

Addressing High-Level Corruption Cases with Social Impact in Kosovo

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The Kosova Democratic Institute is a branch of
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KDI's mission is to support the
development of participatory
democracy and the fight against
corruption by promoting transparency,
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For any comments, feedback, criticism, or suggestions, please contact us through the channels provided below:

Adress: Rr. Bajram Kelmendi, No. 239,
10000, Prishtina, Kosovo.
Tel.: +383 (0) 38 248 038
E-mail: info@kdi-kosova.org
Web: www.kdi-kosova.org
Author: Vullnet Bugaqku
Design: **envinion**

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INTRODUCTION

The fight against corruption remains one of the biggest challenges for the justice system in Kosovo. Despite ongoing efforts and legal reforms, high-level corruption cases continue to face procedural delays, weak indictments, and lenient sentencing policies—contributing to a widespread perception of institutional impunity.

This report provides a more detailed overview of the institutional handling of corruption cases in Kosovo, including their investigation, prosecution, and adjudication by the prosecution offices and the courts. At the center of the study are 30 of the most significant corruption cases, involving high-profile public figures and key state institutions.

The most prominent cases analyzed include Pronto, Hydropower Plants, Stenta 1, Land, Visas, Veterans, Treasury, Subsidies, State Reserves, as well as high-profile cases such as those involving Nagip Krasniqi and Minister Donika Gërvalla. These cases have highlighted systemic failures in prosecuting corruption and the institutional challenges that continue to make punishment difficult in practice.

Through the analysis of these cases—which form part of a developing database of corruption cases across the Western Balkans and Turkey, compiled by Transparency International—three main challenges have been identified that undermine the effectiveness of the justice system in combating corruption:

-  **Delays in judicial proceedings and the statute of limitations on cases;**
-  **Poor quality of indictments;**
-  **Lenient sentencing policies and the lack of criminal asset confiscation.**





DELAYS AND REACHING OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OF CORRUPTION CASES IN KOSOVA

In Kosovo, the adjudication of high-level corruption cases continues to be characterized by prolonged delays and numerous procedural irregularities, which often result in the expiration of the statute of limitations and the acquittal of senior officials accused of corruption and damage to the state budget. The lack of efficiency in the justice system, procedural delays, and poor-quality indictments directly contribute to this phenomenon, making accountability for corruption almost non-existent in practice.

The "Hydropower Plants" case – a classic failure of the system

One of the most glaring examples of delay and its consequences is the "Hydropower Plants" case, in which several former ministers from the Thaçi II Government – including Besim Beqaj, Mimoza Kusari-Lila, Dardan Gashi, and Nenad Rashiq – were accused of misconduct during the privatization process of several hydropower plants.

The alleged offense occurred on May 8, 2013,¹ and according to the applicable criminal legislation, the absolute statute of limitations for prosecution is ten years from the date of the offense.²

In this case, the statute of limitations expired on May 8, 2023, resulting in the termination of the process without any criminal sanctions, although the accused had already been acquitted shortly before the expiration.

Another aspect that highlights the inefficiency of the judicial system is the fact that 866 days after the first-instance acquittal, the Court of Appeals upheld the decision in March 2023—just a few months before the statute of limitations. This sluggish pace reflects systemic failures in concluding cases within the legally prescribed deadlines.

¹ Kallxo.com, March 13, 2023. Rasti Hidrocentralet: Gjyqi ndaj ish-ministrave të Qeverisë Thaçi 2 drejt parashkrimit absolut. Accessed November 27, 2024. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/rasti-hidrocentralet-gjyqi-ndaj-ish-ministrave-te-qeverise-thaci-2-drejt-parashkrimit-absolut>

² Criminal Code No. 06/L-074 of the Republic of Kosovo, Article 99.



The "Stenta 1" case – another case nearing statue of limitation

Another example in which the judicial system has risked allowing a major corruption case to expire is the "Stenta 1" case, involving former Minister of Health Ferid Agani and the Ministry's Secretary General, Gani Shabani. They were accused of violating the Public Procurement Law by unlawfully authorizing payments for patient treatment in private hospitals during the period 2011–2015.³

In this case, the State Prosecution filed an indictment on June 15, 2016, against Agani, Shabani, and 62 other individuals, accusing them of abuse of official position, bribery (both giving and receiving), and other criminal offenses. Due to the case's complexity, the indictment was divided into three parts on February 26, 2018:

- "Stenta 1" – involving Agani and Shabani;
- "Stenta 2" – involving over 40 doctors from public hospitals;
- "Stenta 3" – involving owners and doctors from private hospitals.

Although the indictment was filed in 2016, the Basic Court in Pristina issued an acquittal only on August 1, 2022, and the Court of Appeals upheld the decision on June 12, 2023. In total, the judicial process lasted eight years, and given that the alleged offenses occurred between 2011–2015, the full statute of limitations will take effect on December 31, 2025. This case serves as further proof of the justice system's lack of efficiency in prosecuting and adjudicating corruption.

The "Land" case – a "never-ending" court process

Among the longest and most complex corruption cases in Kosovo is the "Land" case, in which former PDK MP Azem Syla and 45 other individuals are accused. They face charges of organized crime, abuse of official position, money laundering, bribery, aggravated fraud, and causing damages to the state budget amounting to €30 million. Following the investigation and the case's handover from EULEX to domestic authorities (Special Prosecution of the Republic of Kosovo – SPRK), two indictments were filed: Land 1" – involving 22 defendants, including former MP Land 2" – involving 24 other defendants.

The indictment was filed in 2016, but after eight years, a first-instance verdict was finally issued.⁴ On December 26, 2024, the Basic Court in Pristina acquitted Azem Syla on all counts, while sentencing nine other defendants to a combined 39 years of imprisonment and imposing fines totaling €220,000.⁵ Although the trial officially began in

June 2019, three years after the initial hearing in 2016, the pace of proceedings has been extremely slow. For instance, during the period from November 2019 to February 2020, only eight hearings were held for the "Land 1" case. Furthermore, during the COVID-19 pandemic (2020–2022), due to constant changes in the panel of judges and restrictive measures, no hearings were held for nearly two years.

Even after the pandemic, delays persisted. In 2024, only two hearings were held, while nine were postponed. This highlights how, in large and complex cases, intentional delays or a lack of institutional capacity lead to justice system failures and undermine public trust in the judiciary.

³ Betimi për Drejtësi, Analytical Report: Integrity of the Justice System in the Fight against Corruption in Kosovo, December 2018, p. 30. <https://kli-ks.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/IKD-Raporti-SHQIP-FINAL.pdf>

⁴ Betimi për Drejtësi, Rasti Toka, April 18, 2022. Accessed November 29, 2024. <https://betimiperdrejtesi.com/rasti-toka-shembull-i-deshtimit-te-sistemit-te-drejtësisë-ne-luftën-kundër-korrupsionit-dhe-krimin-te-organizuar/>

⁵ Kallxo.com, December 26, 2024. Accessed March 14, 2025. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/rasti-toka-gjykata-merr-vendim-ndaj-azem-syla-dhe-te-tjereve/>



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DEFICIENT INDICTMENTS – A CRITICAL FACTOR IN THE FAILURE TO PROSECUTE CORRUPTION CASES

One of the main factors behind the failure to prosecute major corruption cases in Kosovo is the inadequate preparation of indictments by the State Prosecution. These deficiencies reflect systemic problems within the justice system and include:

- **Incorrect or imprecise classification of criminal offenses**, which are often altered during different phases of the proceedings;
- **Failure to accurately determine the financial damage** caused to the state budget;

- **Lack of strong evidence and legal arguments**, which frequently lead to acquittals;
- **Failure to propose asset confiscation** leaving room for proceeds gained from corruption to remain in the hands of the accused.

The “Pronto” case – a failed indictment that changed several times

The “Pronto” case is one of the clearest examples of a weak and unstable indictment. In this case, former MP Adem Grabovci and three others were initially accused of abuse of official duty. During the investigation phase, the charge was changed to influence-peddling, and later in court, the legal classification was again changed to a lesser offense – violation of the equal status of citizens in Kosovo.⁶

This constant shifting of the criminal charge reflects the absence of a solid legal foundation, making the case destined to fail. The indictment did not clearly identify the injured parties or quantify the financial damage caused, which led the court to acquit the accused due to lack of evidence.

⁶ Telegrafi.com. Prokuroria ngre aktakuzë ndaj Grabovcit, Beqajt, Pajazitit dhe të tjerëve lidhur me aferën Pronto. Accessed December 1, 2024. <https://telegrafi.com/prokuroria-ngrit-aktakuze-ndaj-grabovcit-beqajt-pajazitit-dhe-te-tjeteve-lidhur-aferen-pronto/>



The “Fake veterans” case – lack of evidence in an €88 million scandal

Another classic example of a weak indictment is the “False Veterans” case, in which former Prime Minister Agim Çeku and several other officials were accused of manipulating the KLA veterans’ lists,⁷ causing an estimated €88 million in damages to the state budget.

The court acquitted the defendants in the first instance because the Prosecution failed to provide convincing evidence proving the manipulation. Despite its enormous financial and political implications, the case could not lead to accountability due to the lack of an indictment built on irrefutable facts.

However, following the first-instance verdict, the State Prosecution appealed the decision, and the Court of

Appeals accepted the appeal, annulling the Basic Court’s acquittal and ordering a retrial of the case.

The Court of Appeals, in its decision dated April 22, 2022, noted procedural violations and misinterpretation of the facts by the Basic Court. The decision emphasized that although the prosecution had claimed there were 19,500 applications tied to the categorization of applicants, these applications were not administered as evidence — only the compiled list of 19,500 names was.⁸ The retrial is ongoing, with witness hearings in progress, and a final verdict is yet to be issued.

The “PTK” case – another failed indictment due to lack of evidence

Another case where the Prosecution failed to prepare a solid and well-founded indictment was that of Shyqeri Haxha, former director of PTK.

He was accused of signing a harmful contract on behalf of the Kosovo Post, but due to shortcomings in the indictment, the court found the charges unsubstantiated and acquitted him.

The “VISAS” case – indictments without evidence

A similar problem appeared in the case of Milaim Zeka, who was accused of defrauding citizens by promising EU visas. Due to a weak indictment, he was acquitted.

Likewise, in the Italian visa fraud case involving Ukë Rugova (son of former President Ibrahim Rugova) and former Minister Astrit Haraqija, the indictment was poorly constructed and unsupported by evidence, resulting in the acquittal of the defendants.

The “€53 MILLION” case – problems defining the damage

Another common flaw in indictments in Kosovo is the failure to accurately determine the financial damage to the state budget. This was evident in the case known as

“the €53 million case,” where former Minister Pal Lekaj and three other Ministry of Infrastructure officials were charged with abuse of official position.

⁷ Koha.net, September 2018. Kush janë të akuzuarit në rastin e veteranëve të rrejshëm. Accessed December 1, 2024. <https://www.koha.net/arberi/kush-jane-te-akuzuarit-ne-rastin-e-veteraneve-te-rrejshem>

⁸ Nacionale.com. Më në fund, më 16 dhjetor nis rigjykimi në rastin “Veteranët”. Accessed March 14, 2025. <https://nacionale.com/drejtesi/me-ne-fund-me-16-dhjetor-nis-rigjykimi-ne-rastin-veteranet>



Initially, the Prosecution claimed that the damage was €53 million, but following an expert review commissioned by the court, the actual amount was determined to be €38 million.⁹

After approximately three years of court proceedings, in January 2024, the Basic Court in Pristina issued a guilty verdict against former Minister Pal Lekaj, sentencing him to 3 years and 8 months in prison for authorizing the €53 million payment by the Kosovo Government to “Bechtel-Enka” for extending the deadline for completion of the ‘Arbën Xhaferi’ highway.¹⁰

He was also barred from holding public office in the public administration for 3 years and 6 months. In the same case, the former Secretary of the Ministry, Nebih Shatri, was sentenced to 1 year and 8 months; the Procurement Director, Besim Tahiri, to 1 year and 8 months; and Lekaj’s former advisor, Eset Berisha, to 3 years and 3 months.

The indictment was filed on February 4, 2022, charging the defendants with abuse of official position or authority. However, despite the first-instance conviction, the Court of Appeals, after reviewing the defense’s appeals in February 2025, annulled the verdict and ordered a retrial.¹¹

The “Treasury” case – a rare example of a succesful indictment

In contrast to the many failed cases, the “Treasury” case stands out as one of the few in which the Prosecution prepared a solid and evidence-based indictment.

In this case, Labinot Gruda and Kadri Shala were accused of stealing €2 million from the State Treasury.¹² dThe indictment included: Proper legal classification of the offenses (abuse of official duty, money laundering, unauthorized access to computer systems); A clear determination of financial damages; Strong supporting evidence, which led to the conviction of the accused.

The Appeals Court noted that the initial judgment lacked reasoning regarding the key elements that constitute the offense of abuse of official position. It further noted that the court failed to clarify which specific provisions of the Public Procurement Law were violated by the accused – Pal Lekaj, Eset Berisha, Nebih Shatri, and Besim Tahiri.

Additionally, the Court of Appeals stated that the Basic Court did not adequately explain whether the opinion of the supervising company “Hill International” was advisory or binding on the Ministry, and whether the company had the authority to determine the cost of the project delay.

This decision clearly reflects that in major corruption trials, there is a manifest lack of thorough investigation and adjudication, raising serious doubts about the seriousness with which these cases are treated by the Prosecution and the Courts.

This case demonstrates that when the Prosecution operates professionally and bases its work on solid evidence, it is possible to secure convictions for corruption and the confiscation of illicitly obtained assets.

9 Kallxo.com, April 22, 2024. Rasti 53 milionëshi: Marrëveshja kundërligjore. Accessed November 27, 2024. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/53-milioneshi-marrevesh-ja-kunderligjore/>

10 Gazeta Express, January 31, 2024. Pal Lekaj dënohet me 3 vjet e tetë muaj burg për 53 milionëshin. Accessed March 14, 2025. <https://www.gazetaexpress.com/pal-lekaj-denohet-me-3-vjet-e-tete-muaj-burg-per-53-milioneshin/>

11 Kallxo.com, February 27, 2025. Gjetjet e Gjykatës së Apelit për rastin Pal Lekaj. Accessed March 14, 2025 <https://kallxo.com/lajm/gjetjet-e-gjykates-se-apelit-lidhur-me-prishjen-e-vendimit-denues-te-gjykates-se-prishtines-ne-rastin-e-pal-lekajit-dhe-te-tjereve/>

12 Kallxo.com, June 22, 2023. Afera e 2 milionëshit: Apeli vërteton aktgjykimin dënues. Accessed November 27, 2024. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/afera-e-2-milione-shit-apeli-verteton-aktgjykimin-denues/>





LENIENT SENTENCING POLICY AND INEFFECTIVENESS IN CRIMINAL ASSET CONFISCATION IN CORRUPTION CASES

Lenient sentencing policy

Kosovo continues to struggle with inefficiency in the punishment of corruption, particularly when it comes to high-level public officials. In most high-profile cases, judicial proceedings either end in acquittals or, in the few instances where first-instance convictions are issued, these are often overturned by the Court of Appeals.¹³ This trend has contributed to a lenient sentencing policy, which not only discourages anti-corruption efforts but also reinforces the public perception that senior officials are untouchable by the law.

According to Kosovo's Criminal Code, the offense of abuse of official duty—where the financial damage to the state budget exceeds €5,000—is punishable by 6 months to 10 years in prison. However, in practice, imposed sentences have been significantly lighter than the legal maximum, creating a major discrepancy between the harm caused by corruption and the level of punishment for the perpetrators.

¹³ Kosovo Democratic Institute, Kultura e Pandëshkueshmërisë në Kosovë, December 2020. <https://kdi-kosova.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/01-KULTU-RA-E-PAND%C3%8BSHKUESHM%C3%8BRIS%C3%8B-N%C3%8B-KOSOV%C3%8B-ALB-04.pdf>.



Lenient sentences even for multimillion-euro damages

An analysis of key corruption cases reveals that even when convictions occur, courts have been extremely lenient in sentencing.¹⁴

"€53 million" case

Despite the financial damage to the state being assessed at €38 million, the sentence handed down was only 3 years in prison—an exceptionally low punishment given the scale of harm caused.

Meanwhile, several other major corruption cases—including **Hydropower Plants, Pronto, False Veterans, Visas, Stenta**, the case against former Minister **Nenad Rikallo**, and the case involving former MP **Milaim Zeka**—all ended in acquittals, reflecting a persistent lack of a firm and effective punitive policy.


One factor contributing to this leniency is the absence of consistent sentencing practices in corruption cases, which leads to judges not feeling compelled to impose harsher sentences on high-level officials accused of corruption.

The "Treasury" case – a rare exception

One of the few cases in which justice was enforced firmly and effectively is the **"Treasury"** case, where the theft of €2 million from the state budget was proven.

In this case, the Basic Court in Pristina issued severe sentences: Labinot Gruda and Kadri Shala were sentenced to a total of 21 years in prison and €41,500 in fines, while

the court also ordered the return of the stolen funds to the state budget. Moreover, the verdict was upheld by both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, setting a positive precedent for the handling of similar cases.



¹⁴ Kosovo Law Institute, June 2020. IKD: Politika e ndjekjes dhe dënimeve ndaj profilit të lartë të korrupsionit pa rezultate konkrete. Accessed December 2, 2024. <https://kli-ks.org/ikd-politika-e-ndjekjes-dhe-denimeve-ndaj-profil-it-te-larte-te-korrupsionit-pa-rezultate-konkrete-sistemi-i-drejtësisë-po-lufton-per-statistika-e-jo-korrupsionit/>



Ineffectiveness in criminal asset confiscation

One of the most serious issues in Kosovo's justice system is the significant gap between the temporary seizure and final confiscation of assets obtained through illegal means. According to data from the State Prosecution for 2023, a total of **€87,847,347** in assets were temporarily seized, but only **€23,594,635** were ultimately confiscated by final court decisions.¹⁵ This means that only 26.8% of seized assets are ultimately confiscated—demonstrating the system's inefficiency in completing these processes.

Additionally, a 2023 report by civil society organizations highlighted that of 20 indictments filed for corruption that year, only 4 included proposals for asset seizure and confiscation, while 16 did not include such proposals at all¹⁶. In other words, only 20% of corruption cases included requests for confiscation of illicit assets, whereas in 80% of the cases, the prosecution did not pursue asset confiscation at all.

This clearly shows that the State Prosecution has not placed sufficient emphasis on combating corruption through the mechanism of criminal confiscation.

EU reports on Kosovo

Reports from the European Union—particularly from the European Commission—have consistently emphasized that Kosovo needs to significantly improve corruption investigations, final judicial decisions, and the confiscation of illegally acquired assets.¹⁷ These reports also note that court proceedings tend to be lengthy, making asset confiscation a slow and often unsuccessful process.

As such, the lack of asset confiscation and the lenient sentencing policy render anti-corruption efforts ineffective. Even when convictions are secured, the failure to confiscate illicit assets allows the accused to retain the financial benefits of corruption—turning it into a low-risk, high-reward crime.

15 Kosovo Prosecutorial Council, Annual Work Report 2023. <https://prokuroria-rks.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Raporti-Vjetor-i-Punes-se-KPK-se-per-vitin-2023.pdf>

16 Koha.net, November 2019. IKD: Mbetet sfidë konfiskimi i pasurisë së paligjshme. Accessed November 27, 2024. <https://www.koha.net/arberi/ikd-mbetet-sfide-konfiskimi-i-pasurise-se-paligjshme>

17 Radio Free Europe, October 2024. KE vlerëson përparimin e Kosovës – Raporti i Progresit. Accessed November 29, 2024. <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/ke-vlereson-perparimin-e-kosoves-raporti-progresit-33179801.html>

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INSTITUTIONAL HANDLING OF CORRUPTION CASES DURING 2024

Throughout 2024, the prosecution and judicial processing of corruption cases in Kosovo continued at varying levels of intensity. During this period, a significant number of cases remained under investigation, while several indictments filed by the Special Prosecution moved into the trial phase.

The Vetëvendosje-led government has consistently declared its commitment to strengthening the justice

system and fighting corruption. However, the effectiveness of institutional handling of corruption cases remains debatable, given the ongoing delays, inconsistencies in indictments, and lenient sentencing practices.

Below is an overview of some of the most prominent corruption cases of the past year:

The “Martin Berishaj” case

One of the most controversial cases in recent years involves Kosovo’s Ambassador to Croatia, Martin Berishaj, who is under investigation for money laundering, tax evasion, and false declaration of assets.

How did the ‘scandal’ begin?

In April 2022, the online outlet Nacionale published a report about Berishaj’s alleged involvement in a major financial scandal in Slovenia.¹⁸

The scandal also implicated Slovenian Prime Minister Robert Golob, with whom Berishaj is suspected of conducting suspicious financial transactions.

According to Slovenian media, more than €600,000 in cash was allegedly transferred from Berishaj’s company, MB Consulting, registered in Montenegro, to Slovenian politicians.

Slovenian broadcaster Planet TV reported that over half a million euros in cash were transported from Montenegro to Slovenia, with Kosovo’s ambassador, Martin Berishaj, allegedly acting as the courier.¹⁹

Payments into Berishaj’s company account were reportedly made by a Serbian company, with monthly transfers ranging from €5,000 to €50,000.

18 Nacionale.com. Ekskluzive: Pas raportimit të Nacionale-s, Prokuroria nis hetimet ndaj Martin Berishajt. Accessed December 2, 2024. <https://nacionale.com/dreites/ekzkluzive-pas-raportimit-te-nacionales-prokuroria-nis-hetimet-ndaj-martin-berishajt>

19 Telegrafi.com. Martin Berishaj says that he has sued the Slovenian media that claimed to have discovered his scandal. Accessed December 3, 2024. <https://telegrafi.com/en/martin-berishaj-says-that-he-has-sued-the-slovenian-media-that-claimed-to-have-discovered-his-scandal/>



Kosovo’s Prosecution launched an investigation in September 2022,²⁰ but two years later, no indictment has been filed.

In April 2024, the Special Prosecution interviewed Berishaj and confirmed that the investigation is ongoing,²¹ but with

no visible progress. Due to its political sensitivity and cross-border nature, this case remains a test of the effectiveness of Kosovo’s justice institutions.

The “State reserves” case

This is one of the largest institutional corruption cases in Kosovo, involving officials from the Ministry of Industry, Entrepreneurship and Trade and a well-known businessman.

On August 18, 2023, the Special Prosecution raided the Ministry and the properties of businessman Ridvan Muharremi, arresting two ministry officials—Hafiz Gara and Leutrim Lipovica—as well as Muharremi himself.²²

The arrested officials are suspected of abuse of official position, manipulating procurement procedures for the purchase of state reserves, and bypassing open tendering by classifying contracts as “secret.”²³

The case is currently in the investigation phase, with an indictment expected from the Special Prosecution. Notably, during the investigation, the current Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, was summoned as a witness. Despite receiving three formal requests from the Prosecution and a court order from the Basic Court in Pristina, Kurti refused to testify at the Prosecutor’s Office, insisting that the testimony take place in his own office and according to his own schedule²⁴.

Such an action raises serious concerns about the rule of law in Kosovo and undermines the principle of equality before the law—a principle that must apply to all citizens regardless of their position.

20 Kallxo.com, September 2022. Prokuroria e Prishtinës fillon hetimet ndaj ambasadorit Berishaj. Accessed December 2, 2024. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/prokuroria-e-prishtines-fillon-hetimet-ndaj-ambasadorit-berishaj/>

21 Demokracia.com, March 2024. Prokuroria Speciale: Martin Berishaj është intervistuar për shpëlarje parash dhe shmangie nga tatimi. Accessed December 3, 2024. <https://demokracia.com/prokuroria-speciale-martin-berishaj-eshte-intervistuar-me-dyshimet-per-veprat-penale-shpelarja-e-parave-shmangia-nga-tatimi-dh/>

22 Betimi për Drejtësi, August 2024. Tre të arrestuar për dallavere me rezerva shtetërore – në pranga edhe Ridvan Muharremi. Accessed December 2, 2024. <https://betimiperdrejtesi.com/tre-te-arrestuar-per-dallavere-me-rezerva-shteterore-ne-pranga-edhe-ridvan-muharremi/>

23 Albanian Post, August 6, 2024. <https://albanianpost.com/irfan-lipovica-i-arrestuari-per-skandalin-me-grure-vaj-e-sheqer-i-perzgjedhur-per-tu-emeruar-kryeshef-ne-drejtorene-e-akreditimit-te-kosoves/>

24 Telegrafi.com, January 2025. Kurti tregon pse po refuzon të shkojë në Prokurorinë Speciale. Accessed March 14, 2025. <https://telegrafi.com/kurti-tregon-pse-po-refuzon-te-shkoje-ne-prokurorine-speciale>





The “Nagip Krasniqi – KEC” case

Another high-profile case in 2024 was that of the former CEO of the Kosovo Energy Corporation (KEK), Nagip Krasniqi, who is charged with abuse of official position and tax evasion.

The financial damage to Kosovo’s budget allegedly exceeds €3.2 million, in addition to €500,000 in evaded taxes.²⁵

Krasniqi is suspected of assisting the Slovenian company Holding Slovenske Elektrarne SE in securing contracts for electricity trading in violation of Kosovo’s energy laws.

According to the prosecution, between 2021 and 2023, Krasniqi approved purchases, signed contracts, and authorized transactions—even though he knew that trading electricity with this operator was not permitted without a license or official recognition by the Energy Regulatory Office (ERO).

The trial began in September 2024, and at the initial hearing, Krasniqi pleaded not guilty.²⁶

The “Donika Gërvalla” case

One of the most politically sensitive cases in 2024 involved the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Donika Gërvalla, who was accused of misreporting her assets.

Initially, media reported that Gërvalla—who also serves as Deputy Prime Minister—had failed to disclose all of her roles in both domestic and international institutions. Four months after these reports, the Anti-Corruption Agency announced that the case was still under review.

According to the allegations, Gërvalla did not declare her ownership of a business in Germany, her directorship in a foundation in Kosovo, or the assets of her husband and children.

In January 2023, the Prosecution filed an indictment against her for false declaration of assets, citing the undeclared business and public/private roles.²⁷ Gërvalla denied the charges, stating it was an administrative error, not a criminal offense.

later upheld this decision, sending the case to trial.²⁹ Following an initial hearing on March 7, 2024, a second hearing scheduled for November 7, 2024, was postponed due to Gërvalla’s absence.

The most controversial aspect of this case was the speed of the trial process. On November 19, 2024, the court conducted all trial proceedings in a single day³⁰ and issued its final decision, acquitting Gërvalla due to lack of evidence.

The court ruled that her actions constituted an administrative violation (misdemeanor) rather than a criminal offense.³¹

This decision raised questions about the courts’ selective approach to high-level officials and turned the case into one with significant political and public implications.

On June 19, 2024, the Basic Court in Pristina confirmed the indictment and rejected her request to dismiss the case.²⁸ The Court of Appeals

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CONCLUSIONS

This analysis has thoroughly examined how Kosovo’s judicial and prosecutorial systems have managed and addressed corruption cases, particularly in recent years. By compiling data, monitoring proceedings, and analyzing key cases, the report aims to serve as a tool for informing better policymaking, promoting transparency, improving investigations, and educating citizens on the impact and consequences of corruption. In doing so, it contributes to strengthening institutional accountability and reinforcing the rule of law in Kosovo.

The main focus of this analysis has been the monitoring, identification, and collection of data regarding the handling of corruption cases by the judiciary in Kosovo.

The analysis has highlighted deficiencies and weaknesses in the current prosecution and justice administration policies related to corruption cases, identifying three main problems that negatively affect the fight against corruption in Kosovo:

- **Delays in judicial proceedings**, which often result in the expiration of the statute of limitations and the release of defendants, regardless of the financial damage caused;
- **Fundamental flaws in indictments**, characterized by inaccurate classification of offenses, lack of strong evidence, and failure to quantify the financial damage, leaving room for acquittals;
- **Lenient sentencing policies**, where even in cases of conviction, the punishments are minimal compared to the damage caused, while in most major cases, verdicts result in acquittals or are overturned by the Court of Appeals.

Another major challenge is the **lack of effective criminal confiscation of assets acquired illegally**. Data shows that, despite temporary asset seizures, the majority of assets obtained through corruption are not ultimately confiscated—leaving economic crimes without real consequences and undermining efforts to recover losses caused to the state budget.

The importance of database publication and transparency in governance

This analysis, along with the corruption case database, aims to play a key role in enhancing transparency and public oversight of institutions. With open access to information, citizens, the media, and civil society organizations can closely monitor corruption cases and demand greater accountability from the relevant institutions.



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