerim, are

## ❝ the last blind man"

who is trying to defend Albin Kurti ,...and I'm not saying this in the sense of eyesight».

## Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)



LDK candidate for MP, Berat Rukiqi, in a Facebook post, responding to the insulting and threatening language that Prime Minister Kurti had used against LDK, said of VV that

## ❝ all you do is shouts and screams at the podium/ you are only good for shouting at the podium".

Offensive language was also used in comments by third parties calling VV as "thugs".

Meanwhile, candidate Ardian Olluri from LDK, in a Facebook post, said that Albin Kurti

## ❝ desecrated all its institutions"

until it came to power."

## Alliance for the Future of Kosovo - NISMA





Zafir Berisha, who was part of the AAK–NISMA list of MPs, in a Facebook post called VV "the regime's infantiles", using derogatory language. While, in another post, criticizing Minister Rizvanolli 's meetings in Davos, he wrote that

> **they have either gone loony, or they are fit to be taken to Burdushi[3]",**

something is not quite right with them".

## Coalition for the Family



Candidate for MP of the Coalition for Family, Petrit Mulaku, in a Facebook post, used exclusionary language towards the LGBTQ+ community, presenting the existence and rights of this community as a

> **danger"**

to the state and national identity.

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3 Burdushi is the nickname of Hysri Peqani, a person known in Kosovo as a "folk doctor" or "fortune teller". He claimed to have the ability to cure diseases and predict the future, but was involved in several court cases and was arrested for fraud and illegal activities. His name is often used ironically or derisively to mean someone who believes in conspiracy theories or who is not trustworthy.

**Asdren Bytyqi's Post**

Asdren Bytyqi
January 26 at 4:23 PM

Koalicioni për Familje dënohet prapë me 5000 euro nga PZAP, duke kufizuar lirinë e shprehjes në këtë garë politike. Fjalët "i themi jo martesës burrë me burrë e gru me gru" , "kemi të bëjmë me ideologji" dhe "na detyrojnë të heshtim përballë degjenerimit" kushtuan 5000 euro. Fjala "marre dhe turp" na kushtuan 4500 euro. A e kuptoni pse është kaq e domosdoshme mbështetja e Koalicionit për Familje? Nëse doni që Kosova të mos bëhet si Amsterdami, plot ngjyra lara-lara, garancia e vetme jemi ne.

The other candidate from this coalition, Asdren Bytyqi, opposing the ECAP's decision to fine this political entity, in a Facebook post used derogatory language towards the LGBTQ+ community, writing that

> **we say no to marriage between a man and a man and a woman and a woman "**

...and that

> **we are forced to remain silent in the face of degeneration".**

## New Democratic Initiative of Kosovo (IRDK)



**Fridon Lala's Post**

Fridon Lala
January 13

Kryeministri ma i mirë i punëtori për ne, kryeministri ma i dashuri për ju, po e vlerëson punën e IRDK-së e lartëson angazhimin e të parit tonë, shokut e bashkëpunëtorit tim, kryetarit Elbert Krasniqi.

Po e kuptoj shqetësimin e ish-deputetit pazargji për vizitën e KM. Ai ka ndërruar 4 kryeministra se ndryshëm në 4 mandate, e me asnjërin nuk e ka pasë mundësinë me u ulë në tavolinë.

Lëre që nuk ka arritë të krijojë imazh të mirë për veten, përpos imazhit të pazargjiut, po ai për 4 mandate nuk arriti ta bind asnjë kryeministër ta vizitoj komunitetin, nuk arriti asnjëherë të krijojë kësi imazhi vlerësues për ne, siç e thotë i pari i vendit, KM Kurti.

Veton, të pata premtu që në momentin që vendosi të kyqem në politikë do të jetë fillimi i fundit tënd. Elberti të ka pensionuar politikisht. I vetmi "aktivitet politik" i yti tash e mbas është facebooku, se realisht ti nuk je as në garë, se IRDK është pakrahasimisht tjeter nivel me juve.

Kujdesu me menaxhu mirë dëshprimin. Sot të dëshproj Peja, dje të deshproj Gjakova, ku e bërë hapjen e fushatës në një kafiteri, e të cilën nuk po guxon as me e publiku prej dëshprimit.

Dëshprimi do të jetë i gjatë.

The candidate for MP on the IRDK list, Fridon Lala, has used derogatory language towards the leader of the PLE, Veton Berisha, calling him a

> **monger".**

In a post on Facebook, he wrote that

> **I understand the concern of the former monger MP about the PM's visit".**

## Gender-based violations

Many societies still view political roles as predominantly male, prejudicing women who aspire to high office. Instead of appreciating their ability, they are often asked to "stick to traditional professions" such as art, teaching or family care. Women are judged not only for their political decisions, but also for their appearance, voice, dress or personal life. Male politicians rarely face the same kind of personal attacks. Denigrating language and personal attacks are often used as strategies to discredit women in politics and create an environment where they feel unsafe or worthless. Platforms like Facebook allow people to offend without having to face direct confrontation, making attacks easier and more frequent.

To analyze the campaign environment on social media, DnV used the "Pikasa" platform to analyze comments about 61 women candidates who were featured in 86,576 articles shared on Facebook. The four women who received the most negative comments are:

1. Fitore Pacolli - Dalipi: 1,426 comments

2. Albulena Haxhiu: 1,057 comments

3. Hykmete Bajrami: 931 comments

4. Doarsa R. Kica: 756 comments





By comparing the number of articles mentioning the top three female candidates with the most hate speech, we see that in total interactions including articles and online posts **Hykmete Bajrami** with 76,827 comments, then **Fitore Pacolli – Dalipi** with 58,983 comments, and **Albulena Haxhiu** with 58,899 comments.

From monitoring cases of posts by female candidates for MPs and the negative comments they have received, we see denigrating language from third parties.



The candidate for deputy on the VV list, Fitore Pacolli - Dalipi, in a video published on her Facebook profile, was faced with offensive language in comments from third parties, calling her a

❝ **thug",**     ❝ **thief",**     ❝ **the wretch".**

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The other VV member, Edona Llaloshi has been the target of offensive comments on her Facebook profile. Being a singer by profession, the most frequent insults have been related to this, "suggesting" to her that she stick to her career in music and not get involved in politics. One commenter wrote,

❝ **you cow, just stick to music, because you're not cut out for politics".**

Other offensive comments were

❝ **how did you get tricked into joining VV, they gave you a lot of money, you fraudster"**

VV candidate, Arbërie Nagavci, in a video posted on her Facebook profile, has received negative comments. Among them, one page calls her

## " You are just a moderate illiterate woman".

Arbërie Nagavci is also the Minister of Education, Science, Technology and Innovation.

# Recommendations

**1** **For State and Regulatory Institutions**

**Elections Complaints and Appeals Panel (ECAP):**
- Strengthening oversight and punishment mechanisms for political entities and candidates who use hate speech and disinformation in the campaign.
- Applying categories to the database for violations during campaigns, publishing decisions in editable formats, and punishing repeat offenders.

**Central Election Commission (CEC):**
- Adopting clear guidelines on the behavior of political entities and candidates on social networks.

**Information and Privacy Agency (AIP):**
- Developing a legal framework to protect citizens from the misuse of personal data in election campaigns.
- Increased cooperation with social platforms to limit the spread of disinformation and orchestrated attacks.

**2** **For political entities and candidates**
- Drafting and implementing a Code of Ethics for Digital Campaigns to avoid the use of negative strategies and propaganda.
- Organizing training for candidates and their teams on the ethical use of social media.
- Establish an internal mechanism for reporting and addressing violations by party supporters.

**3** **For Civil Society Organizations and the Media**
- Developing media education campaigns to inform citizens about the dangers of disinformation and the impact of propaganda on elections.
- Creating fact-checking platforms where citizens can report and check questionable information during the campaign.
- Organizing public debates to promote a more constructive and informed discourse during elections.

# Appendix 1:
## Glossary of key terms

| | |
|---|---|
| **Hate speech** | Abusive or threatening speech or writing that expresses categorical prejudice against a particular group, especially on the basis of race, gender, religion, or sexual orientation |
| **Disinformation** | False information deliberately and often covertly spread (as by the planting of rumors) with the aim of influencing public opinion or obscuring the truth |
| **Misinformation** | Spreading false or misleading information, whether intentionally or unintentionally |
| **Out-of-context information** | When a piece of information or a statement is interpreted, used, or presented in a way that does not reflect its full or accurate meaning in the original context. This can happen intentionally or unintentionally and often leads to misunderstandings or misinterpretations. |
| **Defamatory/ derogatory language** | Any type of language, whether written or spoken, that is intended to belittle, damage the reputation of, or denigrate a person, group, or institution. |
| **Meme** | Entertaining or interesting photo, video, etc., that is widely spread on the internet |